MAP III
LAND PURCHASES AND IMPORTANT SETTLEMENTS
IN PENNSYLVANIA BY 1790

Sources:

![Map of Pennsylvania by 1790](image-url)
CHAPTER III

WAR AND WITHDRAWAL: 1754-1764

During the last three decades of official contact between the government and Indians of Pennsylvania the previously peaceful relationship between them became one of increasingly conflicting aims and not infrequent warfare. The first decade was filled with the Seven Years' War and Pontiac's uprising. Neither the Pennsylvanian nor the Indian understood how and why the other commenced, carried on, and concluded fighting. The result was mistrust, hate, and more fighting. Following the suppression of the Indians there were ten years of uneasy peace in which the most important official contacts between the antagonists concerned the Indian trade, and later the acquisition of more land by the colony or by private individuals.

The Indians' grievances which had led to Pontiac's War had not been removed, and contact with white men was further complicated by the growing antipathy between the colonies and the mother country. This manifested itself in Indians affairs by producing a deadlock as to authority and money for managing trade and land purchases. In the resultant chaos neither side paid much attention to Indian diplomacy or needs. Because of these problems there was warfare on the
frontier, starting before the outbreak of the Revolution and lasting after fighting had ceased on the seaboard.

At the end of this time the Indians had moved west out of Pennsylvania and had sold to it their last claims to ownership of land within its boundaries. The government of Pennsylvania conceded to Congress the sovereignty to deal with Indians outside the state, and there were no independent Indian tribes within its borders. The official relationship of one hundred seventy years misunderstanding was ended.

The Peaceful Relationship Collapses: 1754-1764

By the end of the 1740's, as the last chapter has indicated, the Quaker Peace Policy was badly strained by the frontiersmen's scorn, population pressure, forced or suspect land sales, the failure of the province to control the traders, and particularly the appearance of French competition in western Pennsylvania. However, the actual collapse of the Peace Policy, and with it Quaker government, was prompted by several immediate causes.

One of these was competition between colonies, of which the undivided French soon took advantage. Governor Dinwiddie of Virginia and many prominent men of that province were much interested in a land and trade promotion scheme called the Ohio Company. In 1750 Governor Hamilton, fearing
that the Penns might lose land and Pennsylvania traders business, sent the map-maker Lewis Evans to survey the disputed area, to "minute the Settlements that may interfere with the Proprietary Claim..." to "... procure a copy of my Lord Fairfax's dividing line with Virginia," and to "get informed of the stock and scheme of the Virginia Co., trading to the Ohio, and what Disadvantages they labour under, or advantages they now or hereafter may enjoy more than we from their Situation." The Virginians tried to undermine Pennsylvania's reputation by showing a contradiction in the Peace Policy preached and the trade practiced.

Cressap [a Virginia frontiersman] ... intended to let them [the Indians] have his Goods at a low rate--much cheaper than the Pennsylvania Traders sold them; and notwithstanding the People of Pennsylvania always told them they were Brothers and had a great Value for them, yet this only came from their Mouth and not from their Heart, for they constantly cheated them in all their Dealings, ... 2

Croghan feared that the well organized French, than whom ". . . No people Carries on ye Indians Trade in so Regular a manner. . . ." would ". . . Spare no Trouble to advance thire Trade. . . ." and "... hinder the English from


Makeng a Settlement on Ohio..." Not only would the presence of a Virginia fort bring down the French, but it would drive the Indians into their arms, "... for the Indians Doo nott Like to hear of there Lands being Settled over Allegany Mountain, & in particular by ye Virginians..." Despite these dangers the Ohio Company held a conference at Logstown in 1752 and obtained permission from the Indians to erect two forts and make some settlements.

Yet these forts were probably the reason that the Indians permitted the Virginians to settle, and were the center of another cause for the end of Quaker Peace. The Indians at Logstown in 1750 had warned Pennsylvania "... that their Brothers the English ought to have a Fort on this River to secure the trade..." and Pennsylvania had not yet indicated any intention of acting. In 1754 the Iroquois spoke even more strongly to the Commissioners of the Northern and Central colonies, bidding them "... look at the French, they are Men; they are fortifying every where. But we are ashamed to say it, You are all like Women, bare and open without any


5 Letter from Croghan to Governor Hamilton, December 16, 1750. C.R., V, 497. The emphasis is Croghan's.
Fortifications. 6

