

524 W. P. 90 Head Qrs. Dept. of the Pacific, Benecia, October 31, 1854  
John E. Wool, Major General. Forwards field returns and report of Bvt. Major Haller's operations in the Win-nass Indian country. (One enclosure)  
Rec. Dec. 8, 1854.

A-795 Dec. 8, 1854. Respectfully submitted to the Secretary of War, S. Cooper, adj. general. The within detailed operations exhibits much zeal and activity and receives the special commendation of this Dept. Jeffn. Davis., sec. of war. War. Dept. Dec. 10, 54.  
Printed. See. Senate Document No. 16, 2d Session, 33rd Congress.

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Head Quarters Department of the Pacific  
Benecia, October 31, 1854.

Sir:

I have the honor to forward herewith a copy of a field return to which is annexed the operations of Bvt. Major G.O. Haller against the Win-nass Indians.

I am sir, very respectfully

Yr' obt. servt. John E. Wool, Major General

Lieut. Col. L. Thomas

Asst. Adt. General

Head Quarters, Army, New York.

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(Form) Field returns of a battalion under the command of Brevet  
4th Infantry  
Major Granville of Haller, in the Win-asss country, on and near Boise  
River, O.T. during the month of September, 1854.

Present: Field and staff, total, aggregate 1.

3rd artillery aggregate 15

4th Infantry aggregate 29

Independent volunteers aggregate 39 total 77, total aggregate 84.

1 major, 1 assist. surgeon, 1 captain, 1 1st lieut. 2 2nd lieut

5 serbeants, 5 corporals, 58 privates.

Camped at Fort Boise, Snake country, O.T. 30th September, 1854.

Remarks: Det. of Com. L joined Sept. 29 at Fort Boise.

Det. of Comp. I and K.

Capt. Olney's joined Sept. 3d at Butter Creek.

History: The battalion was organized on the 29th August, on the 30th the infantry left Fort Dalles, on the 3rd Sept. Capt. Olney joined ~~the~~ with his company and reported for duty. On the 9th Bvt. Major Haller with an escort consisting of Lieut. Neal and 13 volunteers advanced to and reached Fort Boise on the 11th. On the 12th Lieut. Neal and 6 volunteers while conducting four unnamed prisoners to camp shot down three and wounded the fourth while attempting their escape. On the 13th the column arrived at Fort Boise having marched a distance variously estimated at from 320 to 350 miles. On the 15th the column proceeded to the Payette River. On the 16th scouted up the river and came across five lodges of the Win-nass murderers who seeing the dust the day before had abandoned everything leaving their salmon and packs undisturbed. The Indian Allies here recovered several packs of clothing, bed <sup>covers</sup> ~~blankets~~, etc. & taken from the ..... of the 20th of August. Continued the march and while encamping the scouts brought news of Indians whereupon a volunteer party, consisting of volunteers and regulars dashed off in pursuit and captured a family consisting of the father, mother \_ three children. This Indian proved to be a principal man or chief among the Win-nass Indians. Also captured horses. On the 17th the regulars in scouting, surprised a lodge killed two Win-nass, captured three women and horses and several packs of provisions. The volunteers this day scouted to the eastward. On the 20th crossed the mountains towards Boise River. At midnight advanced to attack at daylight reached a large camp of murderers on the Boise who having heard of our presence in the country had fled. On the 19th established camp 35 miles above ~~Boise~~ Fort Boise and



allowed the animals & troops to rest . On the 21st Lieut. Macfeely, Asst. Surgeon Suckley & a small party of regulars.... the river above trader for a permanent camp and met a Mr. John T. Jeffreys, ~~axxxxx~~ who was bringing up the rear of the immigrants followed by Indians of ~~xxxxx~~ whom he complained. Lt. Macfeely gave chase, capturing a horse, several blankets & saddles. Lieut. Neal and a party of volunteers sent out to support Lieut. Macfeely captured a squaw. On the 23rd the provisions were exhausted and the camp subsisted on the flesh of the captured horse. On the 25th the available (?) force ... the big canyon of Boise River 15 miles above. On the 26th commenced a retreat. On the 27th encamped at "Depot Spring" 6 miles from Fort Boise. On the 29th proceeded to Fort Boise and encamped on the west side of Snake River. Lieut Day (?) 3rd Art. with provision train \_ escort joined bringing orders to return the whole command on the close of immigration. Accordingly on the 30th the troops continued the march and encamped and encamped on Malheur River.

