

INDIAN HOSTILITIES IN OREGON AND WASHINGTON
TERRITORIES.

MESSAGE

FROM

THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES,

TRANSMITTING

*The correspondence on the subject of Indian hostilities in Oregon and
Washington Territories.*

JULY 8, 1856.—Referred to the Committee on Military Affairs, and ordered to be
printed.

To the House of Representatives:

I communicate herewith a report of the Secretary of War, in reply
to a resolution of the House of the 25th ultimo, "on the subject of
Indian hostilities in Oregon and Washington Territories."

FRANKLIN PIERCE.

WASHINGTON, July 8, 1856.

WAR DEPARTMENT,
Washington, July 7, 1856.

SIR: I have the honor to submit herewith the correspondence
called for by the resolution of the House of Representatives of the
25th ultimo, on the subject of Indian hostilities in Oregon and
Washington Territories.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JEFFERSON DAVIS,
Secretary of War.

To the PRESIDENT.

TERRITORY OF OREGON, HEADQUARTERS,
Portland, May 13, 1856.

SIR: The operations of the Oregon volunteers on the northern
frontier have been attended with additional and satisfactory successes
since the date of my last communication. Having made the entire
circuit of the hostile Indian country, the first regiment was concen-

trated by my order at the Dalles, and the main body of it moved in detachments to rendezvous in the Willamette valley, where they have been mustered out of service. The delay in the forward movement of the regular troops, under Colonel Wright, occasioned by the disastrous affair at the Cascades, compelled the detention in service of the volunteers at the north much beyond the time I had contemplated. Awakened at length to the true character and intent of the Indian outbreak, and the imminence of the danger to our settlements on the east side of the Cascade mountains, the efforts of the United States troops are so directed as to lead me to anticipate that my fellow-citizens of the northern army may, consistently with our security, be released from service. I have made arrangements to maintain a small force for the purpose of scouting the country lying along the eastern base of the Cascades, as there are many passes available during the approaching season, by means of which the populous settlements of the Willamette valley may be readily penetrated. Until the country on the south side of the Columbia river is occupied by the regular troops, prudence dictates that my attention should not be wholly withdrawn from that section of the Territory. The indisposition manifested by those who direct the movements of the regular troops sent here for the protection of our settlements, to appreciate the motives by which I have been governed in the organization of the volunteer service, and the want of a cordial co-operation on their part in the prosecution of the campaign against the common enemy, are deeply to be regretted. I cannot, however, relax my efforts in the faithful discharge of the responsible duties devolved upon me by the exciting emergency.

Important and highly satisfactory results have been achieved by the southern regiment. On the 27th ultimo an engagement occurred between the volunteers, under command of General Lamerick, and the main body of the hostile tribes in that section. A speedy conclusion of hostilities in the Rogue River valley is confidently anticipated.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. L. CURRY,
Governor of Oregon.

Hon. JEFFERSON DAVIS,
Secretary of War.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Benicia, May 15, 1856.

COLONEL: I have seen a published letter, dated 7th April, in the Oregon Times, addressed to the Hon. Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War, by G. L. Curry, governor of Oregon, in which he reiterates and confirms all that had been done and said against me by the legislature of Oregon, and the unfortunate Governor I. I. Stevens, of Washington Territory, and, like the former, demanded my removal from the command of the department of the Pacific. The main object of this letter, it would seem, is to vindicate and justify his usurpation of power in raising volunteers and making war and a winter expedition beyond his Territorial jurisdiction against Indians not at

war with the whites, and where there was not a white man to protect or defend, whilst the people of his own Territory were bleeding under the tomahawk and scalping-knife of the savage.

In order to justify the course he has thought proper to pursue, and his refusal to communicate with me on the subject of the war, or make known to me the military wants of his Territory, he says, that "on his return from southern Oregon, he learned from those representing him, who had made me an official visit in his absence, of the inauguration of a plan utterly at variance with his own, which obviated the necessity of a personal interview." In this there must have been some mistake; for I communicated nothing to his assumed representatives, whoever they might have been, in regard to my "plan" to suppress Indian hostilities in Oregon and Washington. However this may be, I have no doubt that my "plan" was and is "utterly at variance with his own."

As I am governed in my course by laws and regulations, and exercise no power not conferred on me by Congress or the President of the United States, and as I have no Territory upon which to levy contributions, nor the control of the treasury of the United States, my plan simply embraced, to the extent of the means placed at my disposal, the suppression of Indian hostilities as soon as possible, and the protection and preservation of the settlers of Oregon and Washington from the cruelties of savage warfare. I did not consider the "war a God-send to the people," nor that it should be prolonged to gratify political and pecuniary speculators, under the pretence of enriching the country. In a word, I played no deceptive game to deprive the people of their property, or to induce them to believe the war a God-send, and the longer it was continued the better it would be for them, no matter how many might, in the mean time, suffer or be sacrificed by savage cruelties. From all which it will be seen that my plan was, as the governor truly said, "utterly at variance with his own," and he might have added directly the reverse.

Although, if I could have made a campaign, which I could not do for the want of means, yet I did not consider a winter campaign, for good and substantial reasons, expedient. And if Colonel Wright had taken the advice and attempted a winter campaign, as *suggested and most strenuously urged upon him* by Governor Curry and Governor Stevens, their cup would have been full to overflowing; for it can scarcely be doubted, that if the colonel had done so, and *as was marked out for him*, not a dwelling would have been left standing on the banks of the Columbia river from the Dalles to its mouth. Had such an event happened, the two governors would have been gratified to their heart's content, for it could not have failed to have caused a long war. I would, however, have established a post, if I could have obtained the means of transporting the necessary supplies before winter set in, at or near Fort Walla-Walla; not because I deemed it necessary to defend or protect the inhabitants of either Washington or Oregon from the Indians in that region, but simply to prevent what followed—a war by Governor Curry's troops with the Walla-Wallas and several of the neighboring tribes, and to keep those tribes from joining the Yakimas, the authors of the war east of the Cascade mountains, should

they be so inclined. That the Walla-Wallas were peaceably inclined, is evident from the fact that Major Chinn remained, with, I believe, only four volunteer companies within the distance of thirty miles of Fort Walla-Walla, sending out almost daily scouting parties that approached within a short distance of the fort, when the major reported there were a thousand warriors, without being molested or interfered with. Again, when Lieutenant Colonel Kelley moved against Fort Walla-Walla, A. Olney, sub-Indian agent, who was not considered favorably inclined to the chief of the Walla-Wallas, reports in substance as follows, viz: "That soon after the arrival of the command at Walla-Walla river, above the fort, a party of Indians were seen on the hills above the camp, when a detachment of volunteers commenced a fire upon them. That he, Olney, succeeded in inducing them to suspend their fire, and had a talk with the Indians, in which he learned the whereabouts of the chief's camp, and directed them to take a message to the chief informing him that he wished to see him. The next day they proceeded in the direction of the village, but before reaching it the chief, with five of his men, met them with a flag of truce. They inquired of him what he wanted; he replied, peace. They told him to return to his people with his flag, and fight them. He said he did not wish to fight. They gave him his choice, to return and fight, or go with them and remain a prisoner. He wished them to go and camp, and allow him to return to his village, and on the morrow he would return and hold a talk. They told him if he left, they would at once attack his village. He, with his men, went with them to camp, where they were disarmed and tied. During the night, some arrangement was made about beef animals, horses, &c., and one of his people sent to the village directing them (the Indians) to gather up horses to supply the colonel's command. On the way they proceeded to the village, which during the night had been abandoned; they found articles which had been taken from the fort. Here he, the chief, asserted that he could recover most of the property, and such as could not be restored he would pay for. The next morning the command was ordered to proceed up Walla-Walla river. Detachments were starting at intervals and diverging to the right and left, and before the command had all left the camp, firing commenced in the advance, but by whom he did not know, but was forced to believe it was by volunteers, as it was evident to him that the Indians did not meditate an attack, for they were at the same time engaged in preparing the morning meal; for in several instances the volunteers dismounted and partook of the roast beef found at the fires where the Indians were encamped." The result of all which ended with driving the Indians across Snake river, adding several tribes to the ranks of the hostile Yakimas, the loss of nearly all the volunteer horses, either captured by the Indians or died of fatigue and starvation, and perhaps the issuing of nearly or quite a million of dollars in scrip. We shall see whether this will be "a God-send to the people." It may be to the money speculators, but not to the people. I am informed that the scrip is now selling for from twenty to thirty-five cents in the hundred.

Thus ended the winter campaign of Governor Curry. If there had been any Oregonians, or other white inhabitants, to protect or defend

east of the Cascade range of mountains, there might have been, perhaps, some excuse for his usurpation of power and raising troops, and making war beyond his own territory and jurisdiction. But such was not the case, except from the Cascades to the Dalles. The few inhabitants—some four or five residing beyond and near Fort Walla-Walla, besides those attached, or who had been attached, principally Canadians or half-breeds, to the Hudson's Bay Company—had left that country under orders, dated 12th of October, 1855, of N. Olney, sub-Indian agent, who, no doubt, gave the order under great excitement and alarm.

Hence, I repeat, there was no circumstance to justify Governor Curry in sending troops from Oregon to Washington Territory, to make war on the Walla-Wallas, from whom the Oregonians had no danger to apprehend. It appears to me to be wholly inexcusable, when the inhabitants of his own Territory were suffering under savage barbarities. The expedition was no less barren in its results, than it tended greatly to embarrass the regular service, by the governor's great demand for horses and mules, as well as other supplies, at that time greatly needed for the regular troops, and for which I had to send to San Francisco and Benicia.

The governor, however, to direct public attention from his unwise, unnecessary, and uncalled for winter expedition, would make it appear, in consequence of my "plan," that I am accountable for the massacres which occurred at the mouth of Rogue river, and the Cascades. In this he is mistaken, as well as in all of his statements made against me. When those massacres took place, I was more than four hundred miles from one, and more than eight hundred from the other. To say nothing of the causes which produced the massacre at the Cascades, the governor could not have but known that the one at Rogue river was caused by his volunteers, who left their position to attend a ball. I think the governor ought to have been generous enough to charge this to himself and not to me. If, however, he had adopted my plan, or had been half as anxious to save his people as I was, and am, from the horrors of savage warfare, the massacres at the Cascades and at Rogue river would never have happened; and the many horrible excesses which disgrace human nature, by the volunteers as well as Indians, would have been prevented in Rogue River valley and elsewhere.

But whilst making the charge against me, he might, with equal propriety, have included the massacre at Panama—that of the chief Pu-pu-mox-mox, and his companions, with all the horrible outrages, as reported by N. Olney, on the body of the chief before and after his death; the massacre of twenty-five friendly Indians, eighteen of whom were women and children, by his volunteers; Major Lupton and party; that of Hank Brown, and others of friendly Indians, at Looking-Glass Prairie; as also of the friendly band of the chief Old Jake; and though last, not the least barbarous, the massacre, by whites, of the friendly chief Spencer's family, six in number, all strangled to death with cords, and his wife's sister violated.

Spencer was at the time in the employ of the United States, and his family had written guarantees from Colonel Wright of their character and good intentions towards Americans.

I repeat, if my plan had been adopted, all the above-mentioned massacres, with those that followed, and inflicted upon the white inhabitants, would have been prevented. But on the part of the Oregonians it was war, and not peace. Extermination of the Indians was the order of the day, and no efforts on the part of the Territorial officers were made to check it. Hence Captain Smith, with two companies of the regulars at Fort Lane, had to employ the greater part of his command to protect four hundred friendly Indians, in waiting at his post to be conducted to the coast reservation, from being killed by the whites; and hence the determination of the inhabitants of Willamette valley to kill these Indians, with all that might accompany them, should an attempt be made to remove them to the coast reservation.

To all which I will only add an extract of a letter from General Joel Palmer, superintendent of Indian affairs in Oregon, on the subject of their removal, who says, December 1st, 1855: "I have received intelligence that meetings of the citizens of Willamette valley, residing along the route to be travelled by these Indians in reaching the designated encampment, as well as those in the vicinity of the latter, have resolved upon resisting such removal, and avowing a determination to *kill* all who may be brought among them, as well as those who sought to effect the object."

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major General.

Lient. Colonel L. THOMAS, *Asst. Adjt. General,*
Headquarters of the Army, New York City.

BENICIA, HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
San Francisco, May 4, 1856.

COLONEL: I hasten to report that I arrived last evening from a tour to Crescent City, Fort Orford, Vancouver, the Cascades, and the Dalles. The three last posts are on the Columbia river.

I was impelled to visit these posts, and especially those on the Columbia river, in consequence of the attack by the Indians on the Cascades. Colonel George Wright, of the 9th infantry, in preparing an expedition for the Walla-Walla country, withdrew all his troops except a sergeant and eight men at a small block-house, to guard and protect the Portage, over which all the supplies for the troops above had to pass. The Indians, being apprized of the small force left to guard this important position, determined to take possession, it being one of their great salmon fisheries. They waited until they supposed Col. Wright had proceeded on his march to Walla-Walla, and accordingly, on the 26th March last, they attacked the Cascades, killing

thirteen men, women, and children, besides killing one and wounding two soldiers defending the block-house, and plundered and burned most of the dwellings on the Portage. The news of the attack the same evening was communicated to Col. Wright, who had only marched five miles beyond the Dalles. The colonel countermarched the next morning for the Dalles, where he found the steamers Mary and Wasco, both of which he took possession of with his troops, and proceeded to the Cascades, where he arrived on the morning of the 28th instant, and soon drove the Indians from the Portage, killing two warriors.

The colonel immediately ordered two block-houses to be erected, one at the upper and the other at the lower Cascades, stationing a company in each. (See the colonel's reports of the attack, and results, herewith transmitted, marked 1 and 2; also, Sergeant Kelly's report, marked 3.) For his gallant defence of the block-house I would recommend him to the special notice of the Secretary of War.

Lieut. Col. Silas Casey, of the 9th infantry, has exhibited great enterprise, zeal, and activity in his operations against the Indians on Puget's sound. He reports, on the 4th, 12th, and 15th April, that the Indians in that region are disorganized, and that Leschi and his war chiefs and immediate followers have left for the Yakima country. It is said by the Indians remaining, who are surrendering to the colonel, that the chiefs have gone to the Yakimas for reinforcements and supplies. To prevent their return, I have ordered Col. Wright, with five companies well prepared, to move promptly against the Yakimas.

The successes of Lieut. Col. Buchanan against the Indians in Rogue River valley are highly flattering. I have great hopes that he will soon compel those Indians to sue for peace. His troops have killed some twenty Indians, and destroyed several villages, besides a large amount of Indian supplies. The only obstacle in the way of entire success is the determination of the citizens and Governor Curry's troops to exterminate the Indians, as may be discovered in former reports, as well as reports marked 4, 5, and 6, herewith transmitted, of Joel Palmer, superintendent of Indian affairs in Oregon,* and Lieut. Sheridan, marked 7, and to prolong the war, and for no other object than to promote the ends and designs of political and pecuniary speculators. The latter are already in the market buying Oregon scrip at twenty, thirty, and thirty-five cents on the dollar. If the exterminating principle is not abandoned, I repeat that not a farmer will be left to till the ground in Oregon. All will be either killed or driven from their farms into cities or places of defence. The Indians can be exterminated, but only at an expense of fifty or one hundred millions, and thousands of innocent and valuable lives. If this principle is to be maintained, which I do not believe is entertained beyond the limits

* I furnished the superintendent of Indian affairs with forty men, commanded by Lieuts. Sheridan and Hazen, both gallant officers, and will do efficient service. I also sent forty stand of arms, with ammunition, for the use of the men employed by the superintendent. All which was considered sufficient for the present moment by Gen. Palmer.

