

From the Office of  
SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON (D., WASH.)

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STATEMENT ON THE SENATE FLOOR  
by

Senator Henry M. Jackson

Member, Senate Armed Services Committee  
Preparedness Subcommittee  
Chairman, Military Applications Subcommittee  
of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy

Mr. President, the limited nuclear test ban treaty we are considering has been described by some as a step toward peace and by others as a step toward war.

If it were plainly the former, the Senate would of course promptly and enthusiastically give its advice and consent to ratification. If it were plainly the latter, we would of course refuse to approve it. We have held extensive hearings and are now engaged in debate because the issue is not plain.

The fact of the matter is that although the treaty is indeed a step in some direction, we do not know, and moreover we cannot know, in what direction it leads. For the treaty does not determine the direction. What we do from now on, and what the rest of the world does from now on -- these are the determining factors.

Even those who most seriously doubt the wisdom of this treaty have not argued that it seals our fate. And most of those who strongly support the treaty have taken pains to underline the risks inherent in it. The consequences hinge, at least in large part, on the wisdom of our future policies and the will and determination with which we pursue them.

Obviously, this is no routine agreement: it has major foreign and defense policy implications, and its provisions relate directly to the present and future credibility of the military deterrent which has been the free world's mainstay in stopping aggression and keeping the peace since World War II.

It has seemed clear to me from the outset that this treaty would not serve the interests of peace and security unless we entered upon its undertakings with a firm understanding of the lines of policy required of us in the new circumstances created by the treaty. We must understand what is required to protect and maintain the free world's ability to deter or survive a nuclear attack and to respond effectively against any aggressor. We must be ready to pursue the necessary policies without reservations of mind or heart.

It was for this reason, Mr. President, that on August 9, prior to Senate consideration of the treaty, I propounded on this floor a number of national security issues on which, in my judgment, frank and adequate assurances from responsible officials of the Executive Branch were needed before the Senate could prudently determine whether to give its advice and consent to ratification.

It is for this same reason that the Joint Chiefs of Staff attach great importance to what they call safeguards. In their testimony before the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee of the Armed Services Committee, and before the Foreign Relations Committee, the Joint Chiefs defined certain safeguards which they believe can reduce the disadvantages and risk of the treaty. These safeguards include:

a. The conduct of comprehensive, aggressive, and continuing underground nuclear test programs designed to add to our knowledge and improve our weapons in all areas of significance to our military posture for the future.

b. The maintenance of modern nuclear laboratory facilities and programs in theoretical and exploratory nuclear technology which will attract, retain, and insure the continued application of our human scientific resources to these programs on which continued progress in nuclear technology depends.

c. The maintenance of the facilities and resources necessary to institute promptly nuclear tests in the atmosphere should they be deemed essential to our national security or should the treaty or any of its terms be abrogated by the Soviet Union.

d. The improvement of our capability, within feasible and practical limits, to monitor the terms of the treaty, to detect violations, and to maintain our knowledge of Sino-Soviet nuclear activity, capabilities, and achievements.

On August 14 the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee unanimously adopted a motion which I made and which was subsequently unanimously adopted by the Armed Services Committee, a motion calling on the Joint Chiefs to supplement their testimony by providing to the Armed Services Committee a statement of the specific requirements to implement the necessary safeguards they had defined.

Senator Russell forwarded this motion to the Secretary of Defense. The part of the response made public and included in the Interim Report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee consists of two items: One, a letter from the Deputy Secretary of Defense setting forth in some detail both the assurances that the safeguards stated by the Joint Chiefs are recognized and accepted at the highest levels of the government and also the standards that will be observed and a preliminary outline of the measures that will be taken to implement these safeguards; and, Two, a letter from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs enclosing a memorandum defining "Criteria to Ensure Fulfillment of the Safeguards Proposed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff."

It should be emphasized that there has been no disagreement on the part of anyone in a responsible position in the Executive Branch about the importance of action to implement the safeguards. On the contrary, there has been endorsement of the position that the United States will take determined, willing, and vigorous action to honor the safeguards, and the Senate is entitled to assume that no reservations attach to this resolve.

This commitment should be recognized by every official of the Executive Branch having anything to do with the actions needed to fulfill these safeguards. It is equally something which should be recognized by Congress, for it may well be that Congress, contrary to the expectations of many people, will have to vote additional appropriations in order to translate the commitment into effective programs of action.