Commissioned Officers Present & absent accounted by name:

1-Granville O. Haller, Bvt. Maj. Co. I. 4th Infy. commanding battalion.

2-George Suckley, assistant U.S. surgeon.

3-Nathan Olney, captain, Ind. volunteers.

4-Orlando Neal, 1st lieut. Ind. volunteers.

5-Edward H. Day, 2nd lieut. Co. L. 3rd Art.

6-Robert Macfeely, 2nd lieut. Co. K. 4th Infy.

7-J.A. Stoley (o could be a, but doubtful) 2nd lieut. Indl Vol.

A true copy, E.D. Townsend, asst. Adj. Genl. Head Quarters

Dept. of the Pacific, Benecia, October 30, 1854.

Council Ground, Camp Stevens

Walla Walla Valley

May 22nd, 1855

Major Gen. John E. Wool,  
Commdg. Pacific Division,  
Vancouver, W.T.

Sir:

I feel it my duty to call your attention to the urgent necessity of establishing the greater portion of the troops now stationed on the Columbia River, at or near this place, and to express the opinion that as regards the Indian service depots, only ~~xxx~~ are required at Vancouver and the Dalles.

Its location to overcome hostile Indians and to protect the several emigrant routes is remarkably central. It is in direct connection with the great South Pass Emigrant Trail and with all the Northern Trails explored by me from the sources of the Missouri. Roads run to the Nez Perce country, to the Yakima country, and over the Cascades to the Sound and to Colville.

It is the central point of Indians within two to three hundred miles. Of the Yakimas, the Klickatats, the Pischouses, the Okinikanes, the Walla Wallas, the Indians below the Walla Walla to the Dalles, the Cayuses, the Palouses, the Spokanes, the Colville Indians, the Coeur d'Alene, the Nez Perces and the Snakes numbering some nine thousand.

at the Dalles

No force is required for the protection against Indians in that neighborhood. A garrison here would have the effect of a garrison at the Dalles for the Indians in that quarter.

The Indians however are generally friendly except the Cayuses and the Snakes.

The Cayuses have been so insolent since measures have been taken to call the ~~tribes~~ neighboring tribes into council, to purchase their



lands, and place them on reservations , that the settlers have been put in jeopardy, and Supt. Palmer and myself have made a requisition on Major Rains to send a military force to this place to be present at the Council, a requisition with which he has promptly complied.

Our camp is in the heart of the country claimed by the Cayuses.

The Snakes have been unusually insolent of late, having seized cattle within the last few weeks at the very gates of Fort Boise and their insolence has incited the Cayuses to assume a tone of defiance towards the settlers and the authorities. The Snakes ought to be summarially punished for the outrages of the past year.

A post at this place to be effective should consist mainly of Cavalry, and should be garrisoned by a force large enough to furnish moveable columns for the protection of emigrant trails during the season of emigration. A wagon road is to be built by authority of Congress from Fort Benton near the Falls of the Missouri to this Valley which will open an emigrant trail from the states bordering the great Lakes. The moveable columns besides protecting the trail might be called on to furnish one or two small detachments to occupy under canvass (sic) temporary stations such as Grand Ronde and Fort Boise where Indians at certain seasons xx resort in great numbers for the purpose of trade.

I am aware the force at your disposal is inadequate to accomplish all that is desired. But I respectfully urge that such force as you have at your disposal will be most effective at this point.