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major General.

of Oregon, the sooner troops are sent to the Pacific department the better it will be for the inhabitants of Oregon and Washington, and perhaps California. The exterminating principle cannot fail to bring the Indians of northern California into the field against the whites.

In conclusion, I would urgently request that at least the recruits (say 250) be sent as soon as practicable to fill up the ranks of the 9th infantry.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major General.

Lieut. Col. L. THOMAS,
Asst. Adjt. General.

HEADQUARTERS NORTHERN DISTRICT, DEPT. OF THE PACIFIC,
Camp at the Cascades, Columbia River, W. T., April 4, 1856.

SIR: For the information of the major-general commanding the department, I have the honor to submit the following report of my operations since the 25th ultimo, the date of my last communication:

Leaving Fort Dalles on the morning of the 26th of March, I halted at Five-mile creek, and encamped for the night. At 10 o'clock p. m., I received an express from Brevet Major Haller, of the 4th infantry, the commander of Fort Dalles, informing me that the Indians had made an attack at the Cascades; that they were murdering the people and burning the houses, and that the steamers "Mary" and "Wasco" had barely escaped falling into their hands. I determined on the instant to make a retrograde movement. The night was intensely dark, and I could not march until daybreak. Arriving at Fort Dalles at 8 o'clock on the morning of the 27th March, I found both of the small steamers at that place. I immediately embarked with companies A, E, F, and G, of the 9th infantry, a detachment of twenty-three dragoons of company E, 1st regiment, and a detachment of company L, 3d artillery, with two mountain howitzers—one on each steamer, and two hundred and fifty rank and file. Owing to the defective machinery of the "Mary," our progress was slow, and at dark I was compelled to halt at Wind river, ten miles above this place, the difficult navigation below Wind river rendering it imprudent to proceed further by night. At 4 a. m. on the following morning (28th,) both steamers got under way, the "Mary" leading. On approaching the landing at the head of the Cascades the "Mary" struck on a rock, which detained her ten minutes, within fifty yards of the shore.

The Indians at that moment had undisputed possession of the landing, and opened a fire on us before we reached the shore. No time was to be lost; our troops were thrown on the land with the utmost rapidity; the steamer Wasco touched the shore at the same moment, and the whole command advanced to the brow of the hill, and returned the fire of the enemy with spirit. Immediately on our right

was a creek flowing into the Columbia; and, to interpose a check to the approaches on that flank, Captain Woodruff, 9th infantry, with his company, was crossed to the opposite bank. The Indians retreated from the open ground to dense thickets on the hill-side. Lieutenant Piper opened a fire with the howitzer. A second line of skirmishers, with its right resting on the creek, was advanced, under Brevet Major Lugenbeal, and Captain Woodruff moved forward at the same moment, and deployed with his left on the creek. Lieut. Davidson, with the dragoon detachment, followed, prepared to act as occasion might require. The enemy fled in every direction, hotly pursued by our troops; but, being well acquainted with this rugged country, they soon concealed themselves in their mountain fastnesses. The troops recaptured about fifty horses and mules; also some stock which the Indians had seized, but not yet driven off. A large number of the horses and mules belong to the United States, and at the moment of attack by the Indians were *in transitu* to Fort Dalles.

I next organized a force, consisting of companies of Captains Winder and Archer, 9th infantry; detachment of dragoons under Lieut. Lear, 3d artillery, with a howitzer, under Lieutenant Piper—the whole commanded by Brevet Lieut. Col. Steptoe—to advance to the block-house, and from thence to the lower landing. This duty was handsomely executed—the enemy routed and dispersed at every point, a large number of animals captured, two Indian warriors killed, and all their property destroyed.

The only military force on the Portage at the moment of attack was a sergeant and eight men of company H, 4th infantry, in a block-house at the lower end of the railroad. One man was killed and two severely wounded before the party could secure themselves. All the citizens near by instantly sought security in the block-house; and although constantly besieged for more than forty-eight hours, the brave sergeant and his little party nobly defended the place, and are deserving of the highest praise.

Having reoccupied the whole line of the Portage, my attention was next directed to a reconnaissance of the adjacent country, and an examination of the trails and passes leading into this place.

The country is mountainous and extremely difficult to traverse; many trails radiate from the Cascades, but it does not appear probable that the Indians who made the attack retired in a body. They have doubtless dispersed in many directions over the country. To restore confidence and security on the line of the Portage, and to protect permanently this important point on our lines of communication, I have posted a company at the lower landing. Captain Winder, the commander, is now engaged in erecting a block-house. I have also commenced a block-house at this point, which will effectually command the railroad and steamboat landing.

The occupation of the two extremes, and the block-house at the foot of the railroad, will afford ample protection to the whole line.

In closing this report, I must add my commendation of the zeal, energy, and fearless intrepidity displayed by the officers and men who landed with me on the 28th of March, brought (most of them)

for the first time under fire; yet their deployments were handsomely made, and they advanced in good order.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
G. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry, Commanding.

Capt. D. R. JONES,
A. A. Gen., Headquarters Dep. of the Pacific, Benicia, Cal.

True copy :

RICHARD ARNOLD,
First Lieut. 3d Artillery, A. D. C.

HEADQUARTERS NORTHERN DISTRICT, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Camp at the Cascades, Columbia river, W. T., April 5, 1856.

SIR: My communication of yesterday will have advised the commanding general of the principal operations of the troops under my command during the preceding ten days.

I have been compelled to suspend the projected advance to the Walla-Walla country, and confined my movements to the north of the Columbia river. In fact the war is now confined to the country of the Yakima and Washington territories, so far as we are concerned.

Before I left Fort Vancouver I sent a chief (Um-hur-litz) to gain information with respect to the feelings and movements of the Indians beyond the Walla-Walla, on the Snake and Palone rivers. This chief has returned bringing with him the Indian chief called "Captain John," and also an old man, a Cayuse chief, third in rank in his tribe. They have been sent by the principal chiefs, with the strongest assurances of their continued friendship. "Captain John" is a "Nez Percé," and always has been distinguished for his unwavering fidelity to the whites. These Indians say that overtures have been made to their bands by the Yakimas, and great inducements held out if they would join them; but that they have always declined having anything to do with them, &c.

After the recapture of the Cascades by our troops, my attention was directed to the friendly Indians, both on this side and in Oregon. I was anxious to know what they had been doing all the time. Some of them I was well satisfied had joined the attacking party, and I was well convinced from their actions that most of them knew the attack was to be made. They had been recognised by a wounded man; but when they found the battle going against them, they came on our side with strong professions of friendship.

The Indians at the Cascades, on the Washington side, number about one hundred and fifty men, women, and children—probably forty men. I sent and took them all prisoners, as well as two from Dog river, in Oregon. I ordered a military commission for the trial of such as might be presented.

The commission found the chief "Chimoneth" and nine men guilty of aiding, assisting, and co-operating with the hostile Indians in the

attack on the Cascades, and sentenced them to be hung. One of the convicted I have reprieved; the others, eight besides the chief, have been executed.

It rains incessantly here. The roads and thoroughfares are almost totally impassable.

At the request of Lieutenant Colonel Morris I have sent company "I," 9th infantry, to Fort Vancouver. At Fort Dalles they have two full companies of the 4th infantry, 35 men of artillery, and 25 dragoons.

As soon as we can build the block-houses, and allay the alarm and general consternation which has prevailed for several days along the river, I am in hopes that confidence will be restored, and our troops will then be ready for any movements in advance.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,

Colonel 9th Infantry, Commanding.

Captain D. R. JONES,
A. A. Gen., Headquarters Dep. of the Pacific, Benicia, Cal.

True copy :

RICHARD ARNOLD,
First Lieutenant 3d Artillery, A. D. C.

FORT CASCADES, W. T.,
March 31, 1856.

SIR: I have the honor of reporting to you the particulars of the Indian attack on this post.

The attack was made on the morning of the 26th of March, between the hours of eight and nine o'clock. The first intimation was a few shots fired in the vicinity of the block-house, and at the same time we learned that one woman had been killed at the upper Cascades. The men in the block-house (four and myself) ran down stairs when the first soldier (McManus) received a shot in the hip, at the same time the cook gave the alarm of Indians. We ran in and secured all the port-holes, loaded the gun, and placed a sentry over the door of the house; all the men loaded their muskets, and remained at the loop-holes, watching the manœuvres of the Indians, when about twenty in number appeared on the hill in front of the block-house. We ran out the piece and fired at them, which caused them to disperse. From the position of those Indians, I am certain our shot had effect. The citizens who were trying to reach the block-house made their appearance about this time; a hot fire began immediately upon the citizens from the hill, which we returned until the last of the citizens in sight reached the house. The Indians then opened a heavy fire upon the block-house; the fire was returned by the men at the loop-holes, when the Indians would shift from stump to stump. This was continued for about four hours, when the firing slackened. They fired an odd shot, for the remainder of the day, about twelve o'clock m. The sentries discovered that there were Indians around the

boarding-house; we brought the gun round, but, in consequence of the port-holes being so small, we could not bring the gun to bear on them with any advantage. When we found that they were going to burn the house, we fired the gun as near as we could in the direction of them, but I think none were injured, but it had the effect of driving them from their position. Nothing of any consequence occurred during the remainder of the evening. About three o'clock, one of the soldiers, (Bernan,) who was shot at the commencement and rolled down the bank to the river, made his appearance among the rocks; he succeeded, after some time, in getting to the block-house. About twelve o'clock at night, Honter, one of the sentries, discovered lights around the houses in front of the block-house; he fired, and the lights disappeared. About four o'clock in the morning, the Indians fired some arrows at the dogs that were at the houses in front of the block-house. About ten o'clock a. m., there being no provisions in the block-house, Sheridan, Houser, and Williams ran from the block-house to the houses on the right, and succeeded in getting some provisions. About twelve o'clock, one shot was fired at the block-house. The remainder of the day, no sign of Indians. About four o'clock in the evening, some Indians were seen on the other side of the river on horseback; we fired the gun at them. About five o'clock, there being no sign of Indians, four men with two citizens went upon the hill, and found one boy killed; they brought him down and put him in the cook-house. These four men (Sheridan, Houser, Williams, and Roach) searched all the houses, and brought all the arms and ammunition that could be found to the block-house, as we had but nine muskets. Nothing occurred during the night; next morning Colonel Steptoe's command relieved us. There can be no doubt but that we killed some five or six Indians.

I am, sir, respectfully, your obedient servant,

MATTHEW KELLY,

Sergeant Company "H," Fourth Infantry.

Col. G. WRIGHT.

Names of the party.

Names, company, and regiment.	Remarks.
M. Kelly.....H, 4	
Frederick Beman.....H, 4	Wounded about fifty yards from block-house.
Owen McManus.....H, 4	Wounded about five yards from block-house.
— Houser.....H, 4	
— Williams.....H, 4	
— Roach.....H, 4	
— Smiley.....H, 4	
— Sheridan.....H, 4	
Lawrence Rooney.....H, 4	Killed. He was chopping wood on the hill at the time of the attack.

Official:

RICHARD ARNOLD,
First Lieutenant 3d Artillery, A. D. C.

OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT INDIAN AFFAIRS,

Dayton, O. T., April 13, 1856—12 m.

DEAR GENERAL: On my arrival here this morning, I learn that not a little uneasiness is manifested among the Indians on the Grande Ronde reservation, owing to the unwillingness manifested on the part of the Rogue River Indians to give up their arms.

This unwillingness appears to be in consequence of the apprehension that they might be attacked, and thus be entirely defenceless. Others of the various tribes have done so, and they express dissatisfaction at the Rogue Rivers retaining theirs. The citizens generally demand that they be disarmed.

Some little difficulty also has occurred between the agents of the Indian department, either as an excuse to have an opportunity to resign, or from real cause, I know not which; at all events, there is a disposition to avoid facing the music when the times require firmness and unity of action.

In the dilemma in which I am placed—between disaffection among the Indians on the reservation, and the alarm and excitement among the citizens, and backing out of agents, (for two of them have sent in their resignations this morning)—I am likely to fail in the entire plan, unless I can obtain aid from the military department.

We have now on the reservation, and at this place, awaiting transportation, about fifteen hundred Indians. It is of the utmost importance that they should be kept there, *and quiet*; with a citizen guard we will, I fear, be unable to maintain order. There is a moral influence depending upon the presence of regular troops, not attainable by volunteers. Those which I have hired (some sixty men) may serve as auxiliaries; but unless we can obtain troops at once, everything may be lost.

I have also to request that I may be furnished with forty stand of arms, to place in the hands of employees on the reservation.

I shall endeavor to call on you in person before you leave. In the mean time, I pray you send me help. I depart immediately for the Grande Ronde reservation, and shall personally investigate the precise condition of affairs, and take such steps as may be advisable with my limited means.

I have the honor to be, general, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOEL PALMER,

Supt. Indian Affairs.

Maj. Gen. JOHN E. WOOL,

Com'g Dept. Pacific, Fort Vancouver, W. T.

True copy:

RICHARD ARNOLD,

First Lieut. 3d Artillery, Aid-de-camp.

OFFICE SUPERINTENDENT INDIAN AFFAIRS,
Dayton, O. T., April 19, 1856.

DEAR GENERAL: In accordance with the intention expressed in my letter to you of the 14th instant, I proceeded to the Grande Ronde reservation, where I found considerable uneasiness and alarm had been gotten up by representations apparently for no other purpose than to cause trouble. But, as mentioned in that letter, the Rogue River Indians decline giving up their arms, for the reasons stated; and whilst I have no fears that they meditate any hostile movement, yet, in the popular phrenzy and feeling among our citizens, I regard it highly impolitic to permit them to retain even the few guns they possess, as it serves a few agitators means of creating alarm, and keeps the country in constant agitation.

There appears to be a determination, on the part of the people, to take steps to disarm them; and a failure to effect the object, on my part, will be followed by the most unwarranted assaults against the Indian department, and bring the community in direct conflict with all the tribes on the reservation. I dare not attempt to disarm them with the force at my disposal.

Doctor Newell, who has just returned from a visit at the Ronde, can give you many details, and explain to you the necessity of an increased force at that point.

I cannot but express my fears that a failure to obtain them would prove disastrous to the whole scheme, and end in deluging the entire country in blood. I need not say that every effort will be exerted to avoid such a calamity.

The fears of the Indians are apparently somewhat allayed for the time; but with the denunciations of political demagogues and interested politicians, renewed efforts to create alarm and provoke retaliation may enable those agitators to wean the confidence of the Indians entirely from us.

In conclusion, permit me to hope that the forces under your jurisdiction may be so arranged as to afford the aid so essential to maintain order and preserve peace among the Indians within this district.

I have the honor to be, general, most respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOEL PALMER,
Supt. Indian Affairs.

Maj. Gen. JOHN E. WOOL,
U. S. Army, Com'g Dept. Pacific, Fort Vancouver.

True copy:

RICHARD ARNOLD,
First Lieut. 3d Artillery, Aid-de-camp.

PORTLAND, April 27, 1856.

DEAR GENERAL: Your note by express, handed me by Captain Dall, finds me in a position which I fear would hardly justify me in going to Fort Orford by this steamer. This I regret very much, for, in ad-

dition to my own inclinations and connexions of priority, I would wish to co-operate and aid in any movement which your long experience and better judgment might suggest as advisable. But I am admonished by the unsettled condition of affairs at the Grande Ronde, and the fact that General Persey has this day given orders to disband the troops under Colonel Cornelius, and who will in a few days return to the valley, portions of them, doubtless, with increased embittered feelings against all Indians, and who may, with the disaffected, noisy politicians, operating to create a stampede among the Indians now on the reservation, effect such an object. And as the plan to defeat so unfortunate a catastrophe has not been fully consummated, I fear by leaving now the object for which the trip is intended in the Fort Orford district would be more than overbalanced by the misfortune almost sure to follow so hasty a departure; besides, there are numerous unpaid claims, the funds for which came up on this steamer, that if neglected would cause a hornet's nest around my own doors—funds also to be forwarded to the different agents, and many other duties required by the service, rendering it highly impolitic to absent myself so soon; all of which can be arranged by the next downward trip of the Columbia. I therefore propose putting it off until then, and go prepared to effect the object. In the mean time I will send messengers to the Indians in the interior of that district, and if possible go through by land myself, if I can get off so as to be there as early as by steamer.