In asking for these forts the Indians were, it is true, asking for protection, as from a superior power. So were the far Miamis of the Illinois country, who reported that a party of two hundred French had threatened them in order to stop their trade with the English, but had found "... that they were resolved to adhere to the English..." the French upbraided the Indians from joining the English, and more so for continuing in their interest, who had never sent them any Presents nor even any Token of their Regards to them." To justify and assure their loyalty the Miami asked the Governor "... that the Traders of Pennsylvania may be encouraged by him to go out and deal with them." 7 However, the Indians did not feel that they were submitting to one power to escape domination by another. Rather, they were looking out for their own interests, chief among which was trade, which "the Indians frequently repeat..." was the foundation of their Alliance or Connexion with us and "... the Chief Cement which binds us


7"A Message from the Tightwees..." to the Governor of Pennsylvania." Received July 31, 1750. C.R., V, 437.
together."  

The reason for the Indian preference for English protection was that their trade goods were better and cheaper than those of the French, and recent aggressive expansion by Pennsylvania traders had introduced these goods to distant tribes who had previously known only the French. Croghan reported of some new converts that

those Ingans were always in the French Interest till now, Butt This Spring, allmost all the Ingans in the woods, have declared against ye French, & I think this will be a fair Opertunity, if pursueth by some Small Presents, to have all ye French Cut off in their parts for the Ingans are very much Led by Any Thing that will Lend to their own Interest, and think a Great Dail of a little powder & Lead att this Time, besides it will be a Mains of Drowning them, that has nott yett Joyned.  

Some Wyandots, being asked by Conrad Weiser "... what occasion'd them to come away from the French, ... they inform'd me their coming away from the French was because of the hard Usage they received from them; ... & their Goods were so dear that they, the Indians, cou'd not buy them."  


9 Letter from Croghan to Secretary Peters, May 26, 1747. P.A., Ser. 1, I, 742. See also C.R., V, 72, for Council's action.

10 The Journal of Conrad Weiser ... to the Ohio. September 8, 1748. C.R., V, 350.
Paradoxically, this great success in trade combined with the failures in other matters to defeat Pennsylvania’s interests and upset the relationship. The Indians had been forced to admit the Virginians, whom they disliked, to preserve their Ohio trade, because the Pennsylvania Quaker Assembly did nothing. It did not settle with nor dispossess the Ohio Company. It did not fortify the Ohio, and the small gift it voted the Miamis did not arrive for over a year after the latter sent a desperate message: "We now look upon ourselves as lost People, fearing that our Brothers will leave us; but before we will be subject to the French, or call them our Fathers, we will perish here."\textsuperscript{11} The exasperated Croghan wrote later, ". . . I am Shure the Conduct of ye Assembly before Ye Warr was a Great Mains of Driveing ye Several Westren Nations of Indians out of the British Interest."\textsuperscript{12}

On top of these diplomatic and military failures the economic success of the English traders could only provoke a violent reaction. "As a result, the French, with their backs against the wall, were forced to use more aggressive measures in dealing with the Indians."\textsuperscript{13} They did what the Indians and

\textsuperscript{11} "A Message to the Governor from the Tightwees." Composed July 6, 1752, received October 16, 1752. C.R., V, 600.

\textsuperscript{12} Letter from Croghan to [Secretary Peters?] December 18, 1757. P.A., Ser. 1, III, 320.

\textsuperscript{13} Jacobs, \textit{Indian Gifts}, p. 115.
Provincial interpreters had feared, and occupied the Ohio Valley. The Senecas, westernmost of the Iroquois, could only watch impotently as "... the French passed Oswego with a very numerous Army of men well armed and some great guns..." and ended the English trade in Western Pennsylvania.\(^{14}\) They drove out the few Virginians who were starting a fort at the forks of the Ohio, and built Fort Duquesne there. Then the French commander announced to the Indians that France had assumed sovereignty over them.