This valley affords great facilities for the maintenance of a military post. Inexhaustible grass summer and winter @@@@ abundance of timber and fuel, beef for a large force through the year; already settlers enough in the vicinity to furnish vegetables , lands adapted to the cereals and to grass, to furnish bread and forage after the first year. There is an admirable site for a post near the mill of Whitman's Mission, some seven miles above the site now occupied

by Bomford, Brooke and Noble . (sic)

As you are now in the country I will urge that you visit this valley and judge for your own observation and investigation of its character as a military center of operations. It can be supplied by wagon trains through nearly the entire year from the Dalles.

The experience of the Cayuse War in connection with the outrages of the Snakes last year and the present insolent deportment of both has impressed me with the conviction that unless some step of the kind I have indicated be taken, a contingency may arise which will involve the country in even greater expenditures than those for which Congress has recently made appropriations.

I am, very respectfully

Your obt. servt.

Signed: Isaac I. Stevens

Gov & Supt. Ind. Affairs

Wash. Terry.

I certify the above to be a true and correct copy of a letter on file in this office.

R.M. Walker

Military Clerk

Executive Officer

Olympia Nov. 21,, 1856.

1/602 W 1856.



Walla Walla Valley, W.T. 14th Nov. /55

Coming to Ft. Walla Walla

Sir:

The young men on the Umatilla river are disposed for war and John Whitford and Tolman (?) instigate them to it. The chiefs of that place, at least, the majority of them, are on the balance and have not yet decided, but Stockolah and Welaptolick with their people have joined the Cayuses and are doing all in their power to have them join against the Americans. The chiefs of this valley have remained firm and will not join the unfriendly Indians--their conduct since Mr. Olney's departure hence has been praiseworthy and did all they could to prevent Mr. Brooks house from being burned and pillaged but in vain. The chief, Howlish Wampool, did it at the risk of his life.

Two Nez Perce chiefs now here, Joseph & Red Wolf, desire to say

tell you that all their tribex is for peace, that they will suffer no hostile Indians to remain among them. In justice to Pierre (Walla Walla Chief) I beg to say that he stuck to his charge until forced away by Serpent Jaune and his people; but not until they had robbed three different times out of the fort. He was alone and of course could not prevent them. As affairs stand it is my humble opinion that it might not be prudent to make your way hither with the force at your command, 150 men. I have requested the bearers of this dispatch to proceed to the Dalles with the letters to the respective addresses of Messrs Olney & Nobles and placed as we are, a mere handful of men, destitute of ammunition, the sooner assistance is tendered to us the better for Serpent ~~Indians~~ Jaune daily threatens to burn our house and to kill us, and he is not the only ~~the~~ enemy we have to dread.

In haste, I remain sir

Respectfully your obt Humble svt.

(Signed) Narcisse Raymond

To the commander in charge

Coming to Ft. Walla Walla



To His Excellency

Dalles of the Columbia, O.T.

Gov. George G. Curry

November 19, 1855

Governor of Oregon Territory

Sir:

In obedience to your order I took up the line of march for the Yakima country on the 3d instant. On the evening of the 7th I arrived with my command in company with the U.S. troops, under command of Maj. Rains on the southern edge of the Yakima valley and encamped on the Simcoe river. On the morning of the 8th I detailed Capt. Cornelius with twenty-five men from his company "C" and ten men from each of the other companies and directed the Capt. with his command consisting of about ~~sixty-nine~~ sixty-nine men to follow up the valley for the purpose of reconnoitering the enemy and to drive in their stock if found in that direction.

