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INVESTIGATION OF THE AMMUNITION SHORTAGES IN THE ARMED SERVICES

LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

INTERIM REPORT

OF THE

PREPAREDNESS SUBCOMMITTEE NO. 2

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES

UNITED STATES SENATE

UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF

S. Res. 86

83d Congress

Respectfully,

MARGARET CHASE SMITH,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Ammunition Shortages.



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LETTER OF SUBMITTAL

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,
May 23, 1953.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: There is submitted herewith an interim report on the shortages of ammunition in the armed services. This constitutes a report on the findings of the committee, based on testimony and written reports which the committee has received. Thus far our inquiry has been concentrated on the ammunition situation as it affected the Korean war and the Army's responsibility for production and supply of ammunition.

As directed by the resolution adopted March 12, 1953, by the full committee, the subcommittee will inquire into the world-wide ammunition situation and determine the ammunition position of the other services.

It is pointed out that this investigation is not complete and it is the purpose of this committee to make specific and constructive recommendations at a later date to insure that this country is never again placed in the dangerous position which this report describes.

Respectfully,

MARGARET CHASE SMITH,
Chairman, Subcommittee on Ammunition Shortages.

INVESTIGATION OF THE AMMUNITION SHORTAGES IN THE ARMED SERVICES

INTRODUCTION

On March 5, 6, and 10, 1953, Gen. James Van Fleet testified before the Armed Services Committee on the question of shortages of ammunition in Korea. The nature of his testimony was so startling that on March 12, 1953, the Senate Armed Services Committee adopted the following resolution:

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In pursuance of the resolution of the Armed Services Committee, an organization meeting of the subcommittee was held on March 19, 1953, at which time it was decided to limit the inquiry of the subcommittee to the geographical area of Korea, and to the Army's responsibility in supplying adequate ammunition for our Armed Forces and those of our allies engaged in that conflict.

Throughout the hearings the subcommittee has endeavored to limit the inquiry to this twofold objective. Testimony has been received as to conditions in other parts of the world, as well as the adequacy of ammunition supplies available to the other branches of our armed services.

BACKGROUND

Since the outbreak of the Korean war there have been recurrent evidences that American fighting men in the field were not being adequately supplied with ammunition. Members of Congress have received correspondence from soldiers and from relatives of soldiers complaining of the rationing of ammunition.

INVESTIGATION OF THE AMMUNITION SHORTAGES IN THE ARMED SERVICES

INTRODUCTION

On March 5, 6, and 10, 1953, Gen. James Van Fleet testified before the Armed Services Committee on the question of shortages of ammunition in Korea. The nature of his testimony was so startling that on March 12, 1953, the Senate Armed Services Committee adopted the following resolution:

Whereas Gen. James A. Van Fleet has testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee substantially as follows:

- (a) That during the period of his command in Korea, extending over a period of 22 months, there have been serious and at times critical shortages of ammunition;
- (b) That he reported almost daily the existence of such shortages;
- (c) That the shortages of ammunition substantially restricted the action of our troops and endangered our defense lines;
- (d) That when he left Korea the supplies of ammunition were improving but shortages still existed; and

Whereas the officials of the Army Department have unanimously testified that defense appropriations for ammunition, as promptly made by Congress upon request since the beginning of the Korean war, have been adequate; be it

Resolved by this committee, That it is our judgment that the statements above referred to by General Van Fleet have been fully substantiated by the testimony before the committee; and

Resolved further, That the chairman appoint a subcommittee of five for the purpose of continuing this investigation and reporting to the committee the officials and conditions responsible for this situation of ammunition shortages in our services wherever they may exist and making such other recommendations as the subcommittee may deem helpful and advisable and at the same time require regular reports from the Defense Department as to the progress being made in producing ammunition in adequate supplies.

In pursuance of the resolution of the Armed Services Committee, an organization meeting of the subcommittee was held on March 19, 1953, at which time it was decided to limit the inquiry of the subcommittee to the geographical area of Korea, and to the Army's responsibility in supplying adequate ammunition for our Armed Forces and those of our allies engaged in that conflict.

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BACKGROUND

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On innumerable occasions Members of Congress have contacted the Department of Defense, and have asked for and received reports. For a period of almost 2 years these reports from the Defense Department and the Department of the Army have shown that a problem existed. At the same time, the reports usually stated that the problem was understood and was being rectified as expeditiously as possible.

In April 1952, Senator Lyndon Johnson of Texas, chairman of the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, wrote to Secretary Pace of the Army on this subject. The replies which he received admitted that there was rationing of ammunition in Korea, and explained that this rationing was due to production and other difficulties. There was assurance given that this ammunition shortage problem was one which was recognized and was being met. The Secretary of the Army, Mr. Pace, further stated that critical ammunition would be produced in quantities in the fiscal year 1953.

By the fall of 1952, evidence had accumulated which indicated that the situation had not improved to the degree which might have been reasonably expected. It was, therefore, quite natural that the Armed Services Committee should request General Van Fleet to testify concerning the problem, upon his return to the United States from Korea.

TESTIMONY

During the hearings held before this subcommittee, the following witnesses have appeared in the order named:

Gen. James A. Van Fleet, United States Army (retired)
 Lt. Gen. Edward N. Almond, United States Army (retired)
 Mr. Robert A. Lovett, former Secretary of Defense
 The Honorable W. J. McNeil, Assistant Secretary of Defense and Comptroller of the Department of Defense
 Mr. Frank Pace, Jr., former Secretary of the Army
 Mr. Archibald Stevens Alexander, former Under Secretary of the Army
 The Honorable Robert T. Stevens, Secretary of the Army
 Lt. Gen. George H. Decker, Comptroller of the Army
 Maj. Gen. William O. Reeder, United States Army (retired)
 Lt. Gen. Williston B. Palmer, Assistant Chief of Staff, G-4, Department of the Army
 Lt. Gen. T. B. Larkin, United States Army (retired)
 Maj. Gen. E. L. Ford, Chief of Ordnance, Department of the Army
 Col. J. B. Medaris, special assistant to the Chief of Ordnance
 Gen. J. Lawton Collins, Chief of Staff, Department of the Army

In addition to the public testimony, the subcommittee has examined a large amount of classified material which has been obtained from the Department of Defense and other agencies of the Government which have been concerned with the problem.