Secretary McNamara's testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee already indicates, for example, that in order to compensate for uncertainties which could only be removed or reduced by tests forbidden by the treaty, we may have to produce and deploy greater numbers of delivery systems and radars and to disperse them more widely than would have been necessary without a treaty. Thus the Secretary acknowledges that if we are going to design around uncertainties, we shall have to have additional military hardware. It is apparent that this may well mean among other things greater numbers of present delivery systems and new mobile systems to reduce vulnerability. All of this costs money. I believe it would be unwarranted to assume that under the new environment of the treaty our security requirements can be maintained by less expenditures for national defense, or even by the same level of expenditure.

The commitment to an effective safeguards program needs emphasis now, Mr. President, because voices are already being heard outside government to the effect that the safeguards should not be implemented and are indeed inconsistent with the spirit of the treaty. For example, the well-known physicist, Dr. Leo Szilard, in a statement submitted to the Foreign Relations Committee, argues that if the United States were to proceed

...with an extensive program of underground bomb testing, then, rather than furthering the cause of peace, the test ban agreement would be likely to do just the opposite.

Lest there be a misunderstanding inside or outside government on this critical issue -- a misunderstanding that might seriously interfere with the full execution of the safeguards program -- the legislative history being written here should make it clear that the Executive Branch has given responsible assurances of effective action to carry out the safeguards and that the Senate, through its appropriate committees, will monitor the actions taken for this purpose. In this



connection I wish to cite the following passage from the Interim Report of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee:

If the treaty is ratified it is the intention of the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee to monitor the implementation of the safeguards and it would also be our hope that other committees of the Congress having jurisdiction in these areas would cooperate in this important program.

Mr. President, I believe that the Senate has played a constructive role in this critical matter. The understanding that has been reached between the Executive Branch and the Legislative Branch will be helpful in the months ahead. It may be of even more importance when responsibility for national security passes to men who have not been engaged in the consideration of this treaty and its implications.

I have become persuaded in the course of studies of the national security process over the past few years by subcommittees of the Government Operations Committee that a key problem faced by every President is to make his views and intentions prevail throughout the vast organization he heads. His statements have to be interpreted in the course of policy execution, and even subordinates acting in good faith sometimes read their own views into their interpretations of the President's will. I hope and believe that the discussion of safeguards has helped to bring about the kind of understanding throughout the Executive Branch that is the key to effective action in harmony with the intentions of the President.

As we approach a decision, I believe that my colleagues may find helpful the opinion of a great American, the distinguished former Secretary of Defense, Robert A. Lovett. Since his retirement as Secretary of Defense, Mr. Lovett has continued to serve the nation in a number of sensitive assignments and is eminently qualified to advise us and the country on the matter before us. In a letter addressed to

the Senator from Arkansas, the chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee, in response to a request for his views, Mr. Lovett states the case for ratification in an admirably balanced way:

On the basis of the testimony so far presented, particularly by the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Defense, there would seem to be positive assurances that this administration has, first, the necessary will and determination to continue our research and developmental laboratories at the level of activity necessary to permit us to retain any nuclear superiority we may currently have and to improve, if possible, our relative position in this field so that our deterrent capability is not lessened by deterioration of either effort or facilities; and, secondly, that our policy, after signing the treaty, will be to continue actively those tests permitted under it and to maintain as insurance a program for atmospheric tests in a status permitting prompt use in the event of abrogation or other emergent events.

Under these conditions -- which represent my understanding of definite assurances given by these officials -- I believe that consent to ratification can properly be given.

Mr. President, this is also the conclusion I have reached. In light of the testimony that has been given and the understandings that have been reached with respect to the policy of the Administration in safeguarding the national interest and in light of considerations I shall state in a few moments, I believe that the Senate may prudently give its advice and consent to ratification.

I now wish, Mr. President, to indicate the other considerations that have led me to this conclusion. They emerge from the testimony presented to the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee and to the Foreign Relations Committee and from my own long concern with national security affairs.

One. No responsible official has based his recommendations on the view that basic Soviet purposes have changed. Their purposes remain incompatible with ours. In response to a question of Senator Russell's, Secretary of State Rusk said:

Mr. Khrushchev has made it very clear that there is no such thing as ideological coexistence. His purposes remain to work toward a Communist world. And that is deeply obnoxious as an idea to us, and the practices which would be used to pursue that idea would be hostile to our own interests.