4th The remainder of the command proceeded over the valley in the direction of the main Yakima on which I encamped for the night with U.S. troops in advance. During the day the rear, comprising Capt. ~~Cornelius~~ Hembree's Co. E and Capt. Hayden's Co G found it necessary to encamp some four miles in the rear of the main body by reason of the inability of a sick man, who was carried on a litter, to proceed further. My command was thus separated into three detachments. Shortly after I had formed my camp ~~near~~ Maj. Rains then about two miles in advance dispatched to me an express with information that he had discovered the Indians on the bank of the river opposite his command. Immediately I ordered out Capt. Bennett, with about forty of his company and about twenty four Co C under Lieut Conner and with them proceeded up the river to where I found the U.S. troops engaged in firing for the purpose of dislodging some Indians who occupied the brush bordering the other (sic) on the eastern side of the river. After a slight delay in



finding a ford we succeeded in crossing, the Indians in the meantime retreating to a high hill. We pursued them charging up the hill, the Indians firing at us a few shots during our ascent, and then deserting their positions. We gave them pursuit over very difficult grounds but were compelled to relinquish our efforts to come up with them as their fresh horses were were (sic) much superior to our own. Lt. Sheridan of the U.S. Army with some twenty dragoons, together with a few other persons XX promptly followed us over the river and up the hill. The enemy continued their retreat to the summit of a mountain, immediately to the northeast of the hill, while we retraced our course to the crossing of the river XXX but found it too deep and rapid. In the attempt unfortunately two of the U.S. troops were drowned. We retired to our camp after dark where we were presently joined by Capt. Cornelius and his detachment. The capt. reported that he had been engaged by a superior force of the enemy for the last half of the afternoon, that two of his party were severely wounded and one slightly and that several

X

[on inserted sheet X were slightly detained in finding the ford but XXX the infantry had attempted to cross ]  
of his horses were injured during the engagement. The conduct of Capt. Cornelius and the men under his command was highly creditable to themselves. They doubtless inflicted considerable injury upon the enemy and brought into camp two head of cattle they had captured and retained during the fight.

On the morning of the 9th we moved in direction of the rap in the range of hills through which the Yakima , and are known as the "Two Buttes," Capt. Cornelius, Hembree and Bennett with their respective companies proceeded in advance and rapidly drove the Indians from the plains and the brush which skirted the river to the position they had previously attempted to fortify on the buttes. A



sergeant was sent back for the howitzers to dislodge them, as the main butte was too steep for horses to scale. Lieut. Piper and Day of the artillery came promptly upon the ground and fired a few shots but such was the elevated position of the enemy that the shells could not be thrown to reach them. The whole command in due time having arrived an encampment was formed at the base of the buttes. Major Haller and Capt. Auger with their companies and a large detachment from the volunteers nobly charged up the hills. The enemy with their accustomed prudence expended a considerable amount of ammunition at a very respectable distance at this force, and quickly fled down the opposite side. At dark our fires were blazing upon the summit of the butte which the Indians had occupied but an hour before. The position the enemy had selected was a strong one. They numbered about 300. With but little resolution they might have maintained their stronghold against our whole force, but it was wrested from them without the slightest injury to the assailants. During the night the enemy occupied the butte but with diminished strength. In the morning they were driven off. Capt. Hemre of Co. D and two companies of Infantry under Capt. Walling and Russell. This time however the enemy were less fortunate as two of their number were killed at the base of the hill. I had detailed Maj. Armstrong with the company of Capt. Hayden and a portion of Company E under Lt. Hannas (?) to pass through the gorge and deploy to the left under the butte, so as to surround and cut off the retreat of the enemy. Owing to some inexplicable mistake, this detachment did not follow the maj. but charged up the river, leaving a gap for the enemy to escape. During this day detached parties scoured the plains in various directions having slight skirmishes with Indians and at night drove into camp on the Atanham, considerable stock. This night our encampment was two miles east of the mission. As the Indians had evidently abandoned that section of the country,



Maj. Rains was apprehensive they had congregated in the neighborhood of Natches [crossed out] and [Nisches [inserted] pass to attack Capt. Maloney's command which was believed to be approaching the Yakima country through that pass.