The mails bring me no intelligence as to any movements in Washington city relative to removals; the reports may or may not be true. My course is clear—that is, to push ahead, regardless of cliques, factions, or political demagogues. This I shall do, and if sustained by the government, have hopes of ultimately seeing my acts approved by all good men.

I have no political aspirations to gratify, but have higher aims than those likely to be attained by selling myself to those political hucksters. Justice and humanity toward those weak, ignorant, and down-trodden aborigines, holds a higher claim, and he who disregards them gives aid to factions disreputable to our reputation as a nation, and violates his duties as a good citizen; but whilst I would strive to protect and maintain the rights of the Indians, I would by no means trample upon those of the whites: both claim the interposition of agents of the government; and as some good people are pretty generally convinced that it is easier and safer to effect a peace with those Indian tribes by negotiations than with the rifle, we may be permitted to effect such an object in southern Oregon.

With the highest considerations, I remain your obedient servant,
JOEL PALMER,
Superintendent of Indian Affairs.

Major General JOHN E. WOOL,
United States Army.

True copy:

RICHARD ARNOLD,
First Lieutenant 3d Artillery, A. D. C.

CAMP, LOWER CASCADES, W. T., April 18, 1856.

SIR: The bodies of the parties of Indians supposed to have been murdered, on or about the 4th of this month, were yesterday discovered a short distance from the road leading from the camp to the block-house, by a party sent from this camp under charge of Lieutenant Harvie.

To-day, in obedience to your instructions, I buried the bodies, and made an examination of the manner in which they came to their death, and of the ground in the vicinity. The *Indian chief Spencer* identifies the bodies of his *father, wife, child, and neice*, and two young men, Vancouver Indians—six in all. The men had their hands tightly lashed behind their backs, and were then strangled to death, by short cords tied around their necks with slip-knots, and then drawn tight by pulling at both ends. The hands of the women were not tied, but they were strangled to death in the same manner; a silk handkerchief was used to strangle the child, a boy three years old. The person of the young woman, from the position of her body and dress, was undoubtedly violated. I did not see her until she had been moved, but when first seen by the interpreter, Mr. Haines, her body was in such a position as to leave no doubt that the above was the case. I feel satisfied that the party were murdered by white men. I send you, with this report, a buckskin gauntlet found near one of the bodies.

The day on which the Indians were seen passing the block-house, it was reported at this camp, by Colonel J. Meek, that a party of six men armed with rifles had followed them, saying that that party of Indians would never reach the lower end of the portage. I think all their names were known by him.

A party of the same size, well armed with rifles, reached this camp the same day. In the accompanying letter I give you some of their names.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Second Lieut. 4th Infantry, Commanding Camp,
Lower Cascades.

Colonel G. WRIGHT,
9th Infantry, Commanding District.

True copy:

RICHARD ARNOLD,
First Lieut. 3d Artillery, Aid-de-camp.

CAMP, LOWER CASCADES, W. T., April 18, 1856.

SIR: Enclosed please find the report required by your note of yesterday. The names of the persons alluded to in the report, are—
J. M. Hamilton, E. W. Baughman, S. Vandevere, W. M. Wilson,
and — Findlay.

I cannot be positive about Finlay, but think he was one of the party. They are all at the Cascades at present.

I am, sir, your obedient servant,

P. H. SHERIDAN,
Second Lieut. 4th Infantry, Commanding Camp,
Lower Cascades, W. T.

Colonel G. WRIGHT,
9th Infantry, Commanding District.

True copy:

RICHARD ARNOLD,
First Lieut. 3d Artillery, Aid-de-camp.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Benicia, May 20, 1856.

COLONEL: Since my communication of the 19th instant I have received from Colonel George Wright the enclosed copies of letters, marked 1, 2, and 3; by which it will be perceived that the troops of Governor Curry keep up their practice of killing friendly Indians.

Also, two letters from Lieutenant Colonel Casey, marked 4 and 5, which indicate, ere long, a termination of the Indian war in that region.

I likewise send a letter from Lieutenant J. Stewart, 3d artillery, marked 6, relating to the Indian difficulties on Tule river. It would appear that Lieutenant Livingston routed the Indians from a strong breast-work, when he killed some 20, and destroyed their camp and provisions. From other sources I have learned that, instead of 500 Indians, as I reported, there were but one hundred in the camp attacked. With the detachment from Tejon, under Lieutenant Allston, I have no doubt the war might be closed, if the citizens could be induced to abandon their determination to exterminate the Indians. Many of them, however, appear to thirst for Indian blood—no matter whether friends or enemies.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL,
Major General.

Lieutenant Colonel L. THOMAS,
Assist. Adjt. Gen., Headquarters of the Army, New York.

No. 1.

HEADQUARTERS, NORTHERN DIST., DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Camp at Fort Dalles, O. T., April 27, 1856.

SIR: I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a letter this day received from Mr. Thompson, the Indian agent at this place; also a copy of a letter I have addressed to the governor of this Territory.

I cross the river to-morrow with companies "E," 1st dragoons,
H. Ex. Doc. 118 —2

"L," 3d artillery, "K," 4th infantry, and "A" and "C," 9th infantry. I have three mountain howitzers, and provisions for fifty days. I shall muster on the Klikitat, when you will again hear from me.

Very respectfully, your most obedient servant,
G. WRIGHT,
Colonel 9th Infantry, Commanding.

Captain D. R. JONES,
*Assistant Adjutant General,
Headquarters, Department of the Pacific, Benicia, Cal.*

A true copy :

D. R. JONES,
Assistant Adjutant General.

—
No. 2.

AGENCY OFFICE,
Dalles, April 20, 1856.

SIR: I would call your attention to the fact that there are at the several Indian encampments within this agency district about three hundred friendly Indians.

On the breaking out of hostilities, in October last, an order was given by this department for all Indians who desired to be friendly towards the whites, to report themselves to the agent for this district, who would enrol their names, receive and protect them as friends, and appoint local agents to watch over their interests; and that all those who refused to comply with this order would be considered and treated as enemies. The above mentioned Indians acceded to our terms; and, with the exception of a few at Dog river, have been constant in their fidelity.

Subsequently to their confederation, circumstances rendered it expedient to circumscribe the area of their communications; this, while it tended to their security, destroyed many of the ordinary facilities for procuring subsistence, and they soon came to want. Their necessities have been, to a considerable extent, supplied from this department.

The season for fish having arrived, some few have been furnished with passports to take fish at the Dalles of the Columbia river, on the Oregon side, and while thus peaceably engaged have been fired upon by the Oregon volunteers, who are encamped on the north side, and about three miles from the bank of the river. If the Indians were permitted peaceably to take fish they could subsist themselves, and thereby relieve the government of a large bill of expense.

I have therefore to request that you furnish a sufficient force to guaranty them protection (during the fishing season) from the common foe—as, also, from our own people.

I would mention that those people, while engaged in fishing, have

been fired upon on two different occasions; the first about six days ago, slightly wounding the Indian in the hand.

Respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. R. THOMPSON,
Indian Agent, Oregon.

G. WRIGHT,
Colonel 9th Infantry, Commanding.

Official: T. C. ENGLISH,
First Lieutenant 9th Infantry, A. A. A. G.

A true copy: D. R. JONES,
Assist. Adj. General.

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No. 3.

HEADQUARTERS, NORTHERN DIST., DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Camp at Fort Dalles, O. T., April 27, 1856.

GOVERNOR: I have the honor to enclose, herewith, a copy of a communication this day received from Mr. R. R. Thompson, Indian agent at this place.

As I march into the Yakima country to-morrow morning with all my disposable force, I am much embarrassed by these wanton attacks of the Oregon volunteers on the friendly Indians. Were I to accede to the request of the agent, to furnish a force to protect those Indians during the fishing season, it would diminish my force to such an extent as to render nugatory my campaign in the Yakima country.

Under these circumstances, and presuming that you still retain authority over the Oregon volunteers, although at present beyond your Territorial jurisdiction, I have to request that they may be withdrawn from the country on the north side of the Columbia river.

Very respectfully, I have the honor to be, your most obedient servant,

G. WRIGHT,
Col. 9th Infantry, Commanding.

Governor CURRY, *Salem, O. T.*

Official: T. C. ENGLISH,
First Lieut. 9th Infantry, A. A. A. G.

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No. 4.

HEADQUARTERS, PUGET'S SOUND DISTRICT,
Fort Steilacoom, W. T., May 6, 1856.

GENERAL: I have to acknowledge the receipt of yours of the 20th ultimo.

My scouts at the head of the Nisqually and Puyallup rivers have not returned.

Captain Dent came across a band of fifteen or twenty men on the Cedar river; destroyed their lodges and about five hundred bushels of potatoes, besides other provisions; he also destroyed a number of blankets, and thinks he killed two of the number. I have enclosed his report. The officers and men deserve much credit for their energy and perseverance.

Most of the Indians near the "Dwamish Lake" have come in. I have directed scouting parties, from different points, to move into the Cedar and Green river region, on the 13th instant, for the purpose of a thorough scouring. If the Indians are pressed on the other side of the mountains, it is my opinion that this side will be soon pacified.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,
Lieut. Col. 9th Infantry.

Maj. Gen. J. E. WOOL,
Comm'g Dept. of the Pacific, Benicia, California.

A true copy :

D. R. JONES,
A. A. General.

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No. 5.

HEADQUARTERS, PUGET'S SOUND DISTRICT,
Fort Steilacoom, W. T., May 2, 1856.

GENERAL: In continuation of my narrative of events, since my communication of the 24th ultimo, I have the honor to report that Lieutenant Shaaff returned from his scout on the Puyallup, on the 26th, with three prisoners. He killed two of the murderers of White and Northcraft. I have enclosed his report. His conduct, in my opinion, was commendable.

On the 27th, sixteen women and children surrendered themselves to me—among them one of the squaws of Kanaskut.

Lieutenant Nugen returned from Seattle on the 28th ultimo. He reports that two hundred Indians, including men, women, and children, (fifty of them men from the "Dwamish Lake,") have gone over to the reservations. Four men with their families still remain out, whom Captain Dent will take, if possible. I have enclosed Lieutenant Nugen's report.

There have been no depredations, positively known to have been committed by the Indians, in this district since about the 7th of March. The enemy are broken into small bands; and, although my last information is to the effect that none of the hostiles have crossed the mountains with the exception of four chiefs, Leshi, Kitsap, Sta-hi, and Quie-moth, still I am of opinion that, unless they succeed in getting a pretty considerable reinforcement from the other side, I shall be able to report this district pacified within a short time. Exhibitions of private revenge will probably take place on both sides for some time, but as far as my power extends it shall be controlled.

Yesterday I ordered a scout to the upper Puyallup; to-day, one to the Nisqually.

I have ordered a scout from the Muckle-shute, up the Nahchess pass, as far as the bare prairie.

On the 30th ultimo forty mules arrived.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,
Lt. Col. 9th Infantry, Comm'g P. S. Dist.

Maj. Gen. J. E. WOOL,
Comm'g Dept. of Pacific, Benicia, California.

A true copy :

D. R. JONES,
A. A. General.

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No. 6.

FORT MILLER, CALIFORNIA, *May 16, 1856.*

SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of the general's communication of the 6th instant, relative to Indian difficulties on Tule river.

My communication of the 1st instant will have informed the general of the first steps which I took in this matter. On the 8th I learned from Lieutenant Livingston that a second attack of the volunteers had been repulsed by the Indians, and that the latter had fortified themselves in a strong position. I immediately sent to him a howitzer, (12-pounder,) with a supply of suitable ammunition. I have not heard from him since; but from other sources I learn that on Tuesday, the 13th instant, he went with twenty men and about thirty volunteers to seek a road and position for the howitzer, and that in doing so he became satisfied that an immediate attack would be successful. He accordingly turned their position, attacking them in flank and driving them before him, killing many, (report says as many as twenty,) and destroying their camp and provisions. It is thought that the Indians will assemble again on the Cahuvia. Some of the last volunteers from the seat of disturbances report that Lieutenant Allston, with forty dragoons, arrived from Tejon just as they left.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. STEWART,

First Lieut. 3d Artillery, Commanding Post.

Captain D. R. JONES,
A. A. General, Headquarters, Dep. of the Pacific.

True copy :

RICHARD ARNOLD,
First Lieut. 3d Artillery, A. D. C.

TERRITORY OF OREGON,

Headquarters, Portland, April 12, 1856.

SIR: I have to acknowledge the reception of your favor of 24th December last. This acknowledgment has been some time deferred in the hope of accompanying it with advices of the arrival of Hardy's tactics. They have not yet been received.

Herewith I have the honor to transmit copies of the latest despatches received from the commanding officers of the volunteers on the northern frontier and in southern Oregon. From these you will perceive that the operations in both sections are being pushed with commendable energy and perseverance in the face of severe trials and privations, and with gratifying results. By the recent disastrous and fatal affair at the Cascades, the forward movement of the United States troops, under Colonel Wright, has been suspended, and the relief of the volunteers on the northern frontier consequently postponed. The country of the Walla-Wallas, Cayuses, and Umatillas, cannot be evacuated by the Territorial force, with safety to our settlements, before it shall be occupied by the regular troops. In view of the rapid approach of the summer season, when offensive operations against the enemy are of doubtful issue, I have directed the main body of the first regiment and battalion of recruits to withdraw from the enemy's country after the termination of the expedition into the valley of the Yakima, leaving a column sufficiently strong on the south side of the Columbia river for the vigilant and efficient occupation of the Walla-Walla country until relieved from that duty by the United States troops.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. L. CURRY,
Governor of Oregon.

Hon. JEFFERSON DAVIS,
Secretary of War.

TERRITORY OF OREGON,

Headquarters, Dalles, February 15, 1856.

COLONEL: Your several communications to the 2d instant have been received.

The recruit of your command, consisting of four companies, numbering about four hundred men, is now en route. A portion is beyond, and the remainder at this point. They will be pushed forward with the utmost despatch. You will find the whole force well mounted, officered, and equipped. Subsistence and adequate transportation for active operations during sixty days will be at your disposal, and it is not for a moment doubted that you will immediately prosecute with energy, activity, and success, the campaign in which your gallant company is engaged.

Relying with confidence upon your skill and prudence, the plan of operations for the achievement of the object developed in general orders will be submitted mainly to your discretion, as it must neces-

sarily be more or less influenced by circumstances, ever changing and constantly occurring. So far as practicable, the plan you will adopt will be controlled by the following suggestions.

The dispirited and exhausted condition of the enemy from the hardships, privations, and disasters they have encountered during the winter thus far, will probably disincline them to engage the force under your command in a pitched battle. Detachments in sufficient force to maintain themselves successfully against any considerable body of the enemy, and not so distantly removed in the field of their operations from each other as to enhance the ordinary dangers of the service, will be calculated to promote effectually the desired issue. After crossing the Snake river, and before reaching the mouth of the Palouse, the main body of the Indians on the south side of the Columbia may be drawn into a general engagement by a display of but a portion of your force, the remainder being kept in reserve to act as circumstances may indicate. At the mouth of the Snake river, or in its vicinity, the Columbia may be crossed advantageously, and the country occupied by the Yakima and other Indians, on the north side of the Columbia, successfully penetrated. It is anticipated that the United States troops, in force, will be in the field about the middle of April. By and perhaps before that time, it is confidently expected that the volunteers will have achieved the purpose for which they were called out, and be ready to return to their long-suspended peaceful pursuits. When satisfactorily informed that the United States troops are in the field, and in a position to maintain the advantages conquered by the Oregon volunteers, you will adopt such prudent measures as may be required to bring your command to the Dalles, when regulations will be made with a view to mustering out of the service. If practicable, it is desired that before the return march shall be undertaken, the Yakima valley should be penetrated far enough to break up any encampments of the enemy existing in that section of the country. There is a trail from the mouth of the Yakima to the Dalles, along the north bank of the Columbia river, available at all seasons of the year, which you may find it convenient to employ on your return march. The successful operations of your command are so far dependent upon the departments of supply and transportation, that the quartermaster and commissary departments in the field should receive vigilant attention, in order to insure regularity, safety, and efficiency to those departments.