All the Land and Waters on this side Allegheny Hills are mine, on the other side theirs; this is agreed on between the two Crowns over the great Waters. I do not like you selling your Lands to the English, they shall draw you into no more foolish Bargains. I will take care of your lands for you, and of you. The English give you no Goods but for Land. We give you our Goods for nothing. \(^{15}\)

The Indians were not happy with the scarce and inferior French goods, but they had to trade where they could. They were sufficiently cowed by French arms not to rise against them, but they hoped that the English would return. Conrad Weiser noted their neutrality at this time:


\(^{15}\)The French Officer's answer to the Second Notice from the Indians on the Ohio, reported September 22, 1753, entered at Council Session of November 14, 1753. G.R., V, 667.
French Margret, with some of her Family, is gone to the English Camp in Virginia, and her Son Nicklaus is gone to Ohio, to the French Fort. I suppose they want to join the strongest Party, and are gone for Information. The Indians that are with the French on Ohio are chiefly Anakunkis [Abnaki, vide supra p. 30. Map I]; Neighbors to New England, and neither they, nor the Rest, (I can't learn their Number,) will be true to the French, as they give out to our Indians. The other Indians on Ohio, think our troops march too slow. They say they will be glad to see the French drove away from Ohio. 16

The unstable peace on the frontier lasted until the disastrous defeat of Braddock on July 9, 1755. This was caused, said Scaroyady, by the "... pride and ignorance of that great General that came from England. ...," and rigid adherence to European tactics. "You are very numerous," he continued, "& all the English Governors along your Sea Shore can raise men enough; Don't let those that come from over the great Seas be concerned any more; they are unfit to fight in the Woods. Let us go ourselves, we that came out of this Ground, We may be assured to conquer the French."17 Tanacharison, also called the Half King, was, with Scaroyady, one of the two official Iroquois representatives on the Ohio. He commented to Conrad Weiser concerning the tactics of the Europeans at Fort Necessity in 1754, "that the French had acted

16 Letter from Weiser to Secretary Peters, May 19, 1755, P.A., Ser. 1, II, 318-19.

as great Cowards, and the English as Fools in that engagement."

Among the Indians who helped to defeat Braddock there were ". . . not one of ye Delawares & only four Mingoes & three Shawanas, all ye Rest [were] North Indians." On the other hand, only a handful of Indians actively aided Braddock. "He looked upon us as dogs, and would never hear anything of what was said to him." Most of the Indians did not commit themselves until after the English defeat, but after that they were forced to join the French for the same economic reasons they had previously gone over to the English. "The Greater Part remained neuter till they saw How Things wou'd go . . . but after the French had ruined Braddock's Army they immediately cut them off. On wch the Indians Join'd the French for their Own Safety." Propaganda and long suppressed fears


19The Mingo were a group of Iroquois who had lived on the upper Ohio since about 1720, more or less independent of the Grand Council at Onondaga. The word, like the Dutch 'Minqua' for the Susquehanna Indians, is derived from the generic Algonquian word for 'dog,' 'stealthy,' 'treacherous.' See Mooney, Mingo, in Hodge, Handbook, I, 867.


played their part along with trade pressures to start the raids which, in the autumn of 1755, ended three-quarters of a century of peace between the white people and Indians in Pennsylvania.

All our accounts agree in this that the French, since the defeat of General Braddock, have gained over to their interest the Delawares, Shawonese, and many other Indian Nations formerly in our Alliance, and on whom, thro' fear and their large promises of Reward for Scalps and assurances of re-instatting them in the possession of the Lands they have sold to the English, they have prevailed to take up arms against us. . . . 23

At a later date the ultimately victorious English took the Indians to task for this shift of alliance, which was 'treacherous' to European eyes. This miscomprehension persisted, despite the many warnings of the Indians that their politics were and would be determined by advantages of trade. However, the 'treachery' of the Indians, the effectiveness of their raids, and their admitted brutality to victims led the Provincial government to take the step which conclusively ended the shadow of the Peace Policy which was still respected verbally. On April 8, 1756, Governor Morris proposed that a scalp bounty should be offered to induce friendly Indians to

hunted the marauders,²⁴ and on April 14, despite an earnest appeal made two days previously by the Quakers,²⁵ he issued "A Proclamation of War against the Delaware Indians." This publicly advertised the reward of one hundred thirty Spanish Dollars for every adult male scalp, fifty for every adult female scalp, of these "Enemies, Rebels, and traitors to His Most Sacred Majesty."²⁶ This wording evaded the issue of what the relationship was, now that peace had passed. An enemy is independent; a rebel starts as a dependent but proclaims his independence and then fights for it; a traitor behaves as though he were dependent until his traitorous act speaks for itself. The government of Pennsylvania apparently thought that the Indians were all three.