At the earnest ~~request~~ insistence of Maj. Rains, on the morning of the 11th with 250 men of my command together with Lt. Sheridan's ~~a~~ detachment of dragoons I proceeded in the direction of the Natches Pass to ~~effect~~ afford such assistance as Capt. Maloney might require against the large body of hostile Indians supposed to have concentrated in that direction to oppose the entrance of that command ~~into~~ into the valley. On the , I attained (sic) the point where the road diverges . A violent snow storm which had continued throughout our march precluding further advance in the direction of the pass, I returned to the mission after an absence of three days and there found Maj. Rains with his command. During my march to the pass several caches were discovered and destroyed. Several caches had likewise been found in the vicinity of the mission. These contained a variety of articles such as vegetables, produce, lead, old guns, numerous gunsmith tools etc. With sundry papers discovered in the mission building was a letter written by the priest Pandosey for Kamiacan, the head chief of the Yakima tribe, addressed to the officers in command of the troop, a copy of which is communicated with this report. There was also found an account book kept by this priest Pandosy which is now in the custody of Maj. Rains. This book contains daily entries of Pandosy's transactions with the Indians and largely demonstrates the indisputable fact that he has furnished the Indians with large quantities of ammunition and leaving it a matter of uncertainty whether gospel or gunpowder was his principal stock in trade. The priest had abandoned the mission but it gave unmistakable evidence of being cared for and attended to during his absence by some Yakima



Indian parishioners. Such articles as were suitable were used by both the U.S. troops and volunteers. The building, which was pole and mud hut, was accidentally burned.

On the 15th we removed from the snow to the Simcoe valley. A house and other property of Kamiakin was burned on the same day by the volunteers. On the night of the 16th we encamped on Maj. Haller's battle ground. For the five previous days we had been in from eight to ten inches of snow. The ~~examined~~ were compelled to keep our horses tied up through the long and cold night in consequence of which they were much broken down and enfeebled. Many of them had become so much reduced that we were compelled to shoot them, rather than abandon them to fall into the hands of the enemy. The <sup>maps</sup> ~~map~~ of the country which had been furnished me, proved utterly worthless and only calculated to mislead. To add to our embarrassment for the ten prior days we were obliged to transfer on litters several sick and wounded men thus imposing a great impediment to our movements. In view of these facts on the evening of the 15 I called a council of officers at which it was unanimously determined it was all important to my command to hasten as rapidly as possible to the Dalles of the Columbia. This was deemed the most prudent course to adopt as the necessary delay in transporting the sick and wounded of the command would exhaust all our substance long before we could attain the "alla Walla country. Besides the strong probability of not obtaining supplies at that point and of not being able to cross the Columbia in the exhausted condition of our animals would not warrant the undertaking.

On the night of the 17th my command as well as that of Maj. Rains encamped in the snow of the Simcoe mountains where I was joined by Capt. Wilson's command consisting of his company and that of Capt. Conoyer. Through Capt. Wilson I received your general orders directing my command to proceed to "alla Walla from the Yakima



by way of the north side Columbia river (sic) On the reception of this order. I directed the captain of the different companies to report the number of horses and men of each company in condition to perform the march. As you will observe by the accompanying ~~papers~~ copies of reports, it was ascertained to be impracticable to comply with the order. I therefore continued the line of march for the Dalles where I arrived this evening, leaving the command encamped on the Klickitat river, twenty four miles distant where good grass is obtained.

It is proper to observe that not an Indian was seen in the Yakima country by my command for five days previous to leaving there. The heavy fall of snow had covered their trail, rendering it impassable to ascertain the direction in which the enemy had fled; but from what evidence I could gather, I am satisfied they have, with their stock, gone to Priest Rapids, or some other point still higher up the Columbia. Their early unmistakable knowledge of our march from this point afforded ample time for the main body, with their stock to remove so far from the Yakima valley that our jaded horses could not possibly overtake them in their flight or reach that part of the country to which they have betaken themselves. I am satisfied the resistance offered by their force at the pass of the Two Buttes was merely for the purpose of gaining a little more time to accomplish the remote removal from the Yakima country, of small scattered portions of their stock.