Perspicuity and accuracy in their accounts are equally important, and that no avoidable embarrassment in these particulars may be incurred, it is desired that no changes should be made in the arrangements organized by the chief of those departments, and under the administration of their commissioned officers at depots and in the field.

The imperfections of the present system are inseparable from an entirely new organization. To promote its successful development it is earnestly desired that by every possible means the utmost harmony may be cultivated between the commanding officer and the officers of the subordinate departments.

In furnishing escorts to trains, &c., as experience has shown the

duty to be an unenviable one among the volunteers, it will be well, so far as practicable, to draw them in equal proportion from the several companies of the regiment as they may be required, and in all cases place them under charge of a commissioned officer.

The post at Fort Henrietta you will constantly maintain with a force of not less than thirty men, to be reduced under no circumstances while the regiment remains in the field, instructing the officers in command to scour the country in its vicinity thoroughly, as the safety of the trains passing to and from the Dalles, as well as the property at that post, must be, as far as possible, completely assured. From time to time you will report your movements, and, for the better regulation of the service and in accordance with military usage, address your reports to the commander-in-chief at headquarters.

With earnest wishes for the prompt and successful issue of the service in which you are engaged, I am, very respectfully,

GEORGE L. CURRY,
Governor of Oregon.

THOMAS R. CORNELIUS,
Commanding 1st Regt. O. M. V.

HEADQUARTERS SOUTHERN ARMY,
Fort Leland, March 31, 1856.

MY DEAR SIR: I have the honor to make the following report of the troops under my command: On the 22d ultimo I gave orders to Major Bruce to move with his command to Illinois valley, to scour that part of the country, and, if possible, to find "Old John's" band of Indians. Bruce immediately repaired to the headquarters of the southern battalion, and gave the necessary orders for a march. His men moved on the 23d instant. As they were about starting, news came into camp of "John's" band being on the trail to Crescent City, and that they had that day killed three men, and that they were then attacking the house of a Mr. Hay. Captain O'Neal's company hastened to the assistance of Mr. Hay, and, in getting there, had to run through the whole of the enemy's line, some 200 strong. As soon as Bruce came up the Indians retreated from the house and took to the mountains. Major Bruce then, with his command, commenced getting the families in that section of country in a condition to protect themselves. In the mean time, the enemy were endeavoring to kill all the mules and horses they could find on their retreat. Major Bruce pursued the Indians some five miles, fighting all the way. Three of his men were killed, and some ten or twelve Indians killed. Night coming on, the men drew off, the Indians still retreating towards the meadows.

On the 22d ultimo, also, I ordered a detachment—consisting of one hundred men of the northern battalion, under the command of Major Latshaw—to go down Cow creek. On the 23d they fell in with from seventy-five to eighty Indians, six miles below Fort Smith. The fight here commenced, the men pressing forward and the enemy re-

treating. Some thirty Indians were collected on a hill to the right of the battle-ground at this time, and one of the spies, looking through a glass, discovered a white man amongst the Indians on the hill. First Lieutenant Combs, of the Benton county company, was ordered to take thirty men and charge the enemy on the hill, which he did gallantly, killing one Indian, and capturing a mule, saddle, blankets, and a pair of boots. The volunteers drove the enemy right and left, scattering them in all directions. The enemy lost four killed, certain, and had many wounded. Four mules and two horses were captured. One white man killed of Sheffield's company, and one of the spy company wounded. Great credit is due to these brave volunteers, who have driven the Indians from the trail, and are still in pursuit of them.

Captain Laban Buoy's command had a fight with some seventy-five Indians, six miles south of Cammas valley. The enemy came into the valley, it appears, to sweep the settlements. Upon hearing it, Captain Buoy, with thirty-five men, started in pursuit, and came up with the enemy on the mountain leading to the meadows from the north. As soon as Captain Buoy came up with the Indians he immediately divided his command, and charged them right and left, and completely routed and defeated them, killing three Indians, whom they found on the ground, one with a navy-sized pistol still tightly grasped in his hand, though dead! The command followed the Indians about a mile, until the men were completely exhausted for want of water. They were then ordered to return to camp. This company, both officers and men, behaved in such a manner as to entitle them to the highest praise of every citizen of our country. Allow me to mention the obligations we are all under to Major Bruce and the men under him, Major Latshaw and the brave boys from the north, as well as Captain Buoy and Lieutenant Moore, both of whom have been in the service all winter.

I have ordered sixty men from Captain Buoy's company to follow the Indians, and, if possible, to fall in with Colonel Kelsey and Major Latshaw at the big bend of Cow creek. Colonel Kelsey bids fair to be a very active officer, and my confidence is unlimited in Lieutenant Colonel Chapman, all of whom are very sanguine of success.

With much respect, I am, sir, your most obedient servant,

JOHN K. LAMERICK,
Brigadier General Oregon Territory.
JOHN R. HALE,
Aid-de-camp.

His Excellency GEORGE L. CURRY,
Governor Oregon Territory, Salem, Oregon Territory.

HEADQUARTERS, FIRST REGIMENT O. M. VOLUNTEERS,
Camp Yakima, April 2, 1856.

SIR: On the morning of the 9th ultimo I despatched Lieut. Charles B. Pillow, company A, of the first battalion, in charge of a detach-

ment of fifty men, to form an encampment at or near Fort Walla-Walla. I gave him orders to hold that post, to scout the adjacent country, and preserve open the line of communication from the mouth of Snake river to our military post on the Umatilla. Having completed my preparations, on the same date I took up the line of march for Snake river with companies A, D, E, H, and K, of the first battalion, and A, B, C, and D of the battalion of recruits, the command numbering about five hundred persons. We were supplied with full rations of sugar and coffee, and one-half rations of flour and beef for the period of nine days. Beyond this we were destitute of supplies of any kind—the commissary department being wholly barren. The first night we camped on the Touchet. In the evening Lieut. Wright, of company E, whom I had previously despatched to reconnoitre the mouth of Snake river, returned and reported he had discovered stock in the forks of the rivers, herded by Indians. The command did not move on the 10th, as I judged it advisable to await for one day the return of an express detachment I had been forced to send to the Dalles to obtain a needful supply of ammunition. Lieut. Miller, of company H, with a detachment of that company, I sent beyond Mill creek to obtain cattle. He returned on the evening of the 11th with twenty-one head of beef, which unfortunately effected their escape from us at Snake river. On the 11th we proceeded down the valley of the Touchet. The afternoon of the 12th, after a march of forty-two miles from camp Cornelius, we arrived on Snake river, twenty-five miles above its mouth, and before night-fall the command had accomplished the passage of the river, with the exception of company A, Capt. Harding, of the recruiting battalion. The transit over the river was made without loss or accident, beyond the loss of two or three animals. On approaching the river a very feeble encampment of Indians was perceptible on the opposite shore. Immediately after a portion of our advance guard had crossed the river I went in pursuit of the enemy, who had fled in the direction of the Columbia on observing our boats. A quantity of their packs of provisions, a small amount of ammunition, and some horses were captured and brought into camp. Capts. Hembree, Wilber, Revais, Burch, and Ankeny, and Lieut. Miller, with portions of their respective companies, were engaged in this movement. We succeeded in killing four of our enemy and captured one Indian boy, of some four or five years. This last I have intrusted for the present to Capts. Hembree and Ankeny. In the pursuit two Indian women were overtaken—they were suffered to pass on unmolested. The succeeding day Capt. Revais, with a detachment of his men, company K, and Lieut. Taggart, of company A, of second battalion, with a detachment under command of Major Cornoyer, struck across the country to the mouth of the Yakima, while Capts. Wilber, Hembree, Lieut. Harding and Lieut. Haley, of the first, and Capts. Burch, Ankemy, and Settle of the second battalion, with their companies, under my immediate command, proceeded down the river to its mouth, and thence up the Columbia for ten miles to opposite the mouth of the Yakima, when we were met by the detachment in charge of Major Cornoyer. We failed to find any considerable force of Indians. A small number were discovered, pur-

sued, and three or four were killed. The remainder, with a small band of stock, had succeeded in crossing the river before they could be overtaken. These fled with great precipitancy towards the north. We returned to camp by different routes, having travelled this day some seventy-five miles over a country presenting no indications of having been occupied by a force of the war party of our enemy. While Lieut. Small, of company "K," and one other man, were together making their course to camp, they were fired upon by eight or ten Indians. The lieutenant returned their fire, succeeded in killing one of the Indians, and himself and companion escaped untouched. The same evening, private Harvey Robbins, of company "D," was slightly wounded in the thigh with an arrow.

The wagon train I had employed for the transportation of our boats, on the 14th, I ordered to proceed to Walla-Walla with five of the boats. One boat was "cached" on Snake river. On the afternoon of this day, I took up the line of march for the Palouse river, following the rough trail of the Snake. On the 16th, after a march of some forty miles from our crossing of Snake river, we encamped two miles below the Palouse. On this march we discovered no manifestations that the country had been occupied during the past winter by any large body of Indians. At long intervals were to be noted evidences of temporary camps of a few families. Signs of numerous — having passed along the trail were perceptible. On arriving in the vicinity of the Palouse, I ordered Captain Hembree forward to ascertain if there was an encampment of the enemy at the mouth of that river. The same evening he reported no Indians there, and no appearances of an encampment at or near that locality since late in the past autumn. On the 17th, I sent an express to the post at Walla-Walla for supplies. We moved up the Palouse a distance of eight miles, and encamped until the morning of the 23d. Prior to reaching the Palouse our scanty stock of provisions was exhausted, and we were reduced to the necessity of subsisting on horse meat. Many symptoms of strong reluctance to proceed further had been for several days manifested by a portion of the command. I called a council of officers on the evening of the 17th, when it was determined to await the arrival of provisions, and in the meanwhile send out detachments to scout the country. On the 18th, Captains Hembree, Revais, Burch, and Ankeny, Lieutenants Hutchinson, Myers, Wright, and Haley, with detachments from companies D, E, H, and K, of the 1st, and B, C, of the 2d, battalions, under command of Lieutenant Colonel Kelley, proceeded up the Palouse, and across the Colville trail, to Clear creek. At the crossing of the creek, the Colonel divided his force, sending one part, under Captain Hembree, down the creek to the Palouse, thence up the Palouse, a distance of thirty miles from the encampment of the regiment. Colonel Kelley, with his party, followed up Clear creek a further distance of twelve miles, thence over the country to Sinking spring, on the trail leading from the Falls of Palouse to Priest's rapids, and from that section pursued an easterly course to camp. The command of Lieutenant Colonel Kelley was absent two days. He saw no Indians or cattle, and but one horse, which was appropriated by the men for their evening's meal. The

colonel reported that his command discovered a recent encampment; that it was evident the whole body had crossed the country towards the Columbia; that no other camping ground of the Indians was found, and that there was but one trail leading from the Palouse river, over the Palouse country, to Priest's rapids. The day of the return of Colonel Kelley to camp, I despatched a second express to Walla-Walla for provisions. Fortunately, on this day we found, on the south side of Snake river, a band of forty Indian horses. With the assistance of a few men, I succeeded in driving them to camp. Most of the number were used for the subsistence of the regiment.

On the morning of the 20th, I was induced, by a series of circumstances, to order a parade of the regiment, at which I informed the command that it was my desire and intention to follow the trail across the Palouse country to the Columbia, and to penetrate the country of the Yakima, before I marched the command to the Dalles, and that such were your orders to me.

I regret to be under the painful necessity to name the fact that one of the field officers exhibited his disrelish of my plan, in a manner into which he ought not to have suffered himself to be betrayed. Lieutenant Colonel Kelley and Major Cornoyer, in unequivocal terms, expressed their decided approbation of the line of march I had proposed to pursue.

On the 21st, Captain Wilson, having in charge Watson's pack train with provisions, reached Snake river. Captain Cason, of E company, recruiting battalion, reported his command at Walla-Walla, ready for duty. I ordered him to form an encampment at the mouth of Snake river, to scout the country on both sides of the river, and after the 24th to have our boats at that point prepared to cross any express I might forward, or the whole command. Watson's pack train brought rations of flour and sugar for twelve, and coffee for nine days. From some mismanagement by the assistant quartermaster in the field, but two hundred pounds of coffee were forwarded to me. I had ordered four hundred and fifty pounds to be sent. At the time, there was some two or three thousand pounds of coffee at Walla-Walla. Several instances of mismanagement have occurred in the quartermaster's department in the field, that have seriously embarrassed my plans and movements.

On Sunday, the 23d, we resumed our march, taking along one of our boats, following the trail that had been discovered by Lieutenant Colonel Kelley, on the 18th and 19th, en route to Priest's rapids, and late on the 26th encamped on the bank of the Columbia.

We were four days in traversing the country between the Palouse and Columbia rivers. Throughout the march, the men and animals suffered severely for want of water and subsistence. Numbers of horses became so exhausted that they were unable to travel. The route was exceedingly difficult; no man in the regiment had before penetrated the country. Not an Indian was seen. A very few miserably-poor horses were secured, which were consumed as provisions. Captains Hembree and Harding and Lieutenant Colonel Kelley, with five men, on the 27th, followed up the Columbia for several miles above Priest's rapids. Captain Hembree reported that the party dis-

covered three Indians on the west bank of the Columbia; that they conversed together; that the Indians stated they had no fire-arms and did not wish to fight; and that they declined to cross the river to our men. He further reported no more or different indications of the locality of the Indians than are presented in every part of the Palouse country.

I was extremely solicitous to cross the Columbia at the point we had attained, and pass directly into the heart of the country of the Yakimas. At a council of my officers, I submitted for consideration several propositions: one as to the expediency of at once passing over the Columbia. The exhaustion of both men and animals, the absence of supplies, and the uncertainty of obtaining provisions from the trains supposed to be on the route to Walla-Walla, in conjunction with other causes, led to the determination that the command be marched on the east side of the river to the mouth of the Yakima. On the 28th we moved down the Columbia over a wretched trail, and on the 30th camped opposite the mouth of the Yakima. Captain Cason arrived at my camp this evening, and relieved our immediate wants by driving in eight head of beef, captured by his company on the Umatilla. It now became imperative to decide whether the country of Kamiakun should be entered and thoroughly scouted. The troops of the United States were hourly expected to arrive in the valley of Walla-Walla, and thus relieve the volunteers of the duty they have for months performed, and enable them to return to their homes.