In the preparation of the subcommittee report, this classified data has been of great assistance as background material. One of the primary concerns of this subcommittee has been to make available to the public all pertinent testimony and data bearing on the question except that which would adversely affect the security of the United States. In some instances there may appear to be unresolved questions in the public testimony. These have been cleared up to the committee's satisfaction in the classified or executive record.

The subcommittee set out to determine:

- (1) What ammunition, if any, was in short supply?
- (2) When was it in short supply?
- (3) Why was it in short supply?
- (4) What was the effect, if any, of the ammunition shortage?

It would be misleading and irresponsible for this committee to suggest that it had received unanimous agreement from all of the witnesses on all pertinent points of the matters being investigated.

This was not the case. There were many divergent views and opinions as to the actual conditions, the responsibility for those conditions, and the effects of those conditions.

Beginning on March 19, 1953, and continuing through April 20, 1953, this subcommittee held open and executive hearings. At the conclusion thereof, the committee calmly and objectively reviewed the testimony and other available material.

THE NATURE AND EXTENT OF THE SHORTAGE OF AMMUNITION AND WHEN IT EXISTED

The record which this committee has gathered is clear that the following items of ammunition were in short supply during the Korean war: 4.2-inch mortar, 60-millimeter mortar, 81-millimeter mortar, 105-millimeter howitzer, 155-millimeter howitzer, and hand grenade. Although it has been pointed out that these are but a small number of the items of ammunition which a modern army uses in war, it should be stated that these are some of the most important rounds. They are basic rounds, and because they are, they were in great demand and our supplies ran low.

There is no disagreement among the witnesses that at the beginning of the Korean war we had vast, though somewhat unbalanced, stocks of ammunition, and among these stocks were quantities of the items listed above. Our early shortages came about, in large measure, because we did not have the supplies in the right place at the right time.

Some of the items had deteriorated since World War II and had to be reworked. Some of the rounds were of such a nature that they could not be readily stored. This was particularly true in the case of the smoke and illuminating types of ammunition.

In addition to shortages of smoke and illuminating rounds, which developed early in the war, there were shortages of a new type of bazooka ammunition. From time to time the needs became so critical that ammunition had to be air-lifted from Japan into Korea. In the case of the bazooka ammunition, it had to be flown from the United States to Korea.

As the Korean war progressed, it became apparent that we were depleting our stockpile of the rounds which we have mentioned above. The exact date on which these rounds became so critical that they had to be rationed is not certain. General Van Fleet stated that they were in short supply during the entire 22 months he was in Korea. Subsequent witnesses told us that rationing was not put into effect until September 1951.

In commenting on the period of time prior to September the witnesses did not agree as to the existence of a shortage or whether there was rationing in effect. It seems logical to assume that if the shortage became so acute as to warrant rationing in September 1951, the shortage must have existed before, and Washington recognized that shortage much later.

There arises an incredible line of testimony, namely, that by rumor or by accident, some people at the Pentagon suddenly awakened to the apparent truth that we were running out of ammunition, and that we

were not producing any appreciable quantity of new ammunition. Mr. Lovett, in his testimony before the committee stated:

The first real knowledge—and "knowledge" is a strong word for it because the first inkling, I think, was in the form of a rumor—came about in the very last part of September 1951 or the early part of October. My impression is that it was very early in October.

Military planners have always been able to compute needs in the future. There is a study which is known as logistics, a slide-rule calculation which enables the military planner to compute his rate of use of an item, by day, week, or month. He compares the present rate of expenditures with the amount on hand. With this information, he can compute that he will be out of ammunition by a certain day. This is the practice of the corner grocer in keeping goods on his shelves.

Somehow the people in the Pentagon did not compute correctly, or if they did, those in authority were so poor at basic arithmetic as to completely miss the point of the figures. We were told by almost all of the witnesses that the alarm went off in the Pentagon in September and October 1951. At this time, all personnel knew that we were running dangerously low in ammunition, and that we were not producing any appreciable amount of ammunition to replace that which we had used.

The problem was recognized at this date. It remained a problem and became a more serious one in November and December of 1952. It was so severe, finally, Mr. Lovett wrote a personal letter to General Clark to secure first-hand facts from the Far East Command and Korea.

One area of information should be cleared in this report, "Where did the shortage exist?" This is an important point. General Collins stated that the man at the front was never out of ammunition.

In a sense General Van Fleet agreed with General Collins' statement. He stated that the man at the gun always had in his possession what is known as a basic load. This is the amount of ammunition which can be carried with the weapon to its position.

General Van Fleet made the further point that has not been refuted, that the man at the gun must not only have ammunition, but he must be allowed to shoot it. He stated:

That basic load is always in the hands of the troops. As they shoot it, it is replaced. We do not run into an actual shortage of ammunition at the guns or with a man * * *. However, you must be in trouble in order to shoot.

In its simplest terms, this was rationing. The shortages, which all agreed existed, must have been at the various supply points behind the man at the gun. General Van Fleet said that there were times when these supply points were down to zero in certain rounds.

There can be no question that there was a shortage of ammunition. We are not impressed by any reasoning which says that the man behind the gun was not affected; it was the man behind the man behind the gun who knew of the shortage.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

There are many terms which have been used in these hearings which should be understood to gain a more comprehensive appreciation of the magnitude of the problem. This is a war. We should define some terms which are terms of war:

The authorized rate of fire under the World War II experience table

The amount of ammunition allowed under this table was the average number of rounds of ammunition fired per gun per day over the entire period of fighting in the western European front during World War II. Included in this computation were the periods of violent, moderate, and inactive warfare. Weapons in reserve were also included in this computation.

A basic load of ammunition

A basic load of ammunition is the amount of ammunition at the gun. In Korea it was a 5-day supply at the authorized rate of fire.

Critical short supply

General Van Fleet describes a critical short supply as existing when the ammunition on hand and in the reserve is less than a 65-day supply.