Two. No responsible official has disputed the view that in the future, as in the past, our national security will depend on, among other things, a favorable military position. In response to a question of mine addressed to Secretary Rusk, the following exchange took place:

Secretary Rusk. Senator, I believe that the United States must maintain in its own security interests a very large overall nuclear superiority with respect to the Soviet Union. This involves primarily the capacity to demonstrate that regardless of who strikes first, the United States will be in a position effectively to destroy an aggressor....

Senator Jackson. ...I am glad to hear you say we should maintain not a balanced but a superior position in order to maintain peace. Is this essentially your view?

Secretary Rusk. That is correct, sir.

Three. No responsible official has rested the case for the treaty on a belief that the Soviet government can be trusted. Senator Sparkman raised this issue, which troubles many Senators as well as many citizens who have written to us about the treaty, and was assured by Secretary Rusk that the treaty did not rest upon the element of faith and trust. The Secretary added:

We will know if there are significant violations of this treaty, we will be free to do whatever is necessary in our own security, and I would think that this is not a matter of trust.

Four. Secretary of Defense McNamara and the Joint Chiefs have testified that the balance of military power is in our favor at the present moment.

Five. With respect to the effects of the treaty on the future balance of military power, we enter of course a more controversial area. Although the views are not necessarily inconsistent, there are notable differences of emphasis. Secretary McNamara believes that there is nothing in the treaty which will shift the balance. The Joint Chiefs, according to testimony to the Foreign Relations Committee by General LeMay, examined the military and technical aspects of the

treaty and came up with a net disadvantage in that field, but as General Taylor stated:

...the Joint Chiefs have reached the determination that while there are military disadvantages to the treaty, they are not so serious as to render it unacceptable.

General Power and General Schriever, however, attached greater importance to the military and technical disadvantages in their testimony to the Preparedness Investigating Subcommittee. And I think it is correct to say that scientists holding responsible posts recognize that the treaty definitely imposes limitations on research and development, though they differ greatly in their views about the desirability of the treaty.

From the evidence presented to the Senate I am compelled to conclude, as indicated in the Interim Report of the Preparedness Subcommittee, that the treaty involves serious - perhaps even formidable - military and technical disadvantages. It should also be added, in the words of that Report, that:

No safeguards can provide the benefits of testing where testing is not permitted, nor can they assure that this Nation will acquire the highest quality weapons systems of which it is capable when the means for achieving that objective are denied.

Mr. President, I have followed military, scientific, and technological developments with interest and care during my service in the House and in the Senate. I have great respect for the views of those men who, like General Power and General Schriever and like Dr. Foster and Dr. Teller, have serious doubts about the wisdom of this treaty or who actually oppose its ratification. But I am also convinced that these men, and the many others who work with them, are men of dedication, imagination, and ingenuity and that they will employ these qualities to offset insofar as it is possible the undoubted military and technical disadvantages. It is indeed in large part because men of their talents will be devoting their energies to ways to overcome these disadvantages that I believe we can accept the risks we necessarily will run.



Six. The Administration in effect recommends acceptance of certain military and technical disadvantages and their attendant risks in the hope that certain gains may be made in other fields. Upon examination these hoped-for gains are either rather precise but insubstantial or they are quite difficult to specify but hopefully significant. Secretary Rusk testified as follows:

This is a limited treaty. The President listed the things it does not do, and we must keep them in mind in judging its significance. At the same time, if -- as seems likely -- most of the nations of the world adhere to the treaty, and if they observe its obligations, this will in itself bring concrete gains.

First, the United States and the Soviet Union already have enough nuclear power to inflict enormous destruction on each other. Still, the search for bigger, more destructive weapons goes on. Each generation of major weapons has been more expensive than the last. Each has involved an increasing burden, an increasing diversion of resources from the great unfinished business of mankind. Yet greater armament has not demonstrably brought greater security. The treaty, if observed, should slow this spiral, without damage to our relative strength.

I do not know, however, how to reconcile this alleged gain with Secretary McNamara's testimony, already cited, where the possible need for additional appropriations for greater numbers of delivery systems and radars and wider dispersal is brought out. It is my conclusion that it would be a mistake to count on any reduction of the armament burden as a result of this treaty. On the contrary, the evidence points to an increase in the burden.