We have hunted and dispersed them wherever they could be found. We have taken some of their stock principally wild mares and colts about one hundred head of which were shot by my orders as they were perfectly useless to our men and could not be guarded at night without mounting guard with the whole company at once, for that purpose.



The few cattle which have been found were also wild and have been killed for the subsistence of the command.

My cooperation with Maj. Rains in command of the U.S. troops has been of the most cordial character.

The officers of the command have on all occasions evinced the most friendly feeling toward the volunteers and appear solely animated with the hopes of success for our common cause. They have afforded us every assistance in their power.

We returned from the Yakima by the trail on which Maj. Haller effected his retreat. I took some pains to examine the position which he had occupied in his defence and saw ample evidence of his having been surrounded by the enemy in very good force. The only matter of surprise is that he escaped with a single man--The courage and intrepidity displayed by the major and his command is worthy of the highest commendation.

We experienced great difficulty in crossing the Simcoe mountains by reason of the great accumulation of snow.

By reference to the enclosed copy of Capt. Wilson's report you will observe that he encountered similar obstacles before meeting us. And I am now fully satisfied that these obstacles in addition to the broken down condition of our animals will preclude the possibility of any portion of the command returning to the Yakima valley this winter.

I learned on my arrival here this evening that an express has arrived from the upper country. You will learn from the enclosed copy of letters of Maj. Chinn and Raymond, the condition of affairs in that region. I shall dispatch within the next 48 hours under command of Capt. Wilson, companies A, I and K amounting to about 180 men to reinforce Maj. Chinn. The other five companies will require some time to recruit their animals.

Very respectfully etc.

J. W. Nesmith. Col. commanding O.M.V.



(Two Puttes)

Expedition letters, from this mileage can be deduced, also perhaps "location" of goods referred to by Sheridan as destroyed

Click Melander

Headquarters, Columbia River District Fort Vancouver, W.T. January 4, 1856

Sir:

The Yakima Expedition left Camp No 1 on the 31st Oct and marched only 4 miles that day. We left Camp No. 2 next morning and 4 miles further, arriving at Camp No. 3 at or before 12 o'clock M when we remained that day giving ample time for all our wild and stray animals to be found and brought up.

At this last place after night you came and informed me that all the packers had banded together refusing to stand guard and the animals and I authorized you to discharge them and employ soldiers. It was impractical in the dark to collect the stray animals which I had directed to be picketed which was done but imperfectly and I believe fear was the cause of their conduct and thought from your remarks that an attempt to (misapprehensible) to them there, but about 8 miles from the post of Fort Dalles could cause them to dissent, subsequently after advancing further I notified you that I would then compel them and you informed me that it was unsatisfactory as they had come to terms.

Our camping ground next day according to our guide McCoy (McCay) being 16 miles off and finding from the above night that our whole force would be delayed going as per plan of campaign to the relief of troops and Captain Maloney who might be fighting an enemy overwhelming in numbers, I determined to march with such companies as were ready so as to reach the ground and our camp before night leaving the Dragoons and (2) companies to bring up the rear as the packers found their animals.



## 2-Twin Buttes Expedition Letters

We arrived at Camp No. 4 sometime before sunset but without our baggage as that with the pack train and troops in rear to my surprise did not come up until late in the night on account of the neglect of the packers as reported, not getting in time the animals strayed away.

I had a chain of sentinels put around the animals which came with us and at night they were picketed but those which came, contrary to my orders were suffered to loose and the consequence was the Indians captured as per affidavit 24 horses and 5 mules. Your clerk, M. Blanshaw (hard to decipher) from much experience thinks our loss smaller than usual on such marches, that may be so yet in the present case the packers ~~wax~~ were to blame and should not have gone off "scott free;" when I called upon you for an explanation.

As you have paid these men however and it is too late now to remit I have come to the conclusion to sign the rolls.