Governed by considerations that impressed me as the best and most prudent I could adopt under existing circumstances, I ordered Major Carl to take command of companies "H" and "K" of the 1st battalion, and "A" and "D" of the 2d battalion, proceed to Walla-Walla river, form there an encampment, scout that valley to the base of the Blue mountains, occupy the country until he was satisfied that a sufficient body of United States troops had come into the valley to hold the same, and march the command directly to the neighborhood of the Dalles. That command is now in the Walla-Walla. To Captain Cason I gave an order to proceed with company "E" to headwaters of Wild-Horse creek, the Umatilla and John Day's rivers, into the Ureka valley and to the Dalles, by way of the Warm springs, to collect and drive in all the horses and cattle on the route, and arrest and hold in custody any and all white persons he might find in charge of stock. Captain Cason has departed to fulfil this mission. The same date I issued an order to the regimental quartermaster and the commissary and their assistants, to withdraw all supplies, stores, and property whatsoever in their charge, from the field to the Dalles, whenever the left column of the regiment might vacate the country. The commanding officer of company "B" of 1st battalion I have ordered to abandon Fort Henrietta, totally destroy that post, and march to the Dalles on the approach of the left column to the Umatilla. Lieutenant Pillow has been ordered to cross the Columbia with his force, and rejoin my command on the Yakima. On the last day of March I crossed the Columbia with companies A, D, and E, of the

1st battalion, and "B" and "C" of the 2d battalion. Lieutenant Colonel Kelley, Major Cornoyer, and Captain Revais, accompanied me.

On the 1st of this month, with Major Cornoyer, Captains Burch and Ankeny, Lieutenant Hult, and nine men, I followed up the Yakima river a distance of thirty miles. We found neither Indians nor evidence of an encampment since last autumn. Captain Hembree, Lieutenant Wright, and a handful of men in an opposite direction, penetrated the country about the same distance. They report no recent traces of the enemy. Lieutenant Colonel Kelley recrossed the Columbia in search of cattle, but returned without success.

I had despatched Lieutenant Caldwell to Walla-Walla for one thousand pounds of flour and twenty-five rations of coffee. With this quantity I proposed immediately to take up the line of march through the Yakimas, and depend on the capture of wild horses for all deficiency of provisions. Lieutenant Caldwell has returned and reports that Major Carl and Lieutenant Miller, despite his remonstrances, took possession of four hundred pounds of the flour, and that he succeeded in obtaining but fourteen rations of coffee. With him came your express messenger, Mr. Robinson, with your advices, and communication from Captain Pownall, the regimental quartermaster, and from Hubbard's wagon-train. A wagon and pack-train with provisions are en route from the Dalles. If they be not delayed or discharged at Fort Henrietta—which I am fearful of, although I have given an order for the trains to push through direct to Walla-Walla—I have hope of obtaining such supplies as will enable me to perform a campaign in the Yakima without danger of suffering for want of subsistence. Quartermaster Pownall communicates that the Cascades have been attacked by Indians, and the United States troops, at that time en route to Walla-Walla, had been recalled to the Dalles. I am apprehensive the failure of the regular forces of the United States to occupy this portion of the Indian country will retard the return of the left column of the regiment to the Dalles. Under the present order of facts, I may find it indispensable for the public good to place either Lieutenant Colonel Kelley or Major Cornoyer in command of the troops on the south of the Columbia river. I shall remain in this section until the arrival of the expected subsistence trains. I contemplate a direct forward movement into the Yakima valley. I shall go through the Klikitat valley; from that point my course must depend upon contingencies that may arise. I propose to send a force down White Salmon river, and, if you deem it advisable, proceed by the mountains and valleys to the north on to Vancouver.

In relation to the loss of Dowell's pack-train, no supplies were obtained by the Indians; the animals were stolen about 4 o'clock, on the morning of the 25th of February, on Wild Horse creek. Pursuit was given, but with no avail. I attribute the loss to carelessness on the part of persons having the animals in charge. At the time the train left the Umatilla, company "A," of the battalion of recruits, was encamped about one mile from the train. I was then at the Umatilla, and supposed it would not be hazardous to leave the train, as it was to proceed to camp Cornelius with company "A." In addition to

this force, Hubbard's wagon-train was proceeding with the pack-train, and under the escort of Captain Harding.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
T. R. CORNELIUS,

Colonel First Regiment Oregon Mounted Volunteers.

His Excellency GEO. L. CURRY,
Governor and Commander-in-chief, Salem, O. T.

TERRITORY OF OREGON,
Portland, February 5, 1856.

SIR: Herewith I have the honor to transmit a certified copy of a memorial adopted by the legislative assembly of this Territory at the late regular session of that body.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
GEO. L. CURRY,
Governor of Oregon.

To the PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES.

To his Excellency the President of the United States:

Your memorialists, the legislative assembly of this Territory, respectfully represent that, early in October last, the people of Oregon and Washington Territories were startled by a general outbreak among nearly all the Indian tribes in the western and middle portions of those Territories. These hostilities, unprovoked on the part of the whites, were characterized by the usual modes of Indian warfare, and indiscriminate slaughter of all our citizens who fell into their hands, without regard to age, sex, or condition, and by the pillaging and burning of dwellings and the destruction of property.

The people in the most defenceless parts of the country, alarmed by the dangers to which they were exposed, called upon the governor of this Territory for that protection which they had a right to ask.

We are happy to say that this cry for relief was not unheeded by the governor, and that our citizens, with a promptness and a zeal which a sense of danger alone could call forth, volunteered to go out in defence of their country, leaving their homes and the various avocations in which they were engaged. They have nobly discharged their duties under many adverse and trying circumstances, and are still in the heart of the enemy's country combatting the Indians, or holding possession of the country which they have conquered.

In this distressing state of affairs, and while the Oregon volunteers were surrounded by hostile Indians, it was with no little satisfaction that your memorialists, as well as the people of Oregon, hailed the arrival in this Territory of Major General John E. Wool, of the United States army. His past services had led us to hope that he would at once have sent the forces under his command to the assistance and relief of our volunteers, who were desirous of returning to

their homes. It is with regret, we confess, that in this respect our hopes have been disappointed. It is with regret that we are compelled to say that General Wool has hitherto remained inactive, and has refused to send the United States troops to the relief of the volunteers, or to supply them with arms and ammunition in their time of need; that he has gone into winter quarters and left our settlements exposed to the ravages of our enemies; that he has removed the greater portion of his troops from the Indian territory to Vancouver, a military point remote from the scenes of war, and that, too, while our volunteers were threatened by an overwhelming force of Indians; that he refused to go to the relief of a number of our citizens who had settled in the Walla-Walla valley, and who had fled from their homes for safety; and that he refused to send any of the forces under his command to protect the people of southern Oregon, whose lives and property were almost daily being destroyed or endangered by the Indians.

Your memorialists would have borne all these grievances in silence, and left those public acts and omissions of General Wool to the just judgment of the people of Oregon and Washington Territories, and to the approval or disapproval of the proper officers of the United State government. But so it is, that General Wool, not content with the inactive and inefficient course which he has hitherto thought proper to pursue in this war, has departed from his inactive policy only to censure the governor and people of this Territory for their commendable zeal in defending their country, and to thwart all their efforts to procure supplies and the means of subsistence for the Oregon volunteers now in the field. Instead of offering aid and encouragement to our people, he has shown a disgraceful activity in his endeavors to persuade our merchants, and those of California, not to furnish ammunition and supplies for our volunteers in this trying time of their need. Instead of attending to the duties of his high office, he has become an intermeddler between the people of Oregon and the government of the United States, and publicly declares that his influence will be exerted to prevent the payment, by the United States, of the just claims incurred in the prosecution of this war.

Therefore, inasmuch as your memorialists, as well as the people of Oregon, have lost all confidence in the willingness of General Wool to assist and defend them in their present Indian difficulties, they most respectfully ask that he may be recalled from the command of the military department of the Pacific; and your memorialists will ever pray.

Passed the Council, January 30, 1856.

A. P. DENNISON,
President of the Council.

Passed the House, January 30, 1856.

DELAZON SMITH,
Speaker of the House of Representatives.

TERRITORY OF OREGON, ss:

I, B. F. Harding, secretary of the Territory of Oregon, do hereby certify that the forgoing is a true and perfect copy of the original, now on file in my office. In testimony whereof, I have [L. s.] hereunto signed my name and affixed the seal of the Territory, the 31st day of January, A. D. 1856.

B. F. HARDING,
Secretary of the Territory of Oregon.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE,
Olympia, W. T., February 19, 1856.

SIR: Having been constantly and closely occupied since my return from the Blackfoot council, I avail myself of this, my first opportunity, to inform the department fully of the condition of this Territory in the existing Indian war. And in order to arrive at a full understanding of the state of affairs, it is deemed necessary to state the facts connected with my return from the Missouri, where a treaty of peace and friendship had been concluded with the Blackfeet and other tribes of Indians.

On the 29th day of October, when two days' march from Fort Benton, on my return to this place, W. H. Pearson reached my camp with an express from acting Governor Mason, bringing the startling intelligence that the Yakima Indians, with whom I had concluded a treaty in June last, had murdered a number of whites in their country, their agent, A. J. Bolon, and had, finally, broken out into open war; had defeated a detachment of United States troops under Major Haller, and had declared the determination to exterminate all the whites in the country. It was supposed that the Cayuses, Walla-Wallas, and Umatillas would join, and that the Spokanes and Cœur d'Alenes were disposed to hostilities.

At this time my party of twenty-five men were in this condition: our animals were poor and jaded from the constant express service in which they had been employed in the operations preliminary to the Blackfoot council; for our expresses had ranged from Saskatchewan, on the north, to the Yellowstone, on the south. They possessed but few arms and little ammunition, as we had, in coming up, found no use for them, passing through the Territory of friendly Indians. Under these circumstances, I halted the train, despatched my secretary, Mr. Doty, to Forts Benton and Campbell to procure arms, ammunition, and fresh animals, and on October 31 I pushed forward to the Bitter Root valley, to make arrangements for fresh animals and supplies, instructing Mr. Doty to come on as rapidly as the condition of the train would permit.

I reached the valley November 4, making the distance of 230 miles in four and a half days. The train left the Missouri November 4, and reached Hell Gate, in the Bitter Root valley, where I had established my camp, in eight days, a distance of 200 miles.

I had overtaken, before reaching the valley, the delegation of Nez Percés chiefs, who had attended the Blackfoot council; a conference

was held with them at Hell Gate. They had already heard through Indian rumors of the war below. I stated to them fully the state of affairs, and requested that certain of their number would accompany me, it being my determination to push forward by way of the Cœur d'Alene Pass, although it was declared to be impracticable on account of snow.

The result of our conference was most satisfactory. The whole party, numbering fourteen men, among whom were Spotted Eagle, Looking Glass, and Three Feathers, principal chiefs among the Nez Percés, expressed their determination to accompany us and share any dangers to be encountered. They expressed a desire that after crossing the mountains I should go to their country, whence a large force of their young men would accompany me to the Dalles, and protect us with their lives against any enemy.

Having replenished my train with all the animals to be had, on November 14 we pushed forward, crossed the Bitter Root mountains the 20th, in snow two and a half to three feet deep, and reached the Cœur d'Alene mission the 25th, taking the Cœur d'Alenes entirely by surprise. They had not thought it possible we would cross the mountains so late in the season. With the Cœur d'Alenes I held a council, and found them much excited—on a balance for peace or for war, and a chance word might turn them either way.

Rumors of all kinds met us here: that the troops had fought a battle with the Yakimas, and had driven them across the Columbia towards the Spokane, and that the Walla-Wallas, Cayuses, and Umatillas were in arms, and that they had been joined by a portion of the Nez Percés. The accounts were of so contradictory a nature that nothing certain could be ascertained from them, excepting the evident fact that several of the tribes below were in arms, blocking up our road, and had threatened to cut off my party in any event. However, I determined to push forward, having first despatched Mr. Craig, my Nez Percé interpreter, with all but four of the Nez Percés, who remained to accompany me to the Nez Percé country, with instructions to collect the Nez Percés, tell them I was coming, and wished a strong party to accompany me to the Dalles, and having done this, to despatch an express to me at the Spokane; on the 27th of November, accompanied by the four Nez Percés, we made a forced march to the Spokane, reaching it the next day.

The Spokanes were even more surprised than the Cœur d'Alenes at seeing us. Three hours before my arrival, they heard I was going to the settlements by way of New York. I immediately called a council, sent to Fort Colville for Mr. McDonald, in charge of that post of the Hudson's Bay Company, and also for the Jesuit fathers at that point. They arrived. A council was held, at which the whole Spokane nation was represented; the Cœur d'Alenes and Colvilles also were present.

The Spokanes and Colvilles evinced extreme hostility of feeling; spoke of the war below; wanted it stopped; said the whites were wrong. The belief was current that Pu-pu-mux-mux would cut off my party, as he had repeatedly threatened. They had not joined in the war, but yet would make no promises to remain neutral. If

the Indians now at war were driven into their country, they would not answer for the consequences—probably many of the Spokanes would join them.

After a stormy council of several days, the Spokanes, Cœur d'Alenes, and Colvilles were entirely conciliated, and promised that they would reject all the overtures of the hostile Indians, and continue the firm friends of the whites.

Having added to my party twenty men on their way from Colville to the Dalles, who had delayed some weeks at this point through fear of the hostile Indians below, I organized my party as volunteers of the Territory, and mustered them into the service.

I then made a forced march to the Nez Percé country, striking the Clear Water at Laparai. Here we found assembled the whole Nez Percé nation, excepting those in the buffalo country.

Mr. Craig had received letters which informed me that the whole Walla-Walla valley was blocked up with hostile Indians, and the Nez Percés said it was impossible to go through.

I called a council, and proposed to them that one hundred and fifty of their young men should accompany me to the Dalles. Without hesitation they agreed to go. Whilst in council making the arrangements for our movement, news came that a force of gallant Oregon volunteers, four hundred strong, had met the Indians in the Walla-Walla valley, and after four days' hard fighting, having a number of officers and men killed and wounded, had completely routed the enemy, driving them across Snake river, and towards the Nez Percé country.

The next day I pushed forward, accompanied by sixty-nine Nez Percés, well armed, and reached Walla-Walla without encountering any hostile Indians. They had all been driven across Snake river below us by the Oregon troops.

It is now proper to inquire what would have been the condition of my party had not the Oregon troops pushed vigorously into the field, and gallantly defeated the enemy.

The country between the Blue mountains and the Columbia was overrun with Indians, numbering 1,000 to 1,200 warriors, including the force at Priest's rapids, under Kam-ai-a-kun, who had sworn to cut us off. It was completely blocked up.

One effect of the campaign of the regulars and volunteers in the Yakima country, under Brigadier General Raines, was to drive Kam-ai-a-kun and his people upon our side of the Columbia river, and thus endangering our movement from the Spokane to the Nez Percé country.

Thus we had been hemmed in by a body of hostile Indians, through whom we could have only forced our way with extreme difficulty and at great loss of life. We might all have been sacrificed in the attempt. For the opening the way to my party I am solely indebted to the Oregon volunteers.

Pu-pu-mux-mux, the celebrated Walla-Walla chief, entertained an extreme hostility towards myself and party, owing to imaginary wrongs he supposed had been inflicted upon him in the treaty concluded with the Cayuses and Walla-Wallas last June, and had been

known to threaten repeatedly that I should never reach the Dalles. He was the first to commence hostilities by plundering Fort Walla-Walla, and destroying a large amount of property belonging to the United States Indian department.

This chief was taken prisoner by the Oregon volunteers while endeavoring to lead them into an ambush. During the heat of the first day's battle he and four other prisoners attempted to escape by ferociously attacking the guard, and were at once shot down.

At Walla-Walla I found some twenty-five settlers, the remainder having fled to the Dalles for protection. With these were 100 friendly Indians.

Special Indian agent B. F. Shaw, colonel in the Washington Territory militia, was on the ground, and I at once organized the district, placed him in command, and directed him, if necessary, to fortify; but at all events to maintain his ground should the Oregon troops be disbanded before another force could take the field.

The Nez Percé auxiliaries were disbanded, and returned home.

Thus we had reached a place of safety unaided, excepting by the fortunate movements of the Oregon troops. Not a single man had been pushed forward to meet us, although it was well known we should cross the mountains about a certain time, and arrive at Walla-Walla at the time we did.