Safety levels (standard since October of 1951)

Army officials described safety level as a 60-day ammunition supply supporting the troops in the field.

Maximum supply level for ammunition

The top (maximum) authorized level is 90 days of supply in support of the troops in the field.

In commenting on the safety level and the top (maximum) authorized level, it was reported that the Army would like to see the levels above 75 days at all times. The comment was made that when the stocks get above 90 days they are temporarily overstocked.

Ammunition day of supply

The ammunition day of supply for a particular weapon is the average quantity in rounds which experience dictates can be expected to be fired by each of these weapons in the hands of a large body of troops over an extended period of time. It is the committee's understanding that the days of supply are determined by the Department of the Army based on requests of the theater commander.

Authorized stock level

The authorized stock level in a theater for a particular type of ammunition is best illustrated by the following equation:

$$\text{Authorized stock level} = \text{number of guns} \times \text{rounds allowed daily for that gun} \times \text{maximum supply level.}$$

In other words, the authorized stock level is the product of the average day's ammunition supply for a particular weapon, multiplied by the number of weapons in the theater, multiplied by the number of days' supply.

Sufficient ammunition

Sufficient ammunition has been defined as enough ammunition to enable the troops to fire at normal rates until resupply from the United States can be carried out.

CAUSES OF THE SHORTAGE OF AMMUNITION

It is stated by witnesses that the following were the major causes of the shortages in the ammunition program:

1. Procurement problems.
2. Production problems.
3. Improper policy guidance.
4. Failure to utilize available money.
5. Other delays.

PROCUREMENT PROBLEMS

To understand the problem of procurement, it must be recognized that the Ordnance Corps had been reduced from a going organization in World War II to a relatively small organization. One of its first jobs was to hire people to do the work brought about by the Korean war. Its organization was not adequate and there was no going munitions industry of substantial size. After getting an organization, the problem of letting contracts had to be solved. The time required for this was known as administrative lead time.

According to General Ford, it required 30 days from the time appropriations were passed until money got to Ordnance. He stated that it took 112 days before a firm contract could be made with industry. This is a time lag of almost 5 months.

It was stated that a major procurement problem was that Ordnance could not delegate contractual authority to its field headquarters. On this there is a conflict. Mr. Lovett reported that he authorized the Army to delegate this authority to the Ordnance Corps in February, April, and July of 1951. General Ford said he did not have adequate authority to delegate contractual authority until December 1952. This remains a conflict in the record and if delays occurred, it cannot be said how much is attributable to these causes.

PRODUCTION PROBLEMS

The production of the ammunition in question is not performed by one manufacturer. It is a production job handled by a number of component manufacturers, who make the parts and ship them to a Government-owned assembly or loading plant where the finished round of ammunition is made. All witnesses stated that it takes 18 months to produce ammunition after a contract is let. All seemed to accept this as an inevitable time factor.

There were additional problems which arose. Machine tools were in short supply. These had to be obtained resulting in some loss of time. The steel strike might have had an adverse reaction, but we are told that materials were moved from struck to unstruck plants and there was no appreciable time loss.

Some mention was made of a shortage of other metals. The committee is inclined to discount this allegation. The Senate Banking and Currency Committee and Senator Burnet Maybank personally gave data to the committee showing that there were ample metals available to the defense effort, and priorities for these were turned back by the Department of Defense.

Ordnance production schedules, which were never met, were made on the basis of the promises of the contractor to produce. There were slippages in all rounds of ammunition as follows:

- (a) 3 months slippage on the 60-millimeter mortar shell;
- (b) 3 to 4 months slippage on the 81-millimeter mortar shell;
- (c) 4½ months slippage on 105-millimeter howitzer shell;
- (d) 6 months slippage on the 155-millimeter howitzer shell;
- (e) 2 to 3 months slippage on the 4.2-inch mortar shell;
- (f) 11 months slippage on hand grenades.

With all the complained of troubles in production, the committee must point out that there is no evidence that there was ever more than one shift of work on these contracts so far as the record shows. Additional shifts would have speeded up production.

IMPROPER POLICY GUIDANCE

Here we speak of the guidance which Ordnance got from its next higher echelon, G-4, and not national policy which is touched on later. G-4 is the organization of planners who approved the plans of the Ordnance Corps for production of ammunition. Ammunition is but one of the items within its responsibility.

G-4 must have been aware of the fact that Ordnance was in as much trouble as it was. General Ford submitted to the committee a great amount of correspondence in which he informed G-4 of his plight. If he received help and guidance, it seems to have had little effect in speeding up the production of ammunition. Ordnance was not put on overtime basis even to get its paper work done.

It is not intended that the upward responsibility should stop with G-4, but the record is not clear as to where it should rest, although it seems certain that General Collins, Mr. Pace, and Mr. Alexander must have had knowledge of Ordnance Corps problems. They formed policy for the Army.

FAILURE TO UTILIZE AVAILABLE MONEY

Army witnesses almost without exception commented that if they had asked for more money earlier the problem would have been solved, or would not have been so bad. Using this same reasoning, the committee concludes that it was the failure to utilize appropriated funds and other available funds that caused the delay. Unequivocally, we conclude that if the money had been put to work early enough, the problem would have been solved.

It has been estimated that \$2.2 billion worth of ammunition has been used in Korea. The Army had that much money for ammunition in its possession by June 30, 1951, at the end of the first year of the Korean war. The failure to use the money early in the war must have been responsible for part of the production delay.

OTHER DELAYS

The committee passed a resolution:

Resolved, That the Secretary of Defense be requested to furnish the Senate Committee on Armed Services the names and positions of all persons, past or present, who take any action whatsoever respecting contracts for ammunition and deliveries thereof, and a description of the action they take.

This resulted in a tremendous list of names which is a part of the printed record. Mr. McNeil introduced a flow chart which showed that some papers traveled over 10,000 miles to some 34 units and over 154 desks before a contract was let. These are referred to as lead times; in a layman's language they are delays.

In his testimony, General Ford said that in the case of a single item of ammunition, 11 action offices and 29 individuals were involved. This required 112 days.