Very Respectfully, your Obedt. Servant

G.I. Rains, Major 4th Infantry

1st Lieut R. Macfeely 4th Infy

Late AA Qm to the Yakima Expedition. Present.



252 1856. Report of Lieut. Col. James K. Kelly relative to the manner and causes of the capture and death of Peu Peu Mox Mox, chief of the Walla Walla Indians. 5/68 O. Aug. 20/58

Salem, January 15, 1856

To His Excellency,

George L. Curry, Gov. of Oregon

Dear Sir:

In compliance with your request I beg leave to submit the following statement of facts to correct a wrong impression prevailing in the minds of many persons respecting the capture and death of Peu-Beu -Mox-Mox the late chief of the Walla Walla tribe of Indians. This erroneous impression I have reason to believe has been caused by unfounded rumors put in circulation by an officer of the United States Army at Fort Vancouver. For what purpose these untrue reports were made you can conjecture as well as I.

In my dispatch of the 8th ultimo I briefly gave the reason why Peu Peu Mox Mox and his companions were put to death; and in my report of the 18th December 1855 I stated how they were captured by the volunteers. As those statements were very brief, I now deem it proper to make your acquaintance with all the facts connected with this affair. I have already reported to you how, by a forced night march from the Umatilla to Fort Walla, directly across the hills, my command arrived in the vicinity of the hostile Indians before they were aware of our presence. On the morning of the 5th December I divided my force, sending Maj. Chinn with about one hundred and twenty five men to escort the baggage and pack trains to the mouth of the Touchet River. With the remainder I started in a north easterly direction so as to strike the Touchet about fifteen miles from its junction with the Walla Walla, supposing that Peu Peu Mox Mox and his warriors were encamped on that stream. About two o'clock in the afternoon as we ~~proceeded~~ were proceeding towards and within three miles of the hostile village, that chieftan with about seventy or eighty armed



warriors made his appearance approaching towards us. An order was at once given to attack them, but as we moved rapidly up I observed six or seven Indians a short distance in advance of their main body bearing a white flag. Halting my command I went where they were in company with Hon. Nathan Olney, Indian agent, the interpreter and three or four others. One of these Indians was the chief, Peu Peu Mox Mox, who asked why we had come armed into this country, and was told that we had come to chastise him and his people for the wrongs they had done to the whites. He said he desired peace, that he did not wish to fight, and that he had done us no wrong. I then recapitulated the wrongs of which he had been guilty telling him that he pillaged and destroyed Fort Walla Walla, seized the U.S. property left there by Gov. Stevens, pillaged and burned the houses of Brooks, Bumford & Noble & McKay and drove off (sic) the cattle of the settlers in Walla Walla valley. At first he denied having done these things, but after some further conversation said these acts were done by his young men and that he could not restrain them. I told him that we had the evidence of Howlish Wampoo, a friendly Cayuse chief that Peu Peu Mox Mox, with his own hands, had distributed the goods when Fort Walla Walla was pillaged and that he had laid out a pile of blankets to be given to the Cayuses when they would join him in the war. To this he made no reply but said he would make his people restore the goods taken by them, so far as they could be restored and pay for the balance. I stated to him that this would not be sufficient. That in addition he should make his people surrender their arms and ammunition, give us cattle for beef and horses to remount my command so that we might pursue the other hostile Indians who were leagued with him. To these terms he assented and said he would come on the morrow and comply with them by delivering up his arms etc. Being well convinced that ~~only~~ he only desired time to remove