Secretary Rusk's testimony continues:

Second, the treaty will help contain the spread of nuclear weapons. We cannot guarantee it. Most of the countries with the capacity and the incentive to develop nuclear weapons over the next decade or so have already announced that they will accept the self-denying ordinance of the treaty. These countries do not include, by the way, mainland China or France.

While this does not guarantee that they will never become nuclear powers, their renunciation of atmospheric testing will act as a deterrent by making it much more difficult and expensive for them to develop nuclear weapons.

Efforts to limit the spread of nuclear weapons deserve our serious attention.

But I believe the role of the treaty in inhibiting proliferation has been generally overestimated. Most of the countries that have signed the test ban,

or will sign it, do not have the capacity or desire to develop nuclear weapons. France, it should be noted, is already regarded by the Administration as a nuclear power and is proceeding with an independent nuclear program. The major concern we have is with the development of nuclear capabilities by Communist China, which has rejected the treaty. I doubt that anyone wishes to argue that something called "world opinion" is likely to have an inhibiting effect on the determination of Peking to become a nuclear power.

Secretary Rusk's testimony continues:

Third, the treaty will reduce the radioactive pollution of the planet. The increased radioactivity from nuclear testing has thus far stayed within tolerable limits, in a statistical sense. But as the President said: "This is not a natural hazard, and it is not a statistical issue."

Moreover, if testing were not restricted, more and more countries would conduct tests. Many of them would lack either the incentive or the means to minimize the fallout. We have a high obligation to safeguard life and health and the genetic integrity of the human race. Today no one can say for certain how much fallout is too much. But if this treaty is observed it will go a long way to assure that we do not transgress those limits.

There is little doubt, I believe, that this argument weighs heavily in the public mind. But unpopular though it may be to say so, there is also little doubt that the fears that have been aroused are out of all proportion to the hazards. Other things being equal, we should of course minimize fallout. But if other things are not equal, and they may not be, we may be compelled at some future date to accept the small hazards of fallout to protect ourselves against larger hazards to peace and security. Nevertheless, I believe that it is proper to conclude that the reduction of fallout is a positive advantage of the treaty.

Secretary Rusk comes next to his last and most important point:

For 18 years we have held the Communist drive in check largely by the deterrent force of our massive military strength. We shall maintain that overwhelming strength until we are certain that freedom can be assured by other means.

But throughout we have known that a lasting peace could not be founded upon armed might alone. It can be secured only by durable international institutions, and by a respect for law and its procedures.

The problem has been to convince the Communist world that its interest also lay in that direction.

The most important thing about the treaty is, therefore, what it may symbolize and what new paths it may open. That, no one can now foretell.

Almost at once, however, in response to a question of Senator Russell's, Secretary Rusk put this, his fourth and, in his eyes, his most important point, in perspective in these words:

We have pressing issues with the Communist world in one form or another right around the globe, with almost a million men in uniform outside the continental limits of the United States because of these issues, in Laos, South Vietnam, Cuba, Berlin, and other places. There are other practices, some of them bilateral in character, which do cause friction. I do not anticipate, to come specifically to your question, sir, I do not anticipate that there is much chance or much wisdom in an attempted comprehensive negotiation. It would not be for Washington and Moscow to try to sit down in some way and resolve all of these problems or even try to resolve them because the interests of many, many nations are involved and, quite frankly, the total question is probably too big to take hold of all at once.

And so despite the fact that there are some highly inflammable questions we still think we ought to keep open the possibility of finding particular points of agreement in the hope that if those can be achieved, it might reduce the fever somewhat and throw some different atmosphere and light on some of the more dangerous problems so we would be prepared to consider other questions.

At the moment I cannot report that there is another question which is highly promising at this--as of today.

I repeat, Mr. President, that we are being asked to accept certain military and technological disadvantages in the hope of making certain small gains and of opening up new paths, though the Secretary cannot see, as of today, any issues which may be negotiable. The Secretary is to be commended for his frank statement. He has not encouraged great expectations.

But hope, Mr. President, is not to be dismissed as a basis for action, even the slender hope held out by Secretary Rusk. It is largely because we are deeply committed as a nation to do what we can to keep alive the hopes of men everywhere for a decent future -- including, I trust, the peoples of Russia and China -- that we shall ratify this treaty.