There is no doubt that typical actions of "coordination" or "for information" caused delays, and many of the "administrative" steps may have been of this type.

NATIONAL POLICY

National policy as expressed in administrative regulations and in laws can be relied on generally as a barometer of world conditions. The world situation was extremely tense when the National Security Act was passed, and the tension had increased in the years that followed until the outbreak of the Korean war.

Although the tension remained, our policy guidance was anything but firm. Intelligence and news reports had stated for some time that there was a large, well-trained, and equipped People's Army massed in North Korea prior to the outbreak of hostilities. It might have seemed logical to train and equip the South Koreans, but we did not do this other than as a constabulary force.

The Secretary of State announced to the world on January 12, 1950, that our defense perimeter did not touch the continent of Asia. In other words, South Korea was not in the area to be defended by us. Was not this an invitation to aggression? Yet, on June 24, 1950, we committed our troops under the United Nations to defend South Korea.

One of the difficulties our country has experienced is that its foreign policies and its military policies have not been integrated as they should have been. The National Security Council was established to integrate these matters. Sometimes it appears that we may have made foreign policy commitments which we were not ready to back up with military strength. The NSC is the agency which is supposed to weigh and decide problems of this sort.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

It was the intent of Congress, when the National Security Act of 1947 and its amendments were passed, to set up the necessary machinery for dealing with a national emergency quickly and effectively. The National Security Council, composed of the President, the Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Director for Mutual Security, the Chairman of the National Security

Resources Board, and other sub-Cabinet officers whom the President might choose, was set up as a war council.

In a period of serious world tension this law was drafted to give the President all the advice and assistance possible in solving problems involving our Nation's security. We presume that this group did keep him advised of all of the problems affecting Korea, though it is not clear whether the ammunition problem was considered by him personally.

We know that the NSC was aware of the problem. The function of the Council is—

to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to the national security so as to enable the military services and other departments and agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the national security.

We feel justified in assuming that he had this advice regarding the shortage of ammunition.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY RESOURCES BOARD

Another agency which had great authority under the National Security Act, which apparently was not given the opportunity of functioning as the framers of the law intended, was the National Security Resources Board. The Board was established to—

advise the President concerning the coordination of military, industrial, and civilian mobilization.

The Chairman of this Board was given broad powers regarding mobilization, but it appears that the plans and services of the group were never used, to the extent intended by Congress. This was supposed to have been a powerful Board and its Chairman had powers second only to the President. There is no evidence that it was ever allowed to function in solving the problem of ammunition shortages.

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

The National Security Act has been called the Unification Act since it was designed to unify the Government of this country in the event war should come. It was also designed to unify the three services under the Department of Defense. This act established the Joint Chiefs of Staff, whose duty is to conduct—

review of major material and personnel requirements of the military forces in accordance with strategic and logistic plans.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff knew of the shortages of ammunition. It is not clear whether they initiated or recommended corrective action.

OTHER POLICIES

Much has been made of the fact that the Korean war was not treated as a war as reflected by the policies of the Army and the Department of Defense. There is an element of validity to this claim. In his semiannual report of June 1952, the then Secretary of Defense said:

Under our current policy of partial mobilization we have not been trying to build the most in numbers of anything. Instead, we have emphasized the best in quality and enough of the best to meet our minimum requirements.

He goes on to say in speaking of the moneys that have been appropriated for the Korean war:

These vast sums have been employed to create a reasonable defensive force to halt Communist aggression. * * *

In the same semiannual report the then Secretary of the Army says:

We are not stockpiling mountains of munitions which might well become obsolete before they are needed; rather we are trying to limit procurement to the quantities of various items which, as far as we can foresee, will actually be needed to sustain our operations in Korea and properly equip our forces with the most modern and effective weapons, meet our commitments under the Mutual Defense Assistance Program * * *

He goes on to say:

If we have too much of anything, we will take that fact into account in placing future orders * * *

There were many other statements of United States policy which treated the Korean War as a second-rate incident, and one which did not warrant special consideration. The budgetary guidelines are examples of this attitude. Although the Army pleads that this had an adverse effect, there were military considerations which went into these assumptions which came from the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a memorandum signed by General Bradley.

To touch specifically on the budgetary guidelines, it has been testified that the planners could not plan properly for the Korean war because one of the assumptions was that it would be over by the beginning of the fiscal year which was being planned. Budget requests were based on the amount of ammo used plus the replacement of reserve stocks with no thought that the War would continue for a longer period of time.

In hindsight this is a most unrealistic policy or assumption. It may well have had an adverse effect on our military planners. We know that applied to the Korean ammunition program, an adverse effect occurred somewhere because no substantial quantity of ammunition was produced, and this was responsible for depleting our existing stocks. This is the result of partial mobilization.

The Congress must recognize that some of its legislation may have proved a barrier to those who were procuring material for the services. There are laws which state that business must be given to distressed areas; there are provisions which insure that small business will be given a fair share of the work. There are many laws which could be cited which must be adhered to by procurement people. If these have caused delays, we desire to have the advice of those who have to live with these problems and to assist in removing red tape caused by legal technicalities.

EFFECT OF THE SHORTAGE OF AMMUNITION

The most apparent and perilous effect of the shortage of ammunition was that our national stockpile had been depleted. The Army witnesses have given us a clear statement as to the problem of tooling up for war. Though much of this has been covered in executive session, it can be stated in simple language. To fight a war the Army

must have stocks of ammunition on hand, or it must have an ammunition industry in being capable of producing the ammunition we need.

At the beginning of Korea we had unbalanced stocks, but we did not have the industry in being. We fought the war for 2 years out of existing stocks before any appreciable amount of ammunition was produced.

Though our stocks were reduced greatly, we now have stocks on hand which we are increasing daily. Likewise, we have a going ammunition industry which we will utilize to produce ammunition until our ammunition reserves meet full military requirements, and at that time it is our hope that the ammunition industry will be kept readily available for future emergencies.