Now that The Peace was officially dead, two movements worked among the white people to restore it as the basis of relationship. The Quakers and their adherents wanted to restore it by independent volition; that is, they wanted the combatants to halt on equal terms. The Imperial Government, the governor and most of his council, and all the back-country population had little faith that peace could be restored by peaceful means. They wanted to use military force

²⁴_G.R., VII, 74.
²⁵_April 12, 1756. G.R., VII, 84-86.
to drive the French out, subjugate the Indians, and dictate peace terms to them. Neither solution alone would have been very satisfactory, but together they were impossible. They produced a peace that was only an uneasy truce, and soon was not even that.

While the British Government and the more aggressive elements in the province were marshaling their forces for an overwhelming military campaign under General Forbes, the pacifiers and persuaders sought to win back the alliance of the Delawares, Shawnee, and Mingo at a series of conferences. The leaders in this attempt to reinstitute the Peace Policy were the Quakers, who hoped to vindicate themselves, damage the proprietary government, and perhaps even return to power. Thus the white men at these treaty conferences from 1754 to 1758 were split into at least two factions by provincial politics. Their authority was further divided by the sudden interest which the Imperial Government had taken towards Indian affairs. The need for centralized administration of Indian relations in North America, especially to meet French competition, had been urged for some time, but it took the pressure of war to produce positive action.

On August 9, 1754, the Board of Trade, in a "Plan of General Concert" for defense, recommended that "the sole direction of Indian affairs be placed in the hands of some one single person, Commander-in-chief . . . If all Your Majesties'
Forts and Garrisons in North America and of all forces raised therein or sent thither, and likewise Commissary General for Indian Affairs." This policy was implemented by a Royal Commission sent to Sir William Johnson, who lived on the Mohawk in New York, on February 16, 1756, appointing him "Colonel of our Faithful Subjects, and Allies, the Six united Nations of Indians and their Confederates, in the Northern Parts of North America," and "Sole Agent and Superintendent of the said Indians and their Affairs ..." The effect of this centralization was felt in Pennsylvania in the directive of September 22, 1756 from Lord Loudon, the British Commander for North America in 1756 and 1757, to Governor Denny of Pennsylvania. Loudon told Denny that:

His Majesty having entirely taken out of the hands of the Governments and Governors all right to Treat with, Confer, or make War or Peace, with the Five Nations or any of their Allies or Dependents; and having reposed this Trust wholly and solely in the Hands of Sir William Johnson, his sole agent for these affairs under my direction; I do hereby, for the future, forbid you or your Government from Confering or Treating with these Indians in any shape, or on any account whatsoever, and I do direct, that whatever Business in that branch of his Majesty's Service shall arise to your Government or Province, You do refer it and put it into the Hands of his Majesty's sole Agent, who will according to the Power with which he is invested, Negotiate and Settle matters in the way his Majesty has directed. I do not at all enter into the merits of this affair, because these have been considered by

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his Majesty, and what I now direct his [sic] by his Majesty's order thereupon. 29

The Government of Pennsylvania was disturbed to receive this order, "of the most extraordinary nature that was ever wrote to a Governor" as Secretary Peters wrote to Thomas Penn on October 2, 1756, the day after it arrived. "I . . . shall only observe to you," he continued, "that if Indian Affairs are taken out of the Hands of the Government so as neither to suffer the Governor to confer nor Treat with Indians, all our friendly Indians will turn against us, and we shall have the most lamentable Winter." 30

Governor Denny had only arrived in August of 1756, and so was not acquainted with the details of the attempt already under way to come to terms with the Delawares. When the eastern Delawares under Teedyuscung indicated that they were willing to make peace, Governor Denny "declared his unwillingness to treat at all in violation of such a direct injunction from his Majesty," but his Council felt that "the Royal Charter gave the Proprietaries and [sic] hereditary and full right, power, and authority of treating with the Indians," and that "it would be vastly injurious to his Majesty's

29 C.R., VII, 270.

30 Secretary Peters to Proprietaries, Gray Collection, p. 93. In Historical Society of Pennsylvania, quoted in Wallace, Weiser, 457.
Interest to refuse now to treat with them, . . . as agreed upon in the former treaty."^^31

The Assembly, when asked its advice, was not so much concerned with the rights of the proprietary government, because it approved the centralization of Indian relations, and did not desire a separate peace, "however burthensome the present War with the Indians may be with this Province." However, it felt that

the Treaty begun by the late Governor (before Sir William Johnson's powers were made known) in pursuance of which the Indians are now come down, should not be wholly discontinued on our part, lest the Opportunity of bringing them to a general Peace with all the British Colonies be lost. We rather think it advisable [to] . . . make a firm Peace with them, but at the same time to let them know that the Government of this Province cannot agree to make Peace with them for itself, and leave them at Liberty to continue the War with our Brethren of the Neighboring Colonies; That we are all Subjects of one great King, and must for the future be all at Peace or all at War with other nations at the same time; 32

So the provincial government, torn by conflicting parties, and caught between its desire for peace and Quaker pressure to treat for it on one hand and the Crown's assumption of authority on the other, carried on half-hearted negotiations with the Indians.