his people and that he would not return if permitted to go, I told him that we came to wage war against him, and that he could not return without exposing his villages to an immediate attack, as I had no faith whatever in his promises to come back. I observed to him that if his promises of reparation were made in good faith he could well come and remain with us until they were fulfilled. I then directed the interpreter to state distinctly to him that he might go away under his flag of truce if he choose, but that if he did so we would without delay commence an attack upon his villages-that if on the other hand he and his six followers would consent to remain and fulfil the terms of his proposed treaty his tribe would not be molested. To save his people from attack he reluctantly consented to remain as a hostage for the fulfillment of his promises, saying that the next morning he would go with us to his village and make all right/ He ~~moreover~~ moreover assured me that none of his people would remove during the night. I then placed a guard around him and his six men. At his request we started to go towards his village to get some beef cattle for food, while his seventy or eighty warriors were marching along with us unmolested. We had gone but about half a mile when I observed that he was leading us into a deep and rugged ravine through which the Touché flowed and in which his village was situated. Upon consultation it was deemed advisable not to venture into the ravine so late in the evening, least we should be surprised by an ambuscade. I ordered the command to march back about two miles to a more secure and open place where we encamped. At night Peu Neu Mox Mox asked permission to send back one of his six men to apprise his people of the terms of the proposed treaty and that they would be expected to fulfil it. This permission was granted and one of them left but did not return as he promised to do. On the morning of the 6th Dec. I went up with my command to the Indian village



and found it entirely deserted and everything removed. This removal had been made during the night as appeared by the rain and snow that had fallen late in the evening. None of the Indians could be seen except those who were on the distant hills, armed and watching our movements. A flag of truce was passed several times between us and every effort made to induce the Indians to conform to the terms of the treaty proposed by their chieftain. All ~~this~~ however was unavailing. After waiting until about two o'clock P.M. and seeing no hope of coming to any terms I marched down to the mouth of the Touchet where Maj. Chinn had camped, taking Peu Peu Mox Mox and his five remaining companions with me. That night one of these men attempted to escape but after running about hundred yards he fell, was seized and brought back. To secure them I ordered all to be tied. At day light on the morning of the 7th they were untied and I then told Peu Peu Mox Mox that I considered he had acted in bad faith towards me. That we had refrained from making an attack upon his people, when we had them in our power, solely upon the condition that he and his companions should remain with us until his promises were fulfilled and that now his people refused to fulfil them, and that he and his men wished to escape. I informed him that the next time either one of them should attempt to run away he would be slain. Early this morning the Indians appeared in considerable force on the hills about half a mile from our camp, all armed and mounted. I then had no apprehensions of an attack and leisurely prepared to march to Whitman's station. The advance guard and one or two companies had moved out on the plain when the Indians commenced firing on some of the men engaged in driving up some beef cattle. The fire was returned and a general fight ensued. The ~~enemies~~ enemy were rapidly driven before us for about ten miles along the Walla Walla until we reached the farm house of La Rogue when they were reinforced



and made a stand. Peu Peu Mox Mox and his companions were in the mean time close guarded and brought up to our camp at La Roque's. All this time they were exceedingly restless and uneasy. At the latter place as I was passing from the right to the left wing of the regiment I went by where the prisoners were. The sergeant of the guard said to me that they were greatly excited while the battle was raging and that he feared they would escape while the men were out in the field. I told him to tie them all and if they resisted or attempted to escape to kill them. I then rode on and when about two hundred yards distant heard the report of fire arms at the place where the prisoners were. I did not stop but passed on to where the left wing was engaged with the enemy and was shortly afterwards informed that when my order to tie the prisoners was about being carried into effect, they resisted, one of them having drawing a concealed knife from his coat sleeve with which he wounded Sergt. Maj. Miller in the arm. Peu Peu Mox Mox attempted to wrest a gun from the hands of one of our men when he was knocked down with the butt of a rifle and put to death, as were also all the other prisoners who attempted to escape except one a Nez Perce youth who made no resistance and who was tied.

I regretted the necessity of putting these men to death, as I was in hopes that they could have been made useful in prosecuting the war against the other hostile tribes. But I am well satisfied that the guard was fully justified in taking away their lives in their efforts to escape.

Very Respectfully, your obt. servt.

James K. Kelly, Lieut. Col.

Comd. 1 regt. O.M. V.