The effect of the shortage of ammunition on the Korean operation must next be considered. Although General Palmer, an able military leader, states that the shortage of ammunition did not have any effect on the operations, the contrary conclusion seems to be compelling, since General Collins described the ammunition situation as critical at times in the Far East Command and the United States. If military leaders are not sure of sources of supply, and particularly ammunition, they will not undertake operations they might otherwise attempt.

We do not propose to argue the point made by General Van Fleet, that he could have defeated the enemy in May and June 1951. We do not propose to engage in second-guessing tactics. There is evidence to indicate that a part of the decision in the summer of 1951, to conduct a sitdown war in Korea, was influenced by the fact that our military planners knew our ammunition supplies were in such bad shape and instituted this new policy to conserve ammunition.

We should next consider the matter of fire power. Saying this another way is, "How much ammunition do you shoot in conducting military operations?" The testimony is clear that our experience in Korea taught the lesson that in a mobile war you do not use as much ammunition as you do in a sitdown war. The sitdown war in Korea began in the summer of 1951. Therefore, we have been in a high-priced war ever since, so far as ammunition is concerned.

It is true that the man in the field or in the trench wants to have all of the ammunition he can possibly have to protect his life. Any of us would react the same way under similar conditions. It does appear that the fighting man is the best judge of what he needs to protect himself. Big fire power men believe that you use a great amount of ammunition to save lives. You shoot a lot, you keep the enemy pinned down, and thus you keep him inactive. This type of fighting calls for more ammunition than World War II tables provide. When under attack, even more ammunition is used.

As General Almond said in response to a question from Senator Hendrickson:

It is not basically in the tactical employment of your weapons. The great difference to me is the fanaticism and almost inhuman attitude of the enemy we fight. In my experience we have never fought an enemy who values life so little. To be unable to stop swarms of men with great quantities of ammunition is something I had never experienced before. To me it testifies more than anything else the need of an adequate supply which will enable you to do your best to stop those hordes.

It is his opinion we must change our thinking and our teaching so that our young officers will realize the value of withering and overwhelming fire power. In this connection, Mr. Pace said in his June 1952 semiannual report:

In the Army, we must increase our fire power and mobility and at the same time reduce our battlefield casualties.

In short, we must make our soldiers more efficient. We must give them the tools to do the work of, say, 10 of a potential enemy whose advantage is in more manpower * * *.

One of the unpleasant and realistic problems to be answered by this committee was raised by General Collins in his testimony before the Committee on Armed Services on March 10, 1953. He said he wished—

* * * to reassure the mothers of the soldiers in Korea that their sons are not being needlessly exposed by a lack of ammunition in Korea. I think that is most important.

Later, in answer to questions by Senator Cooper concerning the shortage, Mr. Alexander had this to say:

Senator Cooper, may I answer that by saying: My reading of the testimony indicates that all the witnesses including General Van Fleet agreed that there never was a shortage in the hands of combat troops to carry out the missions assigned to them, and that no casualties resulted as a result of shortages of ammunition in the hands of combat troops.

The problem can be reasoned this way. If you have sufficient ammunition to pin an enemy down, he will be limited as to the amount of patrolling and probing action he can undertake. These are essential preliminaries to attack. If we allow patrols to move about or permit the enemy to undertake feeler actions, we permit him to make large buildups for attack. The net effect of rationing is to allow these things to happen. To wait until the attack starts may save ammunition, but it is hard to see how it is designed to save lives. The use of heavy fire can be likened to a boxer who has a good left punch. He keeps his left in his opponent's face constantly, and because he does this the opponent can never gain his balance sufficiently to take the initiative.

On the question of the loss of life, General Ridgway had this to say when requesting additional ammunition allowances:

Whatever may have been the impressions of our operations in Korea to date, artillery has been and remains the great killer of Communists. It remains the great saver of soldiers, American and Allied. There is a direct relation between the piles of shells in the ammunition supply points and the piles of corpses in the graves registration collecting points. The bigger the former, the smaller the latter and vice versa.

In view of this it is hard to see how General Collins' position, with which Mr. Alexander associated himself, can be maintained.

FISCAL HISTORY OF AMMUNITION FUNDS

In its study of the fiscal situation as it affected, or did not affect, the ammunition shortage, the first thing that became apparent to the committee is that reliable, accurate information is just not obtainable. Jokingly, Mr. Pace said: "There are lies, damned lies, and statistics."

For practically every specific figure which we have received there have been furnished 2 or 3 other figures purporting to provide exactly

the same information, yet these sums may vary by the hundreds of millions of dollars, in some cases by billions. Figures are like a lamp-post; it supports the inebriate but doesn't shed much light on the subject. Perhaps this is due partly to the inadequacies and inaccuracies of the accounting systems which are used in the Army.

Some of these variations are accounted for by failure to separate Army funds from those given Ordnance for ammunition procurement by its other customers. But the committee believes that the main cause of the difference in figures is due to the lack of sound and accurate accounting methods in the Army the figures and sums given the committee, therefore, represent guesses on the part of the persons concerned.

Part of this confusion is the result of the manner in which the funds are transmitted, rather than the accounting systems themselves.

Incoming orders are financed from the Army management fund by the Ordnance Corps for translation into end items, but these end items are apportioned among the several agencies for which Ordnance is the procuring agency, without regard to whose funds actually pay for whose end items. The Joint Chiefs of Staff had to establish a board to decide where the product should go.

As an example, we have seen that funds given the Ordnance Corps by another service for ammunition were used to pay for desks which were purchased for the use of Ordnance personnel. It may be true that these people were, at the time, engaged in work on the contracts for the other service, but it should be no surprise that accurate figures cannot be given when a technique of blind apportionment such as this is used.

The committee and its staff cannot be expected to arrive at an accurate report on the history of ammunition funds if the Army and the Department of Defense cannot. We have been able to determine a reasonably accurate history of funds available to the Army for ammunition procurement, since the great bulk of the total was specifically appropriated for this purpose.

The Congress fully met the requests made of it by the Department of Defense for ammunition appropriations.

It also is to be strongly emphasized that the Department of the Army had very large amounts of funds which were available for use in the ammunition program through reprogramming in the event that a shortage of funds had ever occurred. The committee feels that not only were funds always on hand in adequate amounts, but, in addition, plentiful funds were obtainable by the reprogramming procedure in event of an emergency.

The first significant date in the history of funds available is January 6, 1951, the day that the second supplemental appropriation was provided the Army. During the first 6 months of the Korean war, the Congress filled Army financial requests for ammunition in the amount of \$404 million. In addition to this, the Army had borrowed from MDAP funds, by arrangement with the Secretary of State, \$1.1 billion of which \$663 million was apportioned to Ordnance for ammunition. The Ordnance Corps utilized \$173 million. Claims that the Army "lacked authority" seem very weak in view of the ease with which this transaction was accomplished.

These funds, plus the moneys of the second supplemental appropriation provided Army Ordnance with funds of \$2,029,233,000 in January

1951. This figure is of particular significance to the committee, since it is greater than total cumulative expenditures for ammunition by the Army from the beginning of the Korean war through February 28, 1953—26 months after the date of availability of the funds and 32 months after the outbreak of the war.

Total moneys paid for new ammunition have been \$1.903 million, leaving the Army approximately \$4.797 million in unexpended funds as of the end of February of this year.

To complete the picture for the first fiscal year of the war, the fourth supplemental, May 31, 1951, provided \$250 million for ammunition, bringing total funds for ammunition to \$2.279 million. Cumulative obligations at this time approximated \$1.6 billion, and deliveries of ammunition were \$64.7 million. The alleged amount of obligations did not reach the \$2.279 million figure until 6 months later, December 31, 1951, at which time the total funds that had been made available to the Army were in excess of \$4 billion.

Between June and July of 1951, the Army cut back its ammunition program \$452.4 million, and in fact did not reprogram the total funds available on July 1, 1951 (\$3,351,349,000) until nearly 1 year later, in June 1952.

This failure to establish firm and authorized procurement programs within the limits of availability of funds undoubtedly retarded to a considerable degree the placing of contracts with industry and the delivery of essential ammunition.

At the end of fiscal year 1952, June 30, 1952, funds of approximately \$6 billion had been placed in the Army ammunition program, and additional reprogramming and reimbursements to the Army are expected to bring this to a total of \$6.7 billion available during the 3 years of the Korean war. Contrasted with these figures, obligations as of the end of fiscal year 1952 were some \$4 billion, and by the end of 1952 had reached approximately \$4.7 billion. At the end of February 1953, it is claimed, total cumulative obligations had reached \$5.8 billion, leaving an unobligated balance of approximately \$900 million.

We do not present these figures as being absolutely accurate, but they are the best approximations at which we have been able to arrive. We have previously stated that the Army and the Department of Defense do not have a system which accurately accounts for the funds under its control, or the amount obligated, and as a result, accurate, consistent figures have not been given this committee.

However, we have spent a great deal of time, both in questioning witnesses and in studying the information presented to us, and have been able to arrive at certain definite conclusions regarding the fiscal situation as it pertains to ammunition.

First, with regard to funds, the Congress not only met all requests made of it, but these funds were adequate. There is evidence that the military people who prepared and presented the budget were fiscal-year minded in their concept of the problems involved. The total value of ammunition which has been expended in Korea to date is \$2.2 billion. During the first year of the war, funds in excess of this amount were made available to the Army. During fiscal years 1951, 1952, and 1953, a total of \$6.7 billion has been obtained by the Army for its ammunition program.

With regard to obligations, the pattern has emerged that obligations have run about 6 months or more behind appropriations and other

funds which were available to the Army. From the figures we have been able to compile, it definitely appears that, since January 1951, the Army has had on hand at all times between one and two billion dollars of unobligated funds available for ammunition procurement.

With these facts, it is indisputable that adequate funds were available at all times subsequent to September 1950.

With regard to deliveries, it is quite obvious that the Army did not translate available funds or obligations into end items within 18 months or 21 months or any other period to date.

Granting the Army the necessities of production lead time, administrative lead time, and the other delays enumerated in the testimony, production should have been coming in in tremendous quantities no later than June 30, 1952. Yet the testimony reflects that during the last 6 months of 1952, total deliveries were valued at \$520 million, and that production has not yet reached the rates which were financed in 1951.

It is a weak approach to argue that more money is needed when there are always unobligated balances on hand and there exists the ability to secure additional funds when needed by reprogramming.

CONCLUSIONS

As a result of the investigation conducted by this subcommittee, evidence has been collected which establishes the fact that there has been a continuing shortage of ammunition during the entire period of the Korean war. It is absolutely clear that at some time or other the following important items were in short supply: the 4.2-inch mortar, the 60-millimeter mortar, the 81-millimeter mortar, the 105-millimeter howitzer, the 155-millimeter howitzer, and the hand grenade. On the basis of the evidence, the subcommittee concludes that:

(1) There were vast stocks of most all types of ammunition on hand at the outbreak of the Korean war. For 2 years, however, the bulk of the ammunition furnished to our troops in the field was supplied out of World War II stocks, seriously depleting these stocks.

(2) It is evident that it was the firm policy of the United States to run the Korean war without disrupting the civilian economy.

(3) From the beginning of the Korean war, the policy was established which forced the planners to assume that the war would be over on different specific dates stated in the assumptions. Beginning with September 27, 1950, the procurement agencies were directed to proceed on the assumption that the war would be ended July 1, 1951. From then on, even after the Chinese Communists entered the war, the same policy of fixing specific dates for the termination of the war continued for more than 2 years.

(4) In attempting to trace the accounting and budgetary procedures for the procurement of ammunition, it becomes apparent that the budgetary structure of the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army is in an intolerable state. It is evident that the accounting and budgetary procedures are not functioning in the manner intended under title IV of the Unification Act. This was shockingly disclosed in many areas but particularly in the conflict between the Comptroller of the

Department of Defense, Mr. McNeil, and the Comptroller of the Department of the Army, General Decker.