Why was this? Arrangements had been made with Major Raines, by acting Governor Mason, to push forward a force under Col. Shaw, to meet me at the Spokane about the time of my arrival there. A company had been enlisted, organized, and marched to Fort Vancouver to obtain equipments, rations, and transportation, which Major Raines had promised both Governor Mason and Colonel Shaw should be promptly furnished them. Some little delay ensued, and, in the mean time, Major General Wool arrived, who immediately declined equipping the company as promised by Major Raines, and stated that he could not in any manner recognise volunteers, or furnish them equipments or transportation, and declining to supply their place with regular troops, when at Vancouver alone were some 350 men.

When remonstrated with by Captain Wm. McKay, in command of the company raised to push forward to my assistance, when informed of the object for which this company was enlisted, and that if it was not pushed forward at once, or if some other force were not sent, Governor Stevens and his party would be in the most imminent danger, the general replied, that, in his opinion, the danger was greatly exaggerated; that probably Governor Stevens would be able to protect himself; but that if he could not, then Governor Stevens could obtain an escort from General Harney.

What a reply was this! A moiety of the Indians now in arms had defeated a detachment of 100 United States regulars.

Major Raines had placed on record his opinion that an insufficient force would be defeated by these Indians, and my party was supposed to number no more than twenty-five men. Yet Major General Wool very coolly says Governor Stevens can take care of himself. So, too, in the remark that I could obtain aid from General Harney. Did General Wool know that the distance from Fort Benton to the sup-

posed position of General Harney was greater than the distance from Fort Benton to the Dalles, and that to obtain aid from him would require not less than six months? and that an express, to reach him, must pass through the entire breadth of the Sioux country? Such ignorance shows great incapacity, and is inexcusable.

Mr. Secretary, Major General Wool, commanding the Pacific division, neglected and refused to send a force to the relief of myself and party, when known to be in imminent danger, and believed by those who are best capable of judging, to be coming on to certain death; and this, when he had at his command an efficient force of regular troops.

He has refused to sanction the agreement made between Governor Mason and Major Raines, for troops to be sent to my assistance, and ordered them to be disbanded. It was reserved for the Oregon volunteers to rescue us.

There has been a breach of faith somewhere. I ask for an investigation into the whole matter.

The only demonstration made by Major Raines, resulted in showing his utter incapacity to command in the field. As has been heretofore said, his expedition against the Yakimas effected nothing, but driving the Indians into the very country through which I must pass to reach the settlements.

I have therefore to prefer charges against General Wool. I accuse him of utter and signal incapacity, of criminal neglect of my safety. I ask for an investigation into his conduct, and for his removal from command.

After making my arrangements on the Walla-Walla valley, I pushed to Vancouver, coming down the trail—the river being still closed—conferred with Major Raines, and then hastened to Olympia, as rapidly as possible, reaching my home on the 19th January. The legislature was still in session. The greatest alarm prevailed throughout the sound. The people were living in block-houses. The enemy had gained the advantage, and our regulars and volunteers had retired before them. Reinforcements were coming from the other side of the mountains to the hostile Indians. In obedience to my own convictions of duty and in response to the sentiments of this entire community, I issued my proclamation calling for six companies of volunteers for the defence of the sound, appointed recruiting officers for the raising of three companies on the Columbia river to operate east of the Cascades, and after remaining in my office but two days, went down the sound to visit the friendly Indians, confer with the inhabitants, and make the necessary arrangements for the troops to take the field.

Since my arrival on the sound, Seattle has been attacked and everything outside of its line of defences burned, except a small place named Alki, on the same bay with Seattle. The whole county of King has been devastated. Rumors of all our places being attacked have reached us daily. The northern Indians have commenced making depredations. They are now meditating to send sixteen war canoes against us. These canoes carry seventy-five men each, and can be urged with great velocity through stormy seas; to meet which danger I have requested Captain Gansevoort, now commanding the

naval forces in the sound, to keep the steamer *Active* cruising between Port Townsend, Bellingham bay, and Seattle, and I have advised Governor Douglass, of Vancouver's Island, of the fact, and requested him to keep one of the Hudson's Bay steamers cruising in the waters of his jurisdiction, and to keep me advised of the movements of the Indians alleged to be hostile.

I have also raised a force of friendly Indians to operate against the hostiles, from the line of the Snow-how-mish. They are already in the field, are supported by all the available strength of the northern battalion of the Washington Territory volunteers, and have struck two decisive blows. The central battalion have moved from this quarter, and are now establishing a depot at Montgomery's. They will on Friday or Saturday move on the Puyallup, and will also be reinforced by friendly Indians.

The most cordial relations exist between myself and Lieutenant Colonel Casey, commanding the Puget Sound district, who appreciates fully the imminence of our danger, and who urges me to push into the field all the volunteers in my power. We shall act in concert throughout.

Since my arrival at the sound, I have revisited the Columbia river, and conferred with Col. Wright, ninth infantry, in command of the Columbia river district. By letter, I have urged both Col. Wright and Major Raines, previously in command of the district, to despatch troops to the interior. They are not permitted to do so by the stringent orders of Gen. Wool; and knowing the necessity of prompt action, I have had no alternative but to call out volunteers.

In Col. Wright I have entire confidence; and if he were allowed to act according to his own judgment, there would be nothing to apprehend. But it seems to be the determination of Gen. Wool to play the part of the dog in the manger—neither to act himself nor to let others act.

As commander-in-chief of the militia of Washington, and in view of my oath of office, I have taken the responsibility to act. Every energy will be devoted to the work. The Indians now hostile on this side of the mountains will soon, I trust, be struck, and peace be restored to our distracted sound.

For my full views in reference to operations east of the Cascades, I enclose a copy of a memoir which I have addressed to Gen. Wool, with an extract of a letter to Col. Wright, modifying my views in certain particulars, in consequence of the lateness of the season and the condition of affairs on the sound.

I also send a copy of my message to the legislature, and of the message of Gov. Mason when that legislature first assembled.

Gov. Mason will soon be in Washington, from whom you will be able to gain every information which this office could furnish.

I have the honor to remain, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

ISAAC I. STEVENS,

Governor and Supt. Indian Affairs, W. T.

Hon. JEFFERSON DAVIS,
Secretary of War.

HEADQUARTERS, CAMP WASHINGTON TERRITORY VOLUNTEERS,
Walla-Walla Valley, W. T., December 23, 1855.

SIR: I reached this point, some thirty miles to the eastward of Fort Walla-Walla, on the Columbia, on the 20th instant. We have had extraordinary success in our long march from the waters of the Missouri, and I trust that the conferences with the Indian tribes on my way will have some effect in preventing the tribes now peaceable from becoming hostile.

A very important result has been gained by the operations of the volunteers of Oregon in this valley. The Cayuses, Walla-Wallas, Umatillas, the Tye of Deshute, and a portion of the Palouse Indians, mustering five or six hundred warriors, have been defeated and driven across the Snake river. They are now scattered along the north bank of the Snake, from its mouth to the Nez Percés country, and the bulk of them are believed to be in camp in the first wood on the Palouse river. From the best information I can gain, I am of opinion that not more than five to six hundred Indians participated in the fight. These Indians are in constant communication with the Yakimas, under Kam-ai-a-kum, and we have reports that he is meditating an attack with their combined forces upon the troops in this valley. These reports I do not credit. I am of opinion that the Indians desire the war to be put off till spring, in the hope that their numbers may be augmented by the Spokanes, Okinakanes, Colvilles, Cœur d'Alenes, and the tribes north of the line, and in case of defeat by having the means of retreat to the north, and across the mountains eastward to the buffalo country.

The Cœur d'Alenes, Spokanes, Colvilles, and Okinakanes, number about 2,100 souls and some 400 to 500 warriors, only a portion armed with guns. The former tribes, numbering about 1,700, I called into council on the Spokane early this month, and have received from them the most unqualified assurances that they would reject all the overtures of the hostile tribes and maintain relations of friendship with the government. But they have been very much shaken by the efforts made to involve them in the war, and if operations are suspended till spring, there would be great danger that they would then be met in arms.

The Nez Percés are staunch and entirely reliable. Some seventy of these warriors, well armed, accompanied me from their own country, and are now in my camp. I crossed the mountains with twenty-five men, and by accessions from the mines, and citizens who had fled for protection to the Nez Percés country, and from other sources, we have a force of volunteers, organized in two companies, and numbering in all fifty-two men. The volunteers of Oregon, in this valley, number about 400 men.

I am of opinion that all the tribes, from the tribes from the Dalles to the Nez Percés country, and from the Blue mountains to the Spokane river, now in arms against the government, have not over 1,200 adult males, and that they cannot bring into the field more than 1,000 effective men. My sources of information are good, and I write with much confidence. The hostile tribes throwing out bands known to be

friendly, and in charge of local agents, do not number quite 5,000 souls.

On reaching this point, I exceedingly regretted to learn that the Yakima country had been abandoned. In my opinion, it could have been held by 200 men, and have been supplied by Walla-Walla. There is a good road from Walla-Walla to the Yakima Mission; the distance is about ninety miles. Little or no snow lies on the ground for more than two-thirds the distance, and at the Mission the snow is seldom more than six inches deep.

This whole valley is remarkably favorable for winter operations. Grass and wood are abundant, and there are numerous streams of excellent water. The snow lies on the ground but a short time, and then but a few inches deep, and scarcely interfering with the grazing of animals.

North of the Snake, the Palouse and its tributaries, the grass is also good, and there is a large quantity of pine. The pine on the Palouse is found eighteen miles from its mouth.

From the Palouse to the Columbia, north of the Snake, the country is not so favorable. There is not much wood, nor much running water, and the grass is of inferior quality. There is nothing but drift-wood on the Snake—enough, however, for camping purposes. There is nothing but drift-wood on the Columbia till you reach the mouth of the Wee-nat-chap-pam, where the pine commences.

From the mouth of the Palouse, and from the several crossings above, there is no difficulty in moving to the Spokane country all through the winter. The grass is uniformly good. There is abundant pine in the Spokane, and there will be wood for fuel at all the intermediate camps on all the routes.

The information here given so minutely is wholly the result of personal examination, and I can vouch for the accuracy of it all.

I send you a map of the country from the Cascades to the Bitter Root mountains, showing the Indian tribes, their numbers, their warriors; the points those hostile are now believed to occupy; the several routes for the movement of troops; points for depot camps, where there is abundant grass and abundant pine within reach; the several crossings of Snake river and the *winter snow-line*, over which the Indians cannot cross when pursued by troops, and the line within which troops can operate all through the winter.

I will respectfully recommend that you urge forward your preparations with all possible despatch. Get all your disposable force in this valley in all of January. Establish a large depot camp here; occupy Fort Walla-Walla, and be ready early in February to take the field. February is generally a mild and open month. February and March are the favorable months for operating; all the Indians are destitute of food; the rivers are easy to cross; the mountain passes are closed. In April the Indians can retreat, in the Pend d'Oreille route, eastward of the mountains. In May the Cœur d'Alene route is also open; the streams are swollen and the salmon begin to run. In June, roots are abundant and the streams most difficult to cross. If operations be vigorously prosecuted in February and March, there is little probability of any of the tribes now peaceable taking part in the war. This

is the conclusion to which I was brought by the recent council held by me with the Indian tribes on the Spokane.

I do not entertain the idea that all operations can be brought to a close in these two months. The strength of the combination can, however, be broken, but the country should be held all through the ensuing year.

As to transportation, I would urge that a line of barges be established on the Columbia; that supplies be hauled in wagons from the Dalles to the mouth of the Des Chutes, and thence by water to Fort Walla-Walla. Then to the Yakima country (the Mission) to the crossing at the mouth of the Palouse, and to any point which may be selected in this valley as a depot camp, supplies can be hauled in wagons. The roads are all good.

When operations are extended to north of the Snake, and the north bank is held, a new depot camp can be established and the water-line extended.

The Hudson's Bay barge should be adopted, only be increased in size. The barge most commonly in use carries 6,000 pounds and requires seven men. But the great difficulty in the river is at the falls at the mouth of the Des Chutes river, which is avoided by hauling in wagons to above that point. A barge could be constructed which would carry 12,000 pounds, require eight men, and make two round trips a month from the Des Chutes to Fort Walla-Walla; supplies for five hundred men, say four pounds per day, including clothing, ammunition, &c., and forage for five hundred animals—twelve pounds a day each animal—would require ten of these barges, eighty men, and about ten three-yoke ox-teams running from the Dalles to the Des Chutes. An ox-team could not make more than three round trips from the Dalles to Fort Walla-Walla in two months, and this would be more than ought reasonably to be expected. To transport the above amount of supplies and forage in wagons would require one hundred ox-teams and one hundred men. Unless foraged on the road, oxen after making one round trip must have rest, and a large number of spare oxen must be at hand at both ends of the line to keep the teams constantly in motion. It will probably be very difficult to get early into the field so large a train. A pack-train will be still more expensive, and it will be wanted in advance. Supplies, in my judgment, will mostly have to be transported from the depot in this valley, and by pack-trains.

The Hudson's Bay people, at Fort Vancouver, can put their hands on the men who understand making these barges. I estimate that five barges could be built at Portland, and be in readiness for their loads at the mouth of the Des Chutes in twenty days, and five more in thirty days; it is a small affair to make them.

I derive my information in regard to the barges from Mr. Sinclair, of the Hudson's Bay Company; a gentleman of sound judgment and large experience, and most favorably known to all the citizens of the Columbia valley.

I believe it is practicable to run stern-wheel steamers from the mouth of the Des Chutes to above Walla-Walla, and as far as the Priest's rapids. But time will be required to get a suitable one on the route

and to establish wood-yards. There is nothing but drift-wood on the immediate banks of the Columbia below the mouth of the Wee-nat-chap-pan. I would respectfully urge, however, that your early attention be given to the matter.

The plan of campaign which occurs to me as feasible is as follows: Occupy the Walla-Walla valley in January; establish a large depot-camp in the Touchet; hold Fort Walla-Walla; get up supplies by a line of barges on the Columbia; have an advance post on the Tucanon, and pickets at the crossings at the Palouse and opposite the bend of the Tucanon. This disposition of the troops will make you master of the Walla-Walla valley, give you the control of the country of the Snake, and enable you to get information of the enemy.

In February cross the Snake, attack the enemy on the Palouse, establish a depot-camp at the first wood, extend the line of barges up the Snake to the Palouse, and push forward a column to below Okinakane.

These operations will probably drive all the hostile Indians into the Yakima country, west of the Columbia river; when move down the Columbia, cross into the Yakima country, and put the enemy to his last battle. He cannot cross the mountains till May, and all the troops left behind at Fort Walla-Walla, and at depot-camps, except indispensable guards, marched up seasonably from Fort Walla-Walla by the line of the Yakima river, would, with the movement of the column from north of the Snake, drive him into a corner from which he could not easily escape.

There will be no difficulty whatever in making the crossing of the Snake. To the upper crossings canoes could be brought from the Nez Percés country. For the Palouse crossing, with a few tools, boats could be made in a few days in the Touchet, and be transported thither on wheels. My India-rubber boats for the Indian service were unfortunately cut to pieces by the Indians at Fort Walla-Walla. During the winter months the rivers are low.

The question occurs, is the plan compatible with the force at your command? In my judgment three to four hundred effective troops will signally defeat any force which the enemy could bring together from the tribes now hostile. In my plan of operations at Fort Walla-Walla, at the depot camp of the valley, and to hold the river crossings, two hundred men would be required. If a smaller force were left, it might tempt the Yakimas, under Kam-ai-a-kum, to move rapidly into his own country, if not already there, cross the Columbia below the mouth of the Snake, steal all the animals and break up the communications. If very much reduced he might successfully attempt an attack upon the troops: With two hundred men I do not think he would attempt anything on this side of the Columbia. The barges, in brigades of five each, manned by forty men, I do not think, with a small force on the Umatilla, would be in danger of attack. They could destroy all the canoes and take from the enemy the means of crossing the river below Walla-Walla.