In doing so, what are the risks we run? Let me emphasize five among the many that might be mentioned.

First, there is the risk that we will relax and fall back into a state which the Senate has learned to call euphoria - which is, if I may play the same game, a state in which one believes that he has serendipity and is therefore likely to display velleity for vigorous action.

In this regard, our previous record as a nation is not too reassuring. On occasions when we should have stayed awake, we went to sleep. Through half-hearted support and the pinching effect of the budget, critical programs have been degraded and vital policies stifled.

My good friend, the distinguished Senator from Minnesota, has said we need hopers, not doubters. I wonder whether he would accept a change of emphasis. We need men of hope and skepticism and action. Skepticism, not cynicism.

Our task, as I see it, is, while remaining skeptical, to act with hope and pursue those policies which may safeguard the opportunities to move the world along a path toward peace.

Second, there may be a serious misjudgment of the basis for the change in Soviet policy.

It is to be hoped that it is in fact our strength and not a major Soviet military-technological advance that has persuaded Moscow that this agreement is advantageous. But the pessimistic possibility cannot be dismissed. It could be, as some witnesses suggested, that the Soviet Union has learned something important that, in its judgment, we do not know but might learn were we free to continue testing in any and all environments. The Soviet government may believe that what it has learned can be the basis, as its development work proceeds, for upsetting the military balance.

If we come to the conclusion at any time that this is the case, we must be prepared to exercise our right of withdrawal from the treaty.

Third, we run the risk of planned abrogation of the treaty by the Soviet Union. The safeguards program is designed among other things to enable us to take necessary measures promptly in the event of Soviet bad faith.

Fourth, it is generally conceded that the Communist Chinese are now engaged in a substantial nuclear weapons program and that in the very near future they will be testing in the atmosphere. The advent of this new unchecked nuclear power may well require us to withdraw from the agreement.

Fifth, it is altogether possible and indeed, in my opinion, probable that a group of nations, with Soviet encouragement, will seek to amend the treaty in the not distant future so as to ban underground tests without inspection or with wholly inadequate arrangements for inspection. In this connection I noted with interest the statement of former Ambassador Dean to the Foreign Relations Committee:

We will undoubtedly be urged, in the spirit of amity and good will, to halt underground testing. But in my judgment without an adequate and effective treaty banning underground tests this would be a tragic mistake.

We may find ourselves under strong pressure in the months ahead to accept an amendment to the treaty banning underground tests without satisfactory inspection. We must be prepared to take our knocks, if necessary, and remain firm in our resolve that a ban on underground tests must be conditioned on fully satisfactory arrangements for inspection. I trust that the Department of State will be alert to this danger and will do what it can to forestall an effort to isolate the United States on this matter.

It is my belief that these and other risks that we will inevitably run under this agreement are tolerable: Provided, that it is firm national policy to keep alert and to protect the present and future credibility of our military deterrent; and Provided, furthermore, that it is firm national policy to use the protections

provided in the treaty when, as, and if needed to guard vital national interests, including the right of withdrawal and the right to exercise the veto by withholding our consent under Article 2 to any attempt to change the treaty by amendment in a form imperiling our vital interests. These protections constitute our explicit rights under the agreement, they form a basic part of the document, we deliberately had them included, and we should be ready to exercise them if emergent events so require.

Mr. President, the essence of my view on this treaty, which has been referred to as a limited treaty, is that it is indeed limited. Actually it is not a treaty, but a loose commitment, a statement of present intentions of the parties not to engage in nuclear weapon test explosions in the atmosphere, in outer space or under water. This nation's commitment will rest on the assumption that certain conditions are met - including the condition that the supreme interests of this nation are not jeopardized. Should those interests be jeopardized we shall be released from our commitment.

In conclusion, Mr. President, the national security interests of this country are of course deeply involved in a number of other situations quite apart from this treaty.

For example, the development of NATO and the obvious efforts of France to reduce its importance; the question of economic and political relations between

the European Common Market and other Western European countries.



particularly Vietnam; and the question of appropriate American policy toward the developing nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

This series of problems certainly gives us no excuse to relax.

If this debate helps the people of the United States really understand what they have to do to provide for the safety of the nation and the preservation of their freedoms, then any time and attention given to this test ban agreement is well-spent. The Senate will have done what it can to put the treaty in the proper perspective.