(5) The procurement system under the Ordnance Department of the armed services indicated unconscionable inefficiency, waste, and unbelievable red tape. The testimony of Mr. McNeil, Comptroller of the Armed Services, showed that some papers for procurement traveled over 10,000 miles to some 34 units and over 154 desks before a contract was let. The testimony showed this result: That after an appropriation had been signed by the President, a month elapsed before the fund was allocated, an average of 5 months before a contract was let, and another 18 months before the first deliveries were made, making 24 months in all as the average period between the passage of an appropriation and the deliveries of ammunition.

(6) It is incontrovertible that as a result of shortages, ammunition of many types had to be rationed to the troops on the battle field.

(7) As a result of the ammunition shortage:

(a) The mission of the United Nations' forces in Korea was circumscribed;

(b) There was a definite and adverse effect on United States military operations;

(c) There was a needless loss of American lives.

(8) The shortage of ammunition is not in any way traceable to a lack of funds. The record reflects that the Congress was fully responsive to all budgetary requests for ammunition, and that the Army consistently failed to spend the money which was available.

(9) It is difficult to pinpoint the responsibility for the situation. The President, the State Department, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of the Army, the National Security Council, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff miscalculated the aggressive designs of international communism. They did not provide the necessary guidance for the military planners. Neither did they take effective action to correct the situation when it became obvious to all parties involved. Neither G-4 of the Army, nor the Ordnance Department, whose duty it was to secure necessary production, discharged its responsibilities in a creditable fashion. Then, when the procurement of items was turned over to the Ordnance Department, the same incomprehensible inefficiency occurred in effecting reasonably prompt deliveries. The tragic situation resulting came from a combination of errors and ineffective administration which involved practically everyone in whom official responsibility has been vested.

(10) The committee concludes that there was a lack of coordination between the civilian chiefs of the armed services and the

military leaders including the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Former Secretary of Defense Lovett testified that he first heard of the shortage of ammunition by rumor, the former Secretary of the Army Pace testified along similar lines, while there was an admission on the part of the Joint Chiefs of Staff that no direct reports were made to the Secretary of Defense as to the reports of ammunition shortages which came to the Joint Chiefs. As the administrative control of the armed services is under the Secretary of Defense, the committee regards such actions as in conflict with the fundamental principle that the administration of the armed services should rest in the hands of civilians, as provided by law, and in the persons of the Secretary of Defense and the Secretaries of the Army, of Navy, and Air Force.

(11) A calm and objective analysis of the testimony which has been presented before this subcommittee can lead only to the conclusion that this is a tragic episode which has been extremely costly to the American people. A repetition of this type of miscalculation and inability to plan for the defense and security of the United States could result in catastrophe for this Nation.

RECOMMENDATIONS

In submitting this interim report of its findings, the subcommittee desires to continue to study the cause and effect of the problem of ammunition shortage, and to look further into our worldwide ammunition position before submitting final and constructive recommendations. In the interim the subcommittee will—

(1) Transmit the entire record of this investigation and the report of same to the Department of Defense and the Department of the Army with a request that they particularize a program or programs designed to correct the conditions described herein and designed to prevent a recurrence of such conditions. The report is also being forwarded to Mr. Bernard Baruch, World War II mobilization adviser; Gen. Brehon Somervell, wartime Chief of the Service of Supply, and Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt, former Chairman of the Army and Navy Munitions Board and Chairman of the War Production Board, and others who have had broad experience in this field, for constructive recommendations.

(2) Request a monthly report from the Secretary of Defense as to the adequacy of available ammunition supplies until such time as this committee decides that the problem has been resolved, and every 6 months thereafter.

(3) Urge the Senate Armed Services Committee to conduct a specific study of the budgetary and procurement procedures of the Department of Defense and the Departments of the Army, the Navy, and the Air Force to ascertain the reasons why the

provisions of title IV of the National Security Act are not functioning as intended.

(4) Request the Department of Defense to inventory all plants, determine their productive capacity in event of war, and the time required for war conversion and report their findings to this committee.

(5) Utilize these and other reports secured by this committee in making a final report and recommendations:

Senator MARGARET CHASE SMITH, *Chairman*.

Senator ROBERT C. HENDRICKSON.

Senator JOHN SHERMAN COOPER.

Senator HARRY FLOOD BYRD.

MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATOR ESTES KEFAUVER (TENNESSEE)

With much of the factual information contained in the committee's report, I find myself in agreement. But I cannot agree with many of the sweeping generalities and with some of the conclusions. Furthermore, in several instances, the report comments on subjects which were not covered in the hearings, which were beyond the purview of the committee, and which, in my opinion, constitute a distortion of history.

Accordingly, I find it necessary to submit the following comments with respect to the report of the committee:

1. For instance, the report undertakes a critical discussion of what it refers to as "national policy," and, in my opinion, contributes to a misstatement of history, and ignores a large number of vital considerations. Thus, the report reiterates that the administration, in 1950, stated that Korea was outside our defense perimeter. I think it only necessary for present purposes to point out that the actual statement of that time describes certain areas as being within the defense perimeter of the United States itself, and stated that the maintenance of world peace at other points was a responsibility of the United Nations. The committee ignores the role of the United Nations in the present conflict in Korea. The committee report wholly ignores the status of the United States as the executive agent of the UN in Korea. Without going into great detail on this particular phase of the matter, I believe that any treatment of policy decisions which ignores the interrelationship between the UN actions and the United States actions is necessarily superficial.

2. I cannot agree with the committee conclusion that "partial mobilization was costly and unworkable." This is an example of the type of statement in this report which I think is ill-advised and a reflection of campaign slogans, rather than of serious analysis of a serious situation. Who had advised total mobilization? Certainly not the Members of this Congress, who, despite the fact that the Korean War is still in progress have just insisted standby control legislation not be effective without a declaration of emergency by the Congress, and which, insofar as I know, is not considering a declaration of emergency. Certainly not the new President—Mr. Eisenhower—who in a speech to this nation Tuesday evening, May 19, made it clear that our mobilization will now become even more "partial" than it has been. While criticizing "partial mobilization" the committee fails to state the alternative—total mobilization, or to point out what that means in the kind of world we live in today. We live, as President Eisenhower said in the speech I just referred to, in an age of peril, in one in which our danger point cannot be fixed or confined to one specific instant. Yet total mobilization means nothing less than the mobilization of all our national resources—our manpower, our industrial power, the sum of our national wealth.