In the advance movement on the Palouse there should be five hundred men. This whole force will be disposable for the first blow on

the Palouse, 200 men will hold the line of the Snake, and 300 will be left for the advance movement on the Columbia below Okinakane.

When the enemy is driven into the Yakima country, from the depot camps north and south of the Snake, a strong column can be thrown across the Columbia at the mouth of the Snake, say 200 men, which, with 150 from this column moving towards Okinakane, will give 350 men. I would advise that 150 men of that column be left to cut off retreat in any attempt to recross the river.

In this plan of the campaign, the troops are interposed between the hostile tribes and the friendly ones, and they are brought to a final stand, when there is scarcely a possibility of escape. If the Yakima country were held simultaneously with this valley, and with operations on the Palouse, it might drive the enemy upon the Spokane, and thus cause them to embark in the war. The holding of the Yakima country would, however, effectually protect the line of the Columbia and render it unnecessary to leave so large a force in this valley. But this plan would require more troops than the other.

By the Walla-Walla valley, in this paper, I mean the whole country in the re-entering of the Snake.

With a small force on the Umatilla, and the troops required at the Dalles, 800 effective men will be required; and making allowances for the sick-list and for casualties, 1,000 men should be in the field. There are here, or are on their way, 500 volunteers from Oregon. I hear that you have, or will soon have, 500 to 600 regulars.

The volunteers with me have been mustered into the service of the Territory for a specific duty, and will be discharged when I go down to the Dalles. On the Spokane I was able to learn nothing of the plan of the campaign, and only knew that Kam-ai-a-kum, with all his forces, were believed to be on the Spokane side of the Columbia, and that the Cayuses and Walla-Wallas were assembled, some 600 warriors, in the Walla-Walla valley. I expected, at that time, to be obliged to force my way through this body with my small force of less, at that time, than fifty men, and the Nez Percés to the Dalles. The Nez Percés chiefs, who accompanied me from the Blackfoot council, tendered to me the services of 150 fighting men of the nation; and it was not until I had been some hours with them in council, in their own country, making the necessary arrangements, that I learned of the defeat of these tribes, and that the road was opened. I took with me, however, some seventy Nez Percés well armed, besides young men to herd and guard our animals.

OLYMPIA, W. T., *January 29, 1856.*

The above was written to be despatched by an express to you at Vancouver. I concluded, however, to come in person, and reached Vancouver the day of your departure from Portland to San Francisco.

I have, since my return, carefully examined the condition of affairs on the sound, have visited nearly every point, and informed myself thoroughly of our necessities.

We are now feeding 4,000 Indians on the sound alone. A band of hostiles, numbering from 200 to 400, are in the field. The whole country is opened to attack from them and the northern Indians. All our peo-

ple are living in block-houses. The town of Seattle was attacked on the 26th instant, and the families compelled to go on ship-board. The whole of King county has been devastated, and the inhabitants driven within the line of defences of the town of Seattle. We need at least 600 troops to cope with the enemy, and the war will, I fear, from the nature of the country, be a protracted one.

In conclusion, it is due to frankness that I should state that I have determined to submit to the department the course taken by the military authorities in the Territory of Washington for my relief. No effort was made, although the facts were presented both to Major General Wool and Major Raines, to send me assistance. The regular troops were all withdrawn into garrison, and I was left to make my way the best I could through tribes known to be hostile. It remains to be seen whether the commissioner selected by the President to make treaties with the Indians in the interior of the continent is to be ignored and his safety left to chance.

I had no fear of my own safety, but the facts in the settlements did not warrant such belief. I simply, with fifty-odd men and 150 Nez Percés, would have been compelled to fight 600 Indians in the Walla-Walla valley, had it not been for the operations of the Oregon volunteers.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 ISAAC I. STEVENS,
Governor of Territory of Washington.

Major General JOHN E. WOOL,
Commanding Pacific Division, Vancouver, W. T.

N. B.—The map is not quite ready. I will send it to the post at Vancouver.

Extract of a letter from Gov. Stevens to Col. Wright, February 6, 1856.

In view of the lateness of the season, my views, as stated in my memoir to Gen. Wool, and a copy of which I have sent to you, are modified as follows:

1st. Operate simultaneously in the Yakima country and north of the Snake river.

2d. Send at least two companies of the troops now at Vancouver to the sound.

The volunteers on the sound will be in the field this week. But the force will be small, and unless operations are prosecuted with great promptness and energy, we have reason to apprehend that many of the Indians now friendly will become hostile.

I will urge you to push two companies to the sound without delay, and to push your troops against the Indians east of the Cascades.

TERRITORY OF OREGON,
Portland, April 7, 1856.

SIR: My attention has been called to a letter, in public print, from Major General John E. Wool to his Excellency Isaac I. Stevens, gov

ernor of Washington Territory, a copy of which I beg herewith to enclose.

In this remarkable production, my official conduct, and the patriotic and self-sacrificing efforts of my fellow-citizens, in the suppression of our present Indian hostilities, are alluded to with such perversion of fact, as to impose upon me a necessity, that, because of the distinguished public service of General Wool in the past, I would most gladly have been spared.

The legislative assembly, at its recent session, adopted, with entire unanimity, a memorial to the President, asking the recall of that distinguished officer from the command of the Pacific military department. The reasons assigned in that document had my cordial concurrence; and I have now, in behalf of myself and the people whom he has aspersed, to request, for the additional causes herein assigned, that he be withdrawn from a position which his prejudices and indifference to the dangers which threaten to desolate our settlements have rendered him incompetent to hold.

Since the commencement of Indian hostilities, I have been actuated by the one purpose of their speedy and complete suppression. To this end I have directed all my energies. Up to the arrival of General Wool in the "Columbia River and Puget's Sound district," the volunteers and the troops of the United States had acted in concert with the utmost harmony and good feeling. By his order the latter were withdrawn from the field at a season when their services could have been of the greatest possible avail. The war was notwithstanding still maintained by the citizen soldiery, and important successes achieved.

General Wool arrived at Fort Vancouver, Washington Territory, in November last, while I was engaged by public duties in southern Oregon, at a point over two hundred miles distant from that post. On my return, I learned from those representing me, who had made him an official visit in my absence, of the inauguration of a plan utterly at variance with my own, which obviated the necessity of a personal interview. The wisdom of my plans it remains only in part for time to vindicate. What those plans actually were, and the necessity for their adoption, are matters of record, and may not with impunity be misrepresented or aspersed, directly or by innuendo. The inconsiderate and impolitic plans of General Wool find fitting illustration in the recent bold and bloody massacres at the mouth of Rogue river and at the Cascades, both within convenient distance of military posts of the United States.

In refutation of a statement so unfounded and presumptuous as that denying the necessity of volunteers east of the Cascade mountains, I have the honor to refer you to my communication of the 24th of October last, and also to submit the following extract from a letter from N. Olney, esq., Indian agent for Oregon, addressed to me under date Walla-Walla, October 12, 1855: "I beg leave to draw your attention to the fact of all the Indians north and south of the Columbia, this side of the Nez Percés and Spokanes, having either commenced open hostilities upon the whites, or are concentrating their forces for that purpose. I have just arrived at this place this morning, from

the Dalles, and find the most alarming state of affairs existing as to the friendly relations heretofore existing between the Americans and the Walla-Wallas, Palouses, Umatillas, and Cayuses. I am doing all in my power to check the gathering storm; but I fear nothing but a large military force will do any good towards keeping them in check. The regular force now in the country I do not consider sufficient for the protection of the settlers, and the chastisement of the Indians. One thousand volunteers should be raised immediately, and sent into this part of Oregon and Washington Territories. * * * These Indians must be taught our power. They must be humbled. And in all conscience send a force that can do it effectually, and without delay."

This extract is a part only of the information referred to in my first communication to the department as controlling my response to the requisition of Major Raines. It is decisive in the contradiction of the following quotation from this very extraordinary letter: "Nor was there any circumstance to justify Governor Curry in sending his troops from Oregon to Washington Territory, to make war on the Walla-Wallas, from whom the Oregonians had no danger whatever to apprehend." I do not deem it essential to dwell upon the want of geographical knowledge here displayed. The Walla-Wallas and their allies had given unmistakable signs of their hostility in the smouldering ruins of the settlers' homes, and by their occupation of the strongholds of the country. Prior even to the 16th of October, the Indian agent had ordered out all the American settlers from among them. It had been deemed a privilege for Americans to travel through their country without being subjected to indignity and peril.

The emigrants to this Territory for several years have complained of their insolence and robberies. Ever since the war waged upon them by the provisional government for the Wailatpu (Whitman) massacre, have the Cayuses—a large majority of them at least—manifested an unfriendly spirit towards Americans.

On the 17th of October last, a vigilant officer of the efficient 4th infantry thus addressed me: "I have reliable information that the Walla-Walla Indians are determined to murder Governor Stevens and his party, if they can possibly do so. Their chief ought to be arrested at once." The chief here alluded to is Pu-pu-mux-mux, for whose death, in order, apparently, to traduce my fellow-citizens, the volunteers of the 1st regiment, disparage their services, and reproach their humanity, it has suited the aims of General Wool to affect a generous sympathy. I have to state that the death of this chief occurred in accordance with the strictest usage of civilized warfare. The four days' battle of Walla-Walla is now on record. The reports of the officers engaged in that brilliant affair have been already transmitted. History will do those brave men justice, upon whom aspersion is sought to be cast. Prejudice and error live but for a season. The Alembic of time will preserve the indestructible truth. It was no "untimely and unproductive expedition" that vanquished a powerful enemy, and opened the way for the safe return of Governor Stevens and his party from the Blackfoot country.

As indicated in my last communication, the volunteers who consti-

tute the 1st regiment, in service on the northern frontier, are, I presume, by this time on their return march, supposing that the United States troops have advanced to a position outside the settlements in the Indian country.

I have to express my acknowledgments for the promptitude with which the 9th infantry were despatched by the War Department, and my regret that such extraordinary expedition should have been rendered abortive through the military mismanagement of General Wool.

The most recent information touching the operations of the volunteer force will be the subject of another communication.

I am, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

GEO. L. CURRY,
Governor of Oregon.

Hon. JEFFERSON DAVIS,
Secretary of War.

HEADQUARTERS PUGET'S SOUND DISTRICT,
Fort Steilacoom, W. T., May 12, 1856.

COLONEL: Inasmuch as there has been of late somewhat of a conflict between the executive and judicial authorities of this Territory, and my name having been used in the pamphlets published on both sides, I have the honor to enclose a copy of the correspondence which took place between Gov. Stevens and myself respecting those persons whom he had caused to be arrested for the crime of treason against the United States.

The remoteness of this station is such, that I have thought best to anticipate any call that might be made for that correspondence.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,
Lt. Col. 9th Infantry, Commanding P. S. District.
Colonel S. COOPER,
Adj. General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.

Copy of letter from Governor I. I. Stevens.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, WASHINGTON TERRITORY,
Olympia, March 31, 1856.

SIR: I have to request that you will keep in close confinement, at Steilacoom, the following persons, five in number:

Charles Wren, Sandy Smith, John McLeod, Henry Smith, John McField. These men not only have returned to their claims in violation of my orders, but their conduct since has been such, that Captain Maxon, who seized them, has brought charges against them of treason. I shall have them tried for giving aid and comfort to the enemy, as soon as I can collect the evidence and order a commission.

The conduct of McLeod and Wren has especially been bad. The evidence against them is stated by Captain Maxon to be positive.

Even should the evidence be insufficient to convict one or more of them, the peace of the country requires that those not convicted be kept in close confinement till the end of the war.

We have no jails in the Territory, otherwise I would not put you to so much trouble. I will endeavor, at the earliest practicable period, to provide a secure place for prisoners in Olympia.

These prisoners are now in charge of Lieutenant Pennington, of Captain Maxon's company, who will deliver them to you.

Yours truly and respectfully,

ISAAC I. STEVENS,
Governor of Washington Territory.

Lieutenant Colonel CASEY,
Ninth Infantry, Commanding Puget's Sound District.

Copy of reply of Lieutenant Colonel Casey.

HEADQUARTERS PUGET'S SOUND DISTRICT,
Fort Steilacoom, W. T., March 31, 1856.

GENERAL: Yours of to-day's date has just been handed me by Lieut. Pennington, of the volunteers, having in charge five men charged with treason against the United States, with a request that I would confine them in my guard-house.

In view of the reasons assigned by you for not confining them in some jail of the Territory, I consider it my duty to comply with your request. I trust that the charges against them will be investigated as soon as possible, in order that justice may be done in the premises. It will be impracticable for me to retain them long in custody.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,
*Lieutenant Colonel Ninth Infantry,
Commanding Puget's Sound District.*

His Excellency I. I. STEVENS,
Governor of Washington Territory, Olympia, W. T.

Copy of letter from James Tilton, Adjutant General Washington Territory volunteer forces.

OFFICE ADJUTANT GENERAL W. T. VOLUNTEERS,
Olympia, Washington Territory, April 2, 1856.

SIR: Herewith enclosed you will find a copy of proclamation of the governor of Washington Territory, declaring martial law to exist in the county of Pierce, Washington Territory.

This is designed to prevent the taking by civil process, habeas corpus, or otherwise, the prisoners Smith, Wren, and the rest, lately sent to Fort Steilacoom for custody.

Should, however, no such process be served upon you, you are requested to suppress or not put in force the proclamation.

Very respectfully, your most obedient,

JAMES TILTON,
Adjt. General W. T. Volunteer Forces.

The COMMANDING OFFICER
At Fort Steilacoom, Washington Territory.

Copy of letter from Governor I. I. Stevens.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, TERRITORY OF WASHINGTON,
Olympia, April 3, 1856.

SIR: I have concluded to publish, at once, the proclamation enclosed to you in my letter of this date, and thus anticipate any action which may be had to defraud public justice of its dues.

Truly and respectfully, your most obedient,

ISAAC I. STEVENS,
Governor of Washington Territory.

To the COMMANDING OFFICER,
Fort Steilacoom.

Reply of Lieutenant Colonel Casey.

HEADQUARTERS PUGET'S SOUND DISTRICT,
Fort Steilacoom, W. T., April 3, 1856.

GOVERNOR: Your communication of to-day's date, as also that of Colonel Tilton, the chief of your staff, enclosing the copy of a proclamation issued by you, declaring Pierce county under martial law, have just been received. You state that the proclamation is designed to prevent the five prisoners in my possession from being taken by "civil process, habeas corpus, or otherwise."

When I consented to receive these prisoners, a few days since, from your guard, for safe-keeping, it was my intention to keep them such reasonable time as the charges against them could be legally investigated. I doubt whether your proclamation can relieve me from the obligation to obey the requisitions of the civil authorities. I request, therefore, that you will relieve me from their charge.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,
Lieut. Col. 9th Infantry, Comd'g Puget's Sound District.

His Excellency I. I. STEVENS,
Governor of Washington Territory, Olympia, W. T.

EXECUTIVE OFFICE, TERRITORY OF WASHINGTON,
Olympia, May 23, 1856.

SIR: Referring to my communication of this date, setting forth the present condition of the Indian war, and the measures of preparation and precaution taken by me to meet probable contingencies, I propose in this letter to submit an estimate of the probable expenses of the volunteer service of the Territory of Washington to the first day of September next.

There have been two distinct organizations—one of three months at the commencement of the war, the second of six months at the expiration of the former.

The six months' levies commenced late in January, and the organization was not complete till early in April. Latterly, to recruit certain companies, three months' have been raised.

It is hoped there will be no necessity of raising additional troops, except to supply the places vacated by expiration of terms of service. Provision in the estimate is therefore made only for keeping up the present organization to the 1st of September.