31 Council Minutes for October 29, 1756. G.R., VII, 305-06.

32 Message to the Governor from the Assembly, October 29, 1756. G.R., VII, 307-08.
There was nothing reluctant, however, about the way the Quakers carried on their own negotiations, outbidding the government with lavish gifts and winning Indian favor from under the noses of the proprietary party at official Treaty Conferences. This does not mean that the Quakers understood the Indians' situation better than such men as Conrad Weiser, who served the provincial government, for they did not.  

But they were no longer in power themselves and so were not subject to the many pressures and responsibilities which a government must compromise as best it can. They were able to take a simple consistent position and keep it: to offer the Indians peace with integrity, and justice in old land frauds.

The confusion among the white men was shown by their ambiguous attitude toward the Indians. "The Indians learned our Weakness," wrote Weiser, "by being Informed of our Divisions." Indeed, the Indians did learn that the relationship was much muddled by the changes taking place among the whites. One worried Mohawk asked Conrad Weiser, "Is it true that you are become a fallen Tree? That you must no more engage in Indian affairs, neither as a Counsellor nor Interpreter?" to which Weiser was forced to reply

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33 Wallace, Weiser, pp. 484, 485-87, 535.

34 Letter from Weiser to Governor Denny, October 27, 1757. P.A., Ser. 1, III, 314.
that the King of Great Britain had appointed Warruycyockon [Johnson] to be manager of all Indian Affairs, that concern Treaties of Friendship, War, &c. and that accordingly the Great General that came over the Great Waters had, in the Name of the King, ordered the Government of Pennsylvania to desist from holding Treaties with the Indians, and that the Government of Pennsylvania will obey the King's Command; and consequently I, as the Government's Servant, have Nothing more to do with Indian Affairs.

The Indians laughed mirthlessly at this, "as much as if they had said, Oh said!" Later the Delawares, speaking to Frederick Post, who was sent by the Provincial government to sound their feelings on peace, officially recognized the difference in governments with which they now had to deal. They asked "the Governor and people of Pennsylvania" to make known to all the English this peace and friendship," and to "let the king of England know what our mind is as soon as possibly you can." 

The political situation was also in flux among the Indians, which further confused the relationship. The eastern Delawares under Teedyuscung asserted that they were no longer dependent upon the Six Nations and in this they were encouraged by Sir William Johnson, who wrote in July 1756 that he had "concluded this Treaty by taking off the Petticoat, or that

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35 Memorandum of Conrad Weiser, April 28, 1757. C.R., VII, 491.

invidious name of Women from the Delaware Nation,"\textsuperscript{37} and also by the "People Called Quakers."\textsuperscript{38} Teedyuscung might claim that by "the Six Nations . . . formerly we were Accounted Women, . . . but now they have made men of us . . . "\textsuperscript{39} but the Iroquois thought different.

Cousins the Delaware Indians
You will remember that you are our women, our Forefathers made you so, and put a Petty Coat on you, and charged you to be true to us and lye with no other man. But of late you have suffer'd the String yt ty'd your Pettycoat to be cut loose by the French and you lay with them and so became a common Bawd, in which you did very wrong and deserved Chastisement . . . We advise you not to act as a Man yet but be first instructed by us and do as we bid you . . . 40.

The government tried to steer a middle course in these disputes. In 1756, at Easton, Teedyuscung burst into a room where the Council was deciding on a belt to have made for him and demanded to know

What is the Reason the Governor holds Council so Close in his hands, & by Candle light; the Five

\textsuperscript{37}\textsuperscript{F.A.}, Ser. 2, VI, 453.
\textsuperscript{38}Minutes of Easton Conference, "Fryday," July 30, 1756. \textsuperscript{C.R.}, VII, 214.
\textsuperscript{39}Minutes of Easton Conference, July 29, 1756. \textsuperscript{C.R.}, VII, 213.