"Such security," as President Eisenhower pointed out, "would compel us to put every able-bodied young man in uniform—to regiment the worker, the farmer, the businessman—to allocate materials and to control prices and wages—in short, to devote our whole nation to the grim purposes of the garrison state. This, I firmly believe, is not the way to defend America."

In the wars we have known in the past, total mobilization was both desirable and necessary. In the long-range type of conflict between the ideology of communism and democracy, total mobilization would most assuredly bring this nation to its knees, or else force us to ignite the whole world in an atomic war. I do not believe the nation is ready for or would accept total mobilization—yet the committee report inferentially recommends total mobilization.

3. While serious shortages of some items of ammunition have existed from time to time in Korea, nevertheless, I think that the committee report should also point out the large number of categories of ammunition which have not been in short supply, in order that it may be clearly understood by the American people that what is here being described is the portion of the iceberg that shows above the top of the water. In any event, the word "shortage" is a relative term, and obviously meant different things to different witnesses who appeared before us, and I do not think that the testimony which we have heard justified certain of the conclusions embodied in this report. For instance, in its conclusions, the committee states that the shortage of ammunition had a serious military effect and there was a needless loss of American lives because of ammunition shortage. It would be my judgment that no such statement should be highlighted as a "conclusion," except on the basis of the most compelling and conclusive testimony to this effect.

American families which have suffered losses in Korea have sustained grief enough, without sustaining the added grief which this type of statement brings, when the statement is based, as the committee acknowledges, on conflicting testimony between various army generals.

4. I wholly disagree with criticism in the report of the policy of spreading defense contracts to areas of critical unemployment and to small businesses. It is my view that if we want the strongest mobilization base, then we must enlarge, rather than contract, our base of potential supply. In areas of unemployment, it would be my opinion that we would receive quicker supply of orders, for manufacturers in such areas would probably have no backlog. One of the reasons that we were so slow in getting ammunition delivery, according to testimony before our committee, was because when plants in standby status were put in operation it was found that they had deteriorated and that much more work than was anticipated was necessary before they started producing.

5. Having learned that, we should profit by the lesson and seek to keep more plants in actual operating condition by spreading many smaller contracts in place of one big one. Think what that would mean when the day arrives—as it did arrive in the case of Korea—when we needed large production and needed it fast. The more plants we have in partial production—then the more plants we have in good,

working condition, ready for rapid expansion, ready for full production at maximum efficiency.

No testimony before our committee indicates that large manufacturers are more efficient or can produce ammunition more quickly than small- or middle-sized plants. I have always thought that our munitions program would be improved if small industries were given a better break.

6. I think that the impression is left in the discussion of the National Security Resources Board that it did no good in this situation. The report ignores the fact that a great amount of work in this field was performed by the Office of Defense Mobilization (headed at that time by Charles Wilson of General Electric) and by the Defense Production Administration and the National Production Authority. The Joint Committee on Defense Production, under the chairmanship of Senator Maybank, kept in very close touch with the work of these defense agencies, and I believe that any reference to the report of Senator Maybank's committee will clearly establish the fact that a good job was done by these defense mobilization agencies. Accordingly, I think that the criticism contained in the committee's report on this aspect of the matter is wholly unfounded.

7. There is no question but that there was misjudgment as to the duration of the war in Korea. My quarrel with the committee report is not in the statement of this fact, which is a fact, or in the statement that there was a shortage of certain types of ammunition, due to this misjudgment, which is another fact. I think that the report, in fairness however, fails to recognize the dilemma in which this left the Pentagon. The Far Eastern Supreme Commander, General MacArthur said and is reported to have told the President at the Wake Island Conference that the boys would be home by Christmas. This is not said in criticism of General MacArthur. I do not know the factors on which he based his estimate—nor the reasons for or sources of faulty intelligence reports he received. It simply points up the fact that neither does this committee know or touch on all the factors that went into all the policy decisions because they were beyond the purview of the committee and not the subject of investigation. On the one hand the officials at the Pentagon were naturally wary of overstocking—for to do so, and to have a large supply on hand at the end of the war which would deteriorate and become useless, would invite attack here in Congress. Not to do so, certainly invited greater attack and is not to be condoned.

Defense officials have taken one step which is certainly in the right direction, and which is much more businesslike. During these early days of the war, they were ordering ammunition on the basis of replacing stockpiles. Now they no longer use this basis—instead they order on the basis of need and anticipated need. I think the committee should commend this step and urge that it be made the basis of munitions procurement permanently.

8. The only good purpose served by any congressional investigation lies not in rehashing of mistakes of the past, but in discovering what those mistakes were as the basis for corrective action in the future.

While this is an interim report, I see no reason why certain specific recommendations should not be made to the Defense Department now, for their consideration and action.

Among other things, there is obviously a need for—and the Department should immediately undertake an overhauling of its procurement system. In doing so there should be an attempt to clearly designate responsibility for adequate supplies of ammunition and other expendable equipment essential in the field of battle. They should eliminate redtape so that responsible officials and responsible field commanders could immediately receive a hearing at the top, without regard to the "budgetary guide lines" and without regard to "channels." The long lapse of time between the appropriation of money and the delivery of ammunition is inexcusable and must be shortened. The whole process passes through too many hands and is too cumbersome.

The defense base should be kept broad, so that we would have many suppliers ready for immediate expansion.

I do not disagree with the other recommendations of the committee—I simply think that these further steps can be taken now.

I also note that the committee requires monthly reports from the Pentagon as to the adequacy of ammunition supplies, and I would add that I think this committee should recommend to the full Armed Services Committee that similar reports be requested of the Air Force as to the adequacy of the number of planes available to it. It would be outside the jurisdiction of this subcommittee to ask such reports of the Air Force, but it may prove vital information for the full Armed Services Committee to scrutinize.

ESTES KEFAUVER.