A fortunate turn in the war may make it safe to very much diminish the force at an early period; but it will not, in my judgment, be safe to estimate upon any such contingency.

The estimated list of the volunteer service will be as follows:

First organization.....	\$300,000
Second organization.....	1,506,756
Non-commissioned staff, express men, guides, &c.....	93,240
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	1,899,996

For particulars I will refer you to the papers and estimates accompanying this report.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your most obedient,
ISAAC I. STEVENS,
Governor of the Territory of Washington.

Hon. JEFFERSON DAVIS,
Secretary of War, Washington, D. C.

A.

Estimate for the expenses of the Indian war in Washington Territory.—
Personnel of volunteers called into service of the United States by Governor I. I. Stevens, of Washington Territory; an estimate of pay for the six months ending September 1, 1856.

[Staff, non-commissioned staff, expressmen, guides, &c., on staff of the commander-in-chief: 60 officers and men, at \$7 per day, (average) \$93,240 00. The foregoing to provide their own horses and pay their own expenses.]

Regiment.	Company letter.	Captains.	Strength of company.	No. of horses.	Days' service to Sept. 1, 1856.	Total No. of days.	Pay per day.	Amount.
Second.....	A.	Capt. Lander.....	53	222	11,766	\$3	\$35,298 00
Do.....	B.	Robberson.....	49	222	10,878	3	32,634 00
Do.....	C.	Henness.....	56	56	222	12,432	4	49,728 00
Do.....	D.	Achilles.....	27	27	222	5,994	4	23,976 00
Do.....	E.	Riley.....	17	222	3,774	3	11,322 00
Do.....	F.	Swindall.....	22	222	4,884	3	14,652 00
Do.....	G.	Smalley.....	43	222	9,546	3	28,638 00
Do.....	H.	Peabody.....	30	222	6,660	3	19,980 00
Do.....	I.	Howe.....	35	222	7,770	3	23,310 00
Do.....	J.	Miller.....	30	30	222	6,660	4	26,640 00
Do.....	K.	Goff.....	100	100	177	17,700	4	70,800 00
Do.....	L.	Warbass.....	90	162	14,580	3	43,740 00
Do.....	M.	Craig.....	100	100	222	22,200	4	88,800 00
Clark county rangers.....		Kelley.....	75	75	131	9,765	4	39,060 00
Wash. mounted rifles.....		Maxon.....	89	89	222	19,758	4	79,032 00
Pioneer company.....		White.....	35	222	7,770	3	23,310 00
Train guard.....		Shead.....	39	222	8,658	3	25,974 00
Nisqually F. guard.....		Sergeant Packard.....	7	222	1,554	3	4,662 00
		Staff, &c., as above.....	60	60
Total.....			957	537	641,556 00

OLYMPIA, Washington Territory, May 25, 1856.

Approved:
ISAAC I. STEVENS,
Governor Territory of Washington, Comd'g-in-Chief.

JAMES TILTON,
Adjutant General Wash. Ter. Volunteer Forces.

B.

Estimates of expenses in the quartermaster and commissary departments of the Indian war in Washington Territory, since the commencement of the war, or date of acting Governor Mason's proclamation, October 14, 1855, to September 1, 1856.

Total purchases, including four months' supplies on hand at the posts of Port Townsend, Seattle, Steilacoom, Olympia, Fort Borst, Fort Cowlitz, Vancouver, Dalles, Fort Stevens, Montgomery, Fort Tilton, Fort Hayes, and other small posts, and also in possession of troops now in the field..... \$675,200

For the pay, say, of 120 teamsters, herders, quartermasters' employees and agents.....	\$120,000
Transportation of supplies to the field to September 1, 1856, with contingent expenses, say.....	70,000
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	865,200

Approved: ISAAC I. STEVENS,
Governor Territory of Washington and Commander-in-Chief.
Quartermaster and Commissary General W. T. Vol. Forces.

Total estimates for Indian war in Washington Territory, to September 1, 1856.

RECAPITULATION.

Amount for three months' men called into the service by acting Governor Mason under proclamation of October 14 and 22, 1855.....	\$300,000
Staff, non-commissioned staff, express men, guides, &c., on staff of commander-in-chief till September 1, 1856, (see estimate A).....	93,240
Amount of pay and allowances for six months' volunteers called into service under proclamations of Governor Isaac I. Stevens, dated January 23, 1856, and estimated to continue in service till September 1, 1856, (see estimate A).....	641,556
Amount of disbursements made and estimated for in the quartermasters' and commissary departments W. T. volunteers, to supply volunteer forces till September 1, 1856, (see estimate B).....	865,200
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	1,899,996

Approved: ISAAC I. STEVENS,
Governor and Commander-in-Chief.
 OLYMPIA, W. T., May 25, 1856.
JAMES TILTON, Adjutant General W. T. Volunteer Forces.

HEADQUARTERS PUGET'S SOUND DISTRICT,
Fort Steilacoom, W. T., May 24, 1856.

COLONEL: I have the honor to enclose copies of communications (this day forwarded to General Wool) for the information of the Secretary of War.

I consider this a case which requires the prompt action of the gen-

eral government. I have recommended patience and forbearance, and shall do my best to prevent a conflict.

I trust it may never be my fate to witness bloodshed in a civil controversy. It may not be expected that I should enter into the merits of the case; but, nevertheless, it appears to me that nothing can justify an executive in suspending the writ of *habeas corpus* but an overruling necessity, and in my opinion that necessity did not exist in this case.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 SILAS CASEY,

Lieut. Colonel 9th Infantry, Commanding P. S. District.
 Colonel S. COOPER,
Adjutant General U. S. A., Washington, D. C.

FORT STEILACOOM, May 24, 1856.

SIR: From a note just received from the sheriff, and from what I have just learned from his deputy, there must be a collision between the citizens and volunteers, both of which are now assembled in Steilacoom, and a scene of bloodshed will be inevitable. I therefore respectfully ask you to furnish a sufficient number of United States troops to preserve the peace and prevent bloodshed.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 F. A. CHENOWETH,
Judge Third Judicial District.

Lieut. Colonel CASEY.

HEADQUARTERS PUGET'S SOUND DISTRICT,
 May 24, 1856.

SIR: Your communication of to-day's date, requesting that I would send a force down to protect your court in the discharge of your duties, has been received.

If I understand the matter aright, the force which it is expected will oppose you are volunteer troops, under the orders of his Excellency I. I. Stevens, governor of the Territory.

Inasmuch as this would seem to be a conflict between two co-ordinate branches of the Territorial government, it appears to me that my position should be a neutral one, and I must therefore decline your request; I will, however, go down to Steilacoom myself and see the officer in command of the volunteers.

With regard to the merits of the existing controversy between the two co-ordinate branches I shall not now express an opinion; I, however, advise forbearance until the matter can be referred to the general government.

Any conflict now would most probably have a bad effect on our Indian relations, and might induce some of them, now quiet, to renew hostilities.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
 SILAS CASEY,

Lieut. Col. 9th Infantry, Com'g P. S. District.
 Hon. F. A. CHENOWETH,
Associate Justice Supreme Court, 2d Judicial Dist., W. T.

HEADQUARTERS PUGET'S SOUND DISTRICT,
Fort Steilacoom, W. T., May 24, 1856.

GENERAL: I have the honor to enclose a communication, this day received from Judge Chenoweth, with my reply.

As I mentioned in my reply, I went down and had a conference with the volunteer officer, and he agreed that the court should be held for certain purposes; and the judge intends so doing, refraining from issuing certain writs.

As this seems to be a civil contest, I have considered that my part was neutrality.

Without attempting to go into the merits of the controversy, I have no hesitation in saying, that if Governor Stevens perseveres in his illegal acts, there will be armed resistance.

The chief justice is now in confinement by his order.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

SILAS CASEY,

Lieut. Col. 9th Infantry, Com'g P. S. District.

Maj. Gen. JOHN E. WOOL,

Commanding Department of the Pacific, Benicia, Cal.

HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Benicia, California, June 3, 1856.

COLONEL: The steamer Columbia is just in from the north. By her I received the gratifying information that the war in Puget's sound and Rogue river valley is nearly or quite at an end. Lieut. Col. Casey reports, the 19th of April: "So far as the Indians on this side are concerned, the contest is about ended, and, should no considerable reinforcements be received, will soon die out. It may, however, be prolonged by the military Territorial organization existing in this Territory, over which I have no control."

Lieut. Col. Buchanan has prosecuted the war in Rogue river valley with great activity, skill, and judgment. The Indians are surrendering themselves unconditionally, and will be conducted to the coast reservation as soon as collected together. Joel Palmer, superintendent of Indian affairs in Oregon, is with Col. Buchanan.

Col. Wright was, at the last dates (18th May,) on the Nahchess river, beyond the Atahnum Mission, with five well-prepared companies. Lieut. Col. Steptoe was on his way from the Dalles to join him with four more. Major Garnett, with two companies, is also on his way from the sound, via the Cowlitz and Columbia rivers, to join Col. Wright. Altogether he will have eleven companies—an ample force to conquer all the Indians he will meet in Washington Territory. The Indians were in considerable force on the opposite side of the Nahchess river, which, at the time, could not be forded. They had proposed peace. The Colonel thinks he will soon make peace, with or without fighting.

From all the information I have received I have no doubt I will be able to communicate by the next mail, the 20th instant, the gratifying intelligence that the Indian wars have ceased in the department of the Pacific. We shall have no enemies to contend with but the exterminators of the Indian race.

Governor Stevens had placed the county of Pierce, Puget's sound, under martial law. The supreme judges of the Territory, not regarding the measure legal, held their court in the county as usual, when an armed force, acting under the orders of Governor Stevens, arrested the chief justice in his seat and the clerk. The records of the court were at first seized, but subsequently returned to the deputy clerk. The citizens held meetings, when the conduct of the governor was denounced.

Herewith I have the honor to enclose, for the information of the War Department, a copy of Captain Burton's communication of May 19, 1856, in regard to Indian affairs in the neighborhood of San Diego, marked No. 1, and my reply of May 27, 1856, marked No. 2; also my correspondence with the Hon. S. J. Henley, superintendent of Indian affairs in California, of May 27th and June 3d, marked Nos. 3 and 4, and with Lieut. Col. B. L. Beall, commanding at Fort Tejon, marked No. 5, all of which I could hope might claim attention. It will be seen that the views expressed by Capt. Burton are but a reiteration of what has been stated in the reports from officers in all parts of the State, copies of which I have transmitted from time to time.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

JOHN E. WOOL,

Major General.

Colonel S. COOPER,

Adjutant General U. S. A., Washington City, D. C.

No. 1.

MISSION, SAN DIEGO, May 19, 1856.

SIR: I have the honor to report that Manuel Cota, late captain of the San Luis Rey Indians, visited me on the 9th instant, and stated to me that his reasons for renouncing his position as captain were—

1st. The number of sub-Indian agents who controlled him were so many that he was in doubt often whether he was doing right or wrong, and frequently he was mortified by the contradictory orders of the sub-agents.

2d. The neglect of the proper authorities to attend to the necessary wants of his people was the source of great mortification to him, and his efforts to relieve his people when they complained to him caused him pecuniary losses that he cannot sustain. That he will resume his duties as captain when *one sub-agent, and one only*, has control over him, and when he receives his appointment as captain of the San Luis Rey Indians direct from the superintendent of Indian affairs, and on no other conditions.

It is unfortunate that Manuel has retired from his position just at this time. Robberies of cattle and horses are frequent among his people, and are daily increasing in number. He is by far the most influential man among them, and can control them if he will do so.

I send you with this a copy of a letter from Judge Hayes, of Los Angelos, respecting the Indian difficulties in the Tulare valley.

The Four-Creek Indians are relations of the Carvilla Indians, near San Gorgoña, and fears are entertained that they will influence the latter in their conduct towards the whites.

Several times within the past week I have received reports of robberies of mares and cattle in the vicinity of San Juan Capistrano; and if these reports are true, some of the Carvillas doubtless are among the depredators.

I start for San Gorgoña with all of my command that I can mount (40,) immediately after the arrival of the next steamer from San Francisco; and will spare no effort to maintain quiet among all of the Indians within one hundred miles of this post, particularly among the Carvillas.

Very respectfully, your obedient servant,

H. S. BURTON,
Captain 3d Artillery.

Captain D. R. JONES,
Assistant Adjutant General, Dept. of the Pacific, Benicia.

P. S.—The steamer is expected from San Francisco to-morrow.

A true copy:

D. R. JONES,
Assistant Adjutant General.

No. 2.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Benicia, May 27, 1856.

CAPTAIN: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant, with enclosure, in regard to Indian affairs in the neighborhood of San Diego. The commanding general is very anxious that peace with the Indians be preserved, and he wishes you to exert all your powers to that end. He regrets extremely that Manuel Cota has resigned his captaincy of the San Luis Rey Indians, and desires you to use your influence to get him to withdraw his resignation and retain his position. The general will do everything in his power to sustain him and to have him remunerated. Application has been made for an additional number of troops to be sent to this department; and the general expects that, in the course of six weeks, he will be able to augment the regular forces in the southern part of the State.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. R. JONES,
Assistant Adjutant General.

Captain H. S. BURTON,
Third Artillery, Com'g Mission of San Diego, Cal.

No. 3.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Benicia, May 27, 1856.

SIR: By the direction of the general commanding the department, I have the honor to enclose herewith a copy of a letter from Captain Burton, commanding officer at the Mission of San Diego, in regard to Indian affairs in that section of the State. The general is extremely anxious to preserve peace with the Indians, and hopes you will do everything in your power to keep them quiet. He deems it very important that Manuel Cota should be induced to hold his position as captain over the San Luis Rey Indians, and trusts that every inducement will be offered to make him retain it.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. R. JONES,
A. A. General.

Hon. T. J. HENLEY,
Superintendent Indian Affairs, San Francisco, California.

No. 4.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Benicia, June 3, 1856.

SIR: I am directed by the general commanding the department to reply to your letter of the 30th ultimo, and to assure you that in sending a copy of Lieutenant Winder's letter there was no intention whatever of "inflicting any injury upon the reputation or usefulness of your department." The officers in command of the several military posts throughout the State are required to make frequent excursions among the Indians, and to report all reliable facts in regard to the state of feeling, condition, wants, &c., of the different tribes. In this way the general is possessed of much useful information concerning them; and, believing that it would not be unacceptable to you, he has from time to time caused copies of reports from citizens and officers in different parts of the State to be sent to you. By a reference to them, it would appear that the statements of Lieutenant Winder are but the reiteration of what is reported from all parts of the State, and especially from the northern part. The general desires me to reassure you that it is his hearty desire to co-operate with the Indian department in every way, and that he has done and will continue to do everything in his power to preserve peace between the whites and Indians.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. R. JONES,
A. A. General.

Colonel T. J. HENLEY,
Superintendent Indian Affairs, San Francisco, California.

No. 5.

HEADQUARTERS, DEPARTMENT OF THE PACIFIC,
Benicia, May 27, 1856.

COLONEL: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your communication of the 17th instant, in regard to the Indian troubles in the Tulare valley and vicinity. The commanding general desires me to say to you that the war has been brought on by white men, contrary to the wishes of the Indians, who are disposed to be peaceable; and he desires you to do all in your power to prevent collisions between the whites and Indians, to protect the settlers, and to maintain peace. He has applied for additional troops to be sent to the department, and hopes he will be able to send them to the seat of hostilities in about six weeks. General Beale has been sent down by the governor of the State, for the purpose of settling the Indian difficulties, and the general wishes you to lend him every assistance in your power to further the objects of his mission. The general has no doubt that, by a proper and judicious course, peace can be secured and preserved.

I am, sir, very respectfully, your obedient servant,

D. R. JONES,
A. A. General.

Lieut. Col. B. L. BEALE,

1st Dragoons, Commanding Fort Tejon